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DUE PROCESS OF SENTENCING
STEPHEN J.

SCHULHOFER t

The aspiration for consistency in criminal sentencing decisions
is nearly universal. But the complexities of criminal justice administration are likely to defeat most current efforts to see this aspiration fulfilled. This Article explores the principal difficulties and
develops a proposal that can bring the goal within reach. My purpose is to suggest the range of procedures necessary to ensure the
effectiveness of a concrete reform proposal and then to consider
whether a sentencing system so elaborated would indeed serve the
values that ordinarily make consistency and formal procedural fairness worthy of pursuit.
Because my objectives require close attention to the details of
law and behavior that stand between reformist goals and their
attainment in the sentencing context, I must limit myself to only a
brief account of the background of the sentencing reform movement. Several factors, by now familiar to a wide public, have
generated a broad consensus in support of one immediate goal-the
restriction of judicial sentencing discretion. These factors include
disillusionment with rehabilitation, the goal that provides a major
1
justification for discretion and individualization in sentencing, and
f Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania.
A.B. 1964, Princeton University; LL.B. 1967, Harvard University.
This article grows out of research originally undertaken for the Federal Judicial
Center and builds on findings developed in detail in the report of that initial study,
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1 The disillusionment rests in part on the apparent absence of empirical evidence
confirming the success of rehabilitative techniques. See D. LIPTON, R. MARTNsoN,
& J. Winrs, THE EFmEEcrcvENEss OF COnnEcTIONAL TsrtATmENT: A SuRvEY oF

(1975). But see Palmer, Martinson Revisited, 12
& DEL QuENcy 133 (1975) (suggesting that the empirical
evidence is not entirely clear-cut).
Perhaps equally important are objections to the moral legitimacy of behavior
modification even if, or particularly if, it works. See, e.g., AMERCAN FmENDs
SEavIcE CoMMrrEE, STmUcGLE FOR JusTicE 34-47 (1971); J. MrroaD, KM ND
UsuAL PuNIsHmENT (1973); Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S. 226 (1959).
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awareness of extreme disparities in the treatment of like cases. 2 The
inconsistencies and uncertainties associated with broad, unstructured
discretion are, of course, unfair in themselves; they are also thought
to undermine the deterrent effectiveness of the criminal law and to
promote resentment among prisoners, thereby increasing their sense
of alienation and mistrust.3 The sentencing process has come to
seem so haphazard that it generates cynicism among the public and
lack of confidence in the regularity, reliability, and effectiveness of
the legal system generally.
Scholars, legislators, and reformers share common ground in
their belief that judicial discretion should not be entirely eliminated, but that it should operate within much narrower bounds,
should be informed by meaningful standards, and should be subject
to appellate review. 4 Efforts to realize this largely unexceptionable
goal will run into difficulty, however, when they confront the complex institutions and practices that comprise the criminal justice
"system." Control of judicial discretion could cause many more
problems than it solves, unless prosecutorial discretion and plea
bargaining are also brought under control. But this is more easily
said than done. I shall focus here on the practical and theoretical
consequences of this unpleasant reality.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the differing approaches to sentencing reform suggested or adopted in jurisdictions
across the country. Part II analyzes the actual allocation of sentencing authority in a single jurisdiction-the federal , -and traces
the problems of institutional dynamics that could defeat the goals
of federal sentencing reform unless effective control of prosecutorial
discretion can be achieved. Part III considers in detail one process
that might serve to impose order upon the prosecutor's de facto
sentencing power. This process, which I call "real offense" sentencing, has received little scholarly attention, but it appears to be a
strong favorite among judges and other criminal justice professionals
and is already being used on a widespread, low visibility basis. I
2

See, e.g., A. PARTRrGE & W. ELDRIDGE, Tim SECOND Cmcurr SENTENCING
STUDY: A REPORT TO Tm JUDGES OF THE SECOND Cmcurr (1974); PREsmENT's
ComMIssION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, TASK

FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 23-24 (1967).
3 See M. FRANKEL, CRmnNAL SENTENCES 39-49 (1972).
4
See, e.g., M. FnAN EL, supra note 3; TWENTIETH CENTURY FuND TASK FORCE
(1976); A. vON H1msCH
ON C MNAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNIssmn,1E
DOING JUSTICE (1976); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and SenThese objectives correspond to
tencing Processes, 75 -ARv.L. REv. 904 (1962).
what Professor Davis describes as the confining, structuning, and checking of discretion. K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 52-55, 97-99, 142-43 (1969).
5 On the reasons for this choice, see note 43 infra.
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conclude that this approach would seldom prove effective in a system of structured discretion and, far from furthering due process
values, would compound the unfairness it is intended to remedy.
Part IV describes the specifics of an alternative approach, involving
formal judicial control of prosecutorial charge-reduction decisions
within a framework of guidelines that I develop in detail.
The first and, for reformers, the most important question is
whether the proposed approach will indeed control prosecutorial
sentencing power. Although a number of factors preclude complete
assurance on this score, I believe that my proposal would, within
realistic limits, prove effective and would comport with traditional
conceptions of equality and fairness. Despite my confidence in these
conclusions, I expect that some professionals active in sentencing
and corrections will dismiss the entire proposal as artificial or unfeasible. I am unwilling to regard this resistance as reflecting only
a vested interest in the status quo. Part V therefore develops some
of the reasons why an elaborate "due process" model, such as that
proposed, might ultimately disserve the very values we associate with
the rule of law. The desirability of visibility, accountability, and
formal procedural fairness cannot simply be taken for granted in
sentencing, or in many other domains in which conventional conceptions of due process are pressed.
I. THE "DETERMINATE SENTENCING" MOVEMENT

"Determinate sentencing" has become a popular goal throughout the nation, but the term has no generally accepted meaning and
the effect of some determinate sentencing statutes is almost diametrically opposed to that of others. The first step in understanding these proposed reforms is to be clear about the starting point,
the complex "indeterminate" sentencing process which prevailed
throughout the United States until three or four years ago and still
exists in most states and in the federal system. Typically, sentencing power is shared by prosecutors, judges, and a parole board or
similar administrative agency.6

The range of potential sentences is

limited initially by the prosecutor's charging decision and by the
scope of penalties authorized by statute. If the defendant is convicted after trial, the selection of sentence within this range-ordinarily a very wide one-is made by the trial judge, whose decision is
not governed by any formal criteria and need not be explained, in
OSee Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of
Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. Rxv.
550 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Alsehuler, Sentencing Reform].
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writing or otherwise. Generally, neither the defense nor the prosecution may appeal this sentencing decision.7 In the case of sentences to imprisonment, defendants ordinarily are eligible for early
release after service of some predetermined minimum period, which
usually represents a small portion of the total sentence. In the
federal system, for example, the defendant becomes eligible for early
release after serving any minimum sentence imposed by the judge
or, at the latest, after serving one-third of the maximum sentence
imposed." The decision whether to grant early release to eligible
offenders is made by the parole agency, often without a formal hearing and usually without the benefit of any concrete standards to
guide its decision. 9
This "normal" procedure for determining sentence applies, of
course, only in a small minority of cases because, in most jurisdictions, seventy to ninety percent of all convictions are obtained
by plea of guilty rather than by trial.10 In guilty plea cases, the
prosecutor's role generally becomes more important: a plea agreement with the defense may specify the sentence that the judge must
impose," or the prosecutor may dismiss related charges, make a
sentence "recommendation" (almost always accepted by the judge),
or take other action directly or indirectly affecting the ultimate
12
punishment.
This sentencing process is "indeterminate" in several respects.
Crucial decisions are made by prosecutors, judges, and parole
officials. In each instance the decisionmaker's power is broad and
7 In the federal courts, there are a variety of narrow exceptions to the general
rule of nonreviewability: (1) sentences constituting cruel and unusual punishment,

see, e.g., Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1975); Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973); (2) sentences imposed "mechanically," without consideration of the defendant's character or the circumstances of the offense, see, e.g.,
Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143-44 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v.

McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1972); (3) sentences based on constitutionally
defective information, see, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 344 U.S. 736 (1948) (false
assumption regarding defendant's criminal record).

See Coffee, The Future of

Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73
MICH. L. REv. 1361, 1435-40 (1975).
8 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976).
9 See generally A. VON HImscH & K. HmNHmAHA, Tim QuEsTION OF PAmoLE 1-3
(1979).

10 See

GEORGETOWN UNnVERsrIT LAw CENTER INsrrruTE OF CRum:NAL LAw
This
PLEA BARGAINmG IN THE UNrED STATES 16-24 (1977).
study stresses, however, that variations in guilty plea rates, both among states and
AND

PROCEDUBE,

among jurisdictions within states, are much wider than previously believed. For
example, the mean guilty plea rate for jurisdictions with a population over 500,000
was found to be 92.7% in New York state, but only 65.6% in Pennsylvania. Id. 21.
11 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
12 For elaboration and qualification of these generalizations, see text accompanying notes 47-55 infra.
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unstructured, and although the effect of a sentencing decision by
one kind of official may be tempered by the decisions of others, the
decision itself is not subject to any form of appeal.13 Finally, the
sentence is not only indeterminate in terms of legal standards and
controls but also indeterminate in time. Even after sentence is
pronounced by the judge, the actual date of release in the case of
imprisonment depends upon parole board action, and the critical
decision may be years away. Indeed, after release the parolee remains subject to reimprisonment under the original sentence if he
or she violates the conditions of release.
Many reform proposals focus upon this delay in determining
the actual sentence, with its result of prolonged and cruel suspense for the prisoners affected. These proposals accordingly contemplate either abolition of parole or a requirement that the parole
release date be fixed very early in the prisoner's term; the sentence
established at the outset will then represent "flat time," the term of
imprisonment that will actually be served. 14 The most extreme
version of this type of "determinate" sentencing is that enacted in
1975 in Maine, under which parole is abolished and trial judges
select flat-time sentences from within broad statutory ranges at the
time of conviction. 15 This system provides certainty for the offender
entering prison, but of course does nothing to make the critical
decisions more uniform or predictable and, in fact, aggravates the
problems of broad judicial discretion by removing the countervailing power of the parole board.
More commonly, reform proposals treat broad judicial discretion as the principal evil. One line of attack, recommended by the
American Bar Association ' and long accepted in a few states,' 7 is
appellate review of trial court sentencing. As long as legislatively
authorized sentence ranges remain broad and the objectives of
punishment remain diverse and in part inconsistent, however, appellate review by itself can accomplish very little.'8
13 But see note 7 supra.
14 E.g.,

D.

FOGEL, ". . . WE ARE

=

LT=ivc PROOF .":

TimE JuSTICE MODEL

supra note 9,
at 27-38.
'5 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, §§ 1151-1254 (1979).
16 ABA PROJECT ON UMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SAmDRoDs
RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIW OF SENTENCES (1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA
FOR CoRnRcTiONS

245-60 (1975); A. VoN HImscH & K.

HANRAHAN,

PROJECT ON APPELLATE R]EVIEW.

17 See Comment, Appellate Review of Sentences: A Survey, 17 ST. Louis U.

LJ. 221, 221 & n.4 (1972).
1s See Zeisel & Diamond, Search for Sentencing Equity: Sentence Review in
Massachusetts and Connecticut, 1977 A.B. FouNDATION RESEARCH J. 881; Note,
Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69
YALE L.J. 1453, 1464-66 (1960).
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A more concrete and important approach has been to reduce
sharply the range of punishments authorized by statute. Legislation
recently enacted in California specifies within very narrow limits
the sentence to be imposed for each offense. 19 This approach appears promising on its face, particularly when combined, as it
typically has been, with attention to the problems of parole board
discretion and timing of the release decision.20 But the variety and
complexity of criminal conduct render specification of precise statutory penalties a prodigious task and render the resulting statutes
exceedingly cumbersome. Legislative attention to the judgments
reflected in each statutory rule for computation of sentence is virtually impossible, and some circumstances relevant to sentencing are
bound to be overlooked. As a solution to these difficulties, the
legislation commonly authorizes some residuum of judicial discretion, 21 but the disease of excessive detail typically remains, while
the attempted cure creates a loophole that could conceivably defeat
22
the entire enterprise.
Legislative specification of punishment poses another problem
that most reformers consider even more serious-the enactment of
increasingly severe penalties. Accustomed to the long prison terms
often pronounced upon conviction, the public and its representatives
are generally unaware that actual time served has been very much
shorter. In addition, intense concern with crime control, combined with little interest in or appreciation of the difficulties and
costs of prison management, induces most legislators unhesitatingly
to prefer long prison terms to shorter ones. 23 In several of the states
that have chosen to rely upon legislatively prescribed sentences,
CAL. PE ALx CODE §§ 1170, 3000, 3040 (West Supp. 1979).
20 See A. voN HmSCH & K. HANHAN, supranote 9, at 83-86.
19

21See, e.g.,

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 1170(a) (2) (West Supp. 1979) (authorizing

court, in its discretion, to impose fine, probation, or county jail term in lieu of

mandated state prison terms).
22
The sentencing reform legislation recently enacted in Indiana provides a
striking example of this danger. The new statute specifies a single "presumptive
sentence" for each of five grades of felonies, but authorizes substantial adjustments
to the presumptive sentence when the trial judge finds an aggravating or mitigating

circumstance. The vagueness of many of these circumstances provides the judge
with discretion to choose a sentence of, for example, two-to-eight years' imprisonment for a Class C felony or six-to-twenty years' imprisonment for a Class B felony.
INn. CoDE ANN. §§ 35-50-1-1 to 35-50-6-6 (Burns Supp. 1979); see Lagoy, Hussey,

& Kramer, A Comparative Assessment of Determinate Sentencing in Four Pioneer
States, 24 C
.mm
&DELINQuENCY 385, 391-94 (1978).
23 See Foote, Deceptive Determinative Sentencing, in NATIONAL INsnriu
OF
LAw ENFORCEMENT & CRnmNAL JUSTICE, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFoRM oR
REGREssioN?
DETERMINATE SE
NaNG];

133-40 (1978)

[hereinafter cited as

Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime,
at 13, 16-17.

HAsmNGs

CETm Ra'., Dec., 1976,
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preliminary reports suggest that penalties imposed will be quite
24
high relative to those of previous practice.
The case for short sentences rests, of course, upon much more
controversial values than does the case for consistent sentences. I
want to consider later the implications, in terms of democratic
theory, of reform efforts to frustrate or deflect the potential legislative preference for more severe prison sentences.25 For purposes
of this introduction, it is enough to note several givens in the
current institutional environment. First, legislatively prescribed
penalties are often considered "too high" not just by civil libertarians, but also by corrections officials, parole boards, prosecutors,
and even police. 28 Second, any proponent of greater consistency in
sentencing must recognize that pursuit of this goal through legislatively prescribed sentences may mean sentences much longer than
those currently imposed, aggravation of the already severe overcrowding in prisons,2 7 and increased likelihood of nullificationnever a very orderly or consistent phenomenon-by police, prosecutors, juries, trial and appellate judges, prison administrators,
parole boards (if any), and those charged with dispensing executive
clemency. These factors, together with the difficulties of achieving
adequate specificity without excessive detail, render troublesome
and potentially self-defeating any approach relying, as does the California statute, upon narrow, legislatively prescribed penalty ranges.
An alternative approach, which could alleviate these difficulties,
is to preserve relatively broad statutory ranges of punishment and
to entrust the development of narrower penalty ranges and more
precise categories of offenses to a "sentencing commission," an administrative agency exercising power delegated by the legislature.
A sentencing commission would have the time and resources to deal
24 See A. voN HmscH & K. HANRAHAN, supra note 9, at 86; Clear, Hewitt, &
Regoli, Discretion and the Determinate Sentence: Its Distribution, Control and

Effect on Time Served, 24 CRimE & DELINQuENcy 428, 44043 (1978); Messinger

and Johnson, California's Determinate Sentencing Statute: History and Issues, in
DETERMIATE SENTENCiNG, supra note 23, at 30-31.

25 See text accompanying notes 267-73, 278-307 infra.

26 1 know of no polls that establish this proposition with rigor, but the observation is made over and over in decisions by these officials. For information on studies
of prosecutors, see, e.g., ABA POjECT ON MmmxuM STANDARDS FOR CRzcAL
JUsTIcE, STAND~ms RELATING TO PLEAS OF GuxLTY § 1.8(a) (iii), Commentary at
45-47 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT ON GUrTY PLEAS]. Regarding
judges, see, e.g., D. NEwMAN, CONvicTIoN: THE DETEmINATON OF OtrmT on
INNOCENCE WriHouT TkAr. 112-30, 177-80 (1966). With regard to decisions by
the police, see, e.g., W. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT LNTO
CUSTODY 13743 (1965). See also Singer, In Favor of "Presumptive Sentences" Set
by a Sentencing Commission, 24 Cnmnm & DELINQUF-zCY 401, 412-13 (1978).
2
7 Petersilia & Greenwood, Mandatory Prison Sentences: Their Projected Effects

on Crime and Prison Populations,69 J. Cnm. L.C. & P.S. 604, 612-14 (1978).
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with the complex array of sentencing problems and, though ultimately accountable to the legislature, 28 would be insulated to a
degree from the most immediate political pressures. To be sure,
reliance upon rulemaking by an administrative agency will pose
serious dilemmas of its own; 29 but this device, for all its imperfections, almost certainly provides a more promising framework for
progress than either the legislative process or the present system of
broad, totally unstructured delegations of authority.3 0
The relatively sophisticated notion of reliance upon administrative rulemaking was first proposed by Judge Marvin Frankel in
his incisive study of criminal sentencing, a work which provided
much of the impetus for the current sentencing reform movement.3 1
The sentencing commission approach has now been adopted in
Illinois, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania, 32 and it has been included
in several bills introduced in Congress, including S. 1437, the pro3
posed federal criminal code passed by the Senate in 1978. 3
Although reform proposals usually do not require that a commission issue its sentencing rules in any particular form, the guideline structure adopted several years ago by the United States Parole
Commission-a matrix displaying categories of offense seriousness
down the vertical axis and categories of offender characteristics
across the horizontal

34

-provides a useful illustration of the kind of

guidelines and categories expected to emerge as a result of delegation to a specialized agency.3 5 These reform proposals differ in
28
In some formulations, the legislature is given a limited period of time in
which to reject the commission's guidelines; if no action is taken during that period,
the guidelines become effective at its expiration. E.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1385(b), (c) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). When a commission is authorized to
promulgate immediately effective guidelines, the legislature of course retains the
power to modify them by subsequent statute.

29

See generally J. FREEMAN, Cnrsis AND LEGrrniAcy: THE ADtmSTRAvE
PocEss AND AMIucAN GOVERNMENT (1978); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HAy.L. Rzv. 1667, 1671-88 (1975).
30 See K. DAvis, supra note 4, at 65-68.
31 M. FPANK,
32

rL.

ANN.

supra note 3, at 119-24.
STAT.

ch. 38, H9 1005-8 to 1005-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979);
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1381-1386 (Purdon Supp.

1978 Minn. Laws ch. 723; 18
1979-1980).

33 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (passed Jan. 30, 1978).
For other proposals for
promulgation of federal sentencing guidelines, see, e.g., S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979); H.R. 6233, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 13959, 95th Cong.,

2d Sess. (1978).
34 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979).
35

The idea of a formal matrix of sentencing categories evokes hostility from

many who see such "pigeon-holing" of behavior and individuals as immoral or
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other particulars, including the composition of the commission and
locus of power to appoint its members, the criteria the commission
is directed to apply, the force of its standards, the availability of
appeal from judicial sentencing decisions, and the preservation or
abolition of early release on parole. Yet all of the recent sentencing
commission proposals have in common the failure to address the
problem of prosecutorial discretion. 6 The reform proposals calling
for legislatively prescribed penalties make the same omission. As
a result, despite important differences among the many approaches
to sentencing reform, all leave untouched a major area of sweeping,
unstructured sentencing power.
This universal failure to deal with prosecutorial sentencing
power cannot be ascribed to unawareness of its significance.
Scholars and reformers who have proposed restrictions upon judicial
and parole board discretion commonly concede the critical role of
prosecutorial discretion but confess that they are simply not in a
position to offer concrete proposals for bringing that discretion
under control.37 The very importance of prosecutorial discretion,
together with the difficulty of subjecting it to effective constraints, 38
has prompted all proponents of sentencing reform to postpone attention to the problem until the relatively tractable issues of judicial
and parole board discretion have been resolved. 39 The next part of
this Article will examine the likely consequences of this cautious
strategy of taking one step at a time, restricting the discretion of
judges and parole officials without simultaneously restricting the
discretion of prosecutors.
dehumanizing. Even if the idea of categorization (or at least presumptive categorization) is not rejected in principle, highly sensitive moral issues are implicated
in the complex methodological decisions that must be made to construct the categories and to carry out the empirical research that supports them. For thorough
exploration of these problems, see Coffee, Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66
GEo. L.J. 975 (1978); Project, Parole Release Decision-making and the Sentencing
Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810 (1975). Although I need not, for present purposes, detail
the substance of these problems, a task ably executed by the authorities just cited,
a central premise of my analysis is that problems of this kind are better faced and
resolved, whatever the resolution, rather than relegated, as at present, to unprincipled, inconsistent decisionmaking in a system of low visibility, discretionary power.
See text accompanying notes 259-307 infra.
36 Recent amendments to the pending federal legislation take the first steps
toward redressing this oversight. See note 183 infra.
ar E.g., Twmrr=mT CENTuny FuND TAsE FORCE ON GhIuNAL SENTENCING,
supra note 4, at 26-27; A. voN HmscH & K. HANBAHAN, supra note 9, at 22-23;
A. VON HmscI, supra note 4, at 106.
3
sSee text accompanying notes 89-95 infra
39 See authorities cited in note 37 supra.
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THE EFFECT OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES ON THE DISTRIBUTION
OF SENTENCING AUTHORITY

Critics of recent reform proposals often charge that the failure
of these proposals to address prosecutorial discretion is a fundamental weakness. 40 Two independent themes in this sort of criticism must be distinguished. First is the charge that because
prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining are so important, with
guilty pleas accounting for up to ninety percent of all convictions,
the effort to address judicial discretion represents a difficult and
ultimately trivial exercise. The second theme, implicitly contradicting the first, is that judicial sentencing power currently does play a
significant role and that restraining judicial discretion will permit
prosecutorial discretion to assume a dominance that it does not
have today.
The first charge, that judicial sentencing power represents a
trivial portion of the sentencing problem, seems quite misguided.
The empirical premise of this criticism is, first of all, far from solid.
Guilty pleas do, to be sure, account for the bulk of all convictions.
But, as I will show presently, 41 we have no clear understanding of
the extent to which judges actually control or influence sentences
in guilty plea cases. More important, even if this charge rests on
an accurate view of the facts, it is ill-founded as a matter of principle. However small the proportion of fully contested cases, these
are the ones in which expectations of fair process are at their peak.
As a highly visible embodiment of an aspiration, even a seldom
realized one, trial procedure assumes a symbolic importance far out
of proportion to the frequency of its use.
The subtler and more important line of criticism does not
claim that the judicial role is trivial, but instead stresses its significance and focuses on the interaction between the judiciary and
others who exercise discretion in the system. A plan to narrow the
discretion of judges and parole boards could reduce the possibility
for abuse and arbitrary decisions by these officials, but it would also
40

E.g., Alschuler, Sentencing Reform, supra note 6, at 566; Coffee, supra note

36, at 979-80 & n.15; Zimring, supra note 23, at 16; Legislation to Revise and
Recodify Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on H.R. 6869 Before the Subcomm. on

Criminal justice of the House Comm. on the

Yudiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess.

2462-73 (statement of William Anderson, U.S. General Accounting Office); 1933

(Judge James Burns, D. Ore.); 2245, 2262 (John Cleary, Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender
Ass'n); 595-96 (Thomas Emerson, Professor of Law, Yale Law School); 2331-42
(Matthew Heartney, Yale Law School); 2356-57 (G. La Marr Howard, Nat'l Ass'n
of Blacks in Criminal Justice); 2474 (Judge Morris E. Lasker, S.D.N.Y.); 2224
(Cecil C. McCall, Chairman, U.S. Parole Comm'n) (1978) [hereinafter cited as
House Judiciary Hearings].
41 See text accompanying notes 47-67 infra.
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limit their ability to counteract abuses of prosecutorial power in
plea negotiation. A reformed sentencing system, controlling two of
the important sources of discretion, might therefore generate even
greater sentencing disparities than those resulting from the present
system of three uncontrolled, but to some extent offsetting, sources
42
of discretion.
Although some critics of sentencing reform assume that this
possibility would materialize, it is in fact rather difficult to assess
whether a reform that does not control prosecutorial discretion
would, on balance, increase or reduce sentencing disparities. One
must ascertain, for example, the extent to which judicial and parole
commission discretion do temper prosecutorial discretion in guilty
plea sentencing today and also what portion of this tempering role
would remain operative under an entirely different framework.
And the analysis of present conditions must, because of the limits
of current knowledge, be nearly as speculative as the analysis of
future conditions.
In the next few pages I will attempt to lay bare some of the
details of institutional practice upon which answers to such quesdons depend. In order to make the analysis sufficiently concrete, I
will emphasize the specifics of law and behavior in a single jurisdiction. The next section therefore focuses upon the distribution
of sentencing authority in federal prosecutions, and the remainder
of the Article considers issues raised by the nature of the discretion
of federal prosecutors. 43 Although I believe that my principal conclusions and the core of my proposal may be applied to most American jurisdictions, transposing the analysis into these contexts will
require caution, together with some obvious qualifications to be
described in the dosing pages of this Article. But my argument
will be best understood if I adhere to specifics, and the discussion
thus remains rooted in the particularities of the federal system.
A. The Current Distribution of Federal Sentencing Authority
In the existing federal system, sentencing authority is shared
by prosecutors, judges, and the United States Parole Commission,
If the defendant is conin the typical pattern described earlier.
42 See, e.g., Alsehuler, Sentencing Reform, supra note 6, at 563-64; Zimring,
supra note 23, at 16.
43 I choose the federal system not because it is typical (it is not, see text accompanying notes 334-35 infra), but rather because it is in some ways more orderly than
most state systems, and thus presents a somewhat less forbidding environment in
which to begin exploration of a difficult problem of social control.
44 See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
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victed after trial, the selection of sentence, within broad statutory
ranges, is made by the trial judge. In the case of sentences to imprisonment, the defendant will be eligible for early release after
service of any minimum sentence set by the judge or, at the latest,
after service of one-third of the maximum sentence imposed.45 The
decision whether to grant early release to eligible offenders is made
by the Parole Commission according to formally promulgated guide46
lines.
Contested cases, of course, represent only a small part of the
total: roughly eighty to ninety percent of all federal convictions are
47
obtained by plea of guilty (or nolo contendere) rather than by trial.
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, there are four distinct routes to the imposition of sentence after a plea of guilty:
(1) the defendant may plead guilty to all of the original
charges, with hopes for leniency but no official assurances;
(2) the defendant may plead guilty to only some of the
initial charges, in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement
to dismiss the remainder of the charges; 48
(3) the defendant may plead guilty (either to all or some
of the charges) in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement
to make a nonbinding recommendation on sentence; 49
(4) the defendant may plead guilty pursuant to an agreement specifying the sentence that must be imposed if the
guilty plea is accepted. 0
In the first instance the mix of sentencing authority among prosecutorial, judicial, and parole officials is identical to that in contested cases. Generalization is hazardous in the other three situations; solid empirical evidence concerning the distribution of
sentencing power is virtually nonexistent. 51
45 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976).
In the case of a life sentence or a sentence
exceeding 30 years, the defendant will be eligible for parole after serving 10 years.

Id.

C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979).
47For fiscal 1974, the figure was 85% (30,679 of 36,252 convictions).
4628

ADMmn-

isTRAvE OFmCE oF THE UNrrED STATES CouRTS, FEDERAL Oi=NrDjuS nq UNITED

STATES DiSTMCT CoURTs 1974, at 16 (1977).
48 FED).

R. Curm. P. Il(e)(1)(A).

-19Id. 11l(e) (1) (B).

50Id. 11(e)(1) (C).
51 See generally Note, Restructuringthe Plea Bargain, 82 YA.nL L.J. 286, 291-95
(1972). The Justice Department is presently undertaking a survey, in part to
develop more information in this area. The questionnaire being used will not, however, yield statistics indicating the precise importance of various plea bargaining
procedures in any given United States Attorney's office.
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In evaluating the significance of prosecutorial power in these
guilty plea situations, it will be useful to focus first on the relationship between the prosecutor and the judge. In a charge-reduction
agreement (item 2), the prosecutor controls the outer boundaries of
sentencing, but because the judge generally will have the option to
impose a substantial prison term even after charge reduction, 52 the
decision whether the defendant will go to prison and the initial
determination of the length of any prison term imposed remain
53
largely in judicial hands.
When presented with an agreement for a recommended sentence (item 3), the judge is, in theory, free to disregard the recommendation and impose any sentence within statutory limits. In
practice, however, the judge cannot exercise that prerogative very
often without discouraging defendants from tendering this type of
plea. Government recommendations therefore are probably accepted in most instances.-4 One should not infer, though, that the
prosecution in fact controls the sentencing decision. A few judicial
rejections of recommended sentences can suffice to communicate the
courts preference. Thereafter recommendations will normally conform to what the judge will accept; they must if the prosecutor is to
maintain the credibility of this inducement to plead. A process of
mutual accommodation between prosecutor and judge may thus
determine the actual level of sentences imposed in "recommendation" cases. And even when the prosecutor plays the dominant role
in practice, he or she can retain control over sentencing only with
the continued acquiescence of the court.
The plea agreement for a definite sentence (item 4) appears to
involve the greatest limitation on the judge's discretion. Because
rejection of the disposition contemplated by the agreement entitles
the defendant to withdraw the plea, the court may exercise this
prerogative even less readily than it would in the case of a nonbinding recommendation.5 5 Nonetheless, the court's ability to influence
52

See 1 S.

ScH-L~orFn, PRosEcuTORrAL DiSCRETON AND FEDmRAL SENTENCING
Judicial Center Report 1979) [hereinafter cited as FED~mAL

REFORm 10 (Federal
SENTE cING REmoRm];
5

2

id. 47.

3 The trial judge can retain even greater control by rejecting the plea agree-

ment altogether, but the scope of this power is subject to some doubt under current
law. See text accompanying notes 163-72 infra.
54
See D. NEwMAN, supra note 26, at 87. For discussion of other factors that,
in practice, restrict the trial judge's ability to disregard the prosecutor's recommendation, see Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TAsK FoRcE REPORT: Tim
CouRTs, supra note 2, at 108, 110-11.
55 Some judges believe that rejection of binding agreements unduly disrupts the
docket because such cases must be rescheduled for trial and compliance with the
Speedy Trial Act must be ensured. For this reason, some judges may even discourage binding plea agreements in favor of nonbinding recommendations, which
can be rejected without disturbing the finality of the plea.
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dispositions remains significant. Rejection of the plea in a given
case may be followed quickly by a new agreement more acceptable
to the judge. In any case, subsequent agreements may, as in recommendation cases, tend to conform more closely to judicial preferences.
The judicial role thus appears strongest in connection with the
first type of plea and progressively weaker with the others, but we
still lack a basis for determining the precise mix of prosecutorial
and judicial discretion in each of the situations. We even lack
reliable information concerning the percentage of guilty pleas obtained in each of these ways. Plainly, a good deal depends upon
informal customs in each federal district; these have not been
studied and, in any event, are subject to change. My own impression is that, in many districts, judges currently claim and exercise
the paramount sentencing power in most of their cases.
The interaction between judges and prosecutors, on the one
hand, and the Parole Commission, on the other, has become somewhat easier to understand with the publication of the Commission's
guidelines for determining release dates. 56 These guidelines indicate the time each prisoner will ordinarily serve, as a function of
both the severity of the offense and the offender's "parole prognosis" 57 (as determined by a few personal characteristics). The
severity of the offense depends on "the overall circumstances of the
present offense behavior" and may be "more severe than the offense
of conviction." 5s For example, in determining the release date for
a prisoner sentenced under a charge-reduction agreement (item 2),
the Commission will, if it deems "persuasive" its information about
more serious offenses originally charged, 59 base the presumptive re56 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979).
57The parole prognosis is the predicted likelihood that the offender, if granted
early release, will avoid revocation of the parole.

58 United States Parole Commission, Guideline Application Manual app. 4, at

4.08 (May 1, 1978).
59 Such information may be obtained from the presentence investigation, the
grand jury indictment (including counts dismissed as part of a plea agreement), and

other sources.

Id. Much depends upon how readily the Commission will find that

evidence of the more severe offense is "persuasive." The manual mentions as indicia
of persuasiveness only specificity of the allegation, corroboration of the allegation by
"established facts," and the reliability of the source of the allegation. Id. The
Commission's published statements suggest the likelihood that it will routinely find
a more severe offense in charge-reduction situations. See 40 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,330

(1975).

And the cases litigated to date suggest that the persuasiveness standard

will be readily met in charge-reduction situations. See, e.g., Billiteri v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-45 (2d Cir. 1976); Bistram v. United States

Parole Bd., 535 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiarn); Manos v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 399 F. Supp. 1103 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156,
161-63 (D. Conn. 1974). But see Pernetti v. United States, 21 CRnn.
L. REP. 2033
(BNA) (D.N.J. 1977) (holding that Parole Commission may not consider charges
dismissed as part of a plea agreement).
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lease date on the same category as that which would have controlled
after conviction on those original charges. This focus upon the
"real offense" appears on its face to negate the prosecutor's chargereduction power: at least in a great many cases, defendants who win
charge reductions will be released no sooner than those otherwise
similarly situated who do not.
Likewise, plea bargains taking the form of recommendations
(item 3) or binding agreements (item 4) may be essentially nullified
by the parole guidelines. For example, if one defendant pleads
guilty to bank robbery in return for a three-year sentence, while
another convicted after trial receives a six-year sentence, and their
parole prognosis is comparable (say, "very good"), the release date
for both ordinarily would fall somewhere between twenty-six and
thirty-six months. 60 Moreover, within this range the Parole Commission apparently would not choose a later date for the second
defendant simply because his or her initial sentence was longer; the
Commission's stated policy of counteracting such differences 61 leads
it to ignore initial sentences altogether. 62 Other things being equal,
the two defendants would be released from prison on precisely the
same date. Neither judge nor prosecutor would have effectively
determined the sentences actually served.
The Parole Commission's power is not, however, completely
unchecked. Prosecutors and judges can resort to countermoves of
their own. The prosecutor may, by reducing the charges, increase
the likelihood that the judge will award probation; the judge, in
turn, can award probation whether or not the prosecutor so recommends. And a grant of probation cannot, of course, be counteracted
by the Parole Commission, whose release guidelines apply only to
offenders receiving prison sentences. Even when an offender is
sentenced to prison, whether through a charge-reduction agreement,
recommended sentence, or binding agreement, judges and prosecutors still retain power to outmaneuver the Parole Commission:
they can use low maximum sentences to ensure the release of
prisoners who should be held under the guidelines or use high
minimum sentences to ensure the continued incarceration of prisoners who should be released under the guidelines. 6 3 Anyone who
60 See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1979).

61 See 40 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,330 (1975).
62
See Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238, 255 & n.74
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted,440 U.S. 945 (1979).
63See text accompanying note 45 supra. The minimum sentence may not,
however, exceed one-third of the maximum sentence imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 4205

(1976).
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doubts that such maneuvering occurs should consult the numerous
cases in which trial or appellate courts vacated a sentence already
imposed and provided an opportunity for resentencing solely on the
ground that parole guidelines adopted after imposition of the sentence generated a release date that the original sentencing judge
Although the Supreme
would have considered inappropriate."
65
Court ultimately held these resentencing procedures improper,
judges and prosecutors still may, and many clearly will, consider
the effect of the parole guidelines before deciding how to exercise
their sentencing discretion in future cases. 66
Who, then, determines punishment in a guilty plea case?
Judges and prosecutors may in effect delegate the sentencing decision
to the Parole Commission, and perhaps they frequently choose to
do so. But it seems that these officials can decide to make the
67
critical decisions themselves, within broad limits.

The Commis-

sion's ability to moderate the sentencing decisions of prosecutors
and judges is probably less, therefore, than it was when these officials
-along with everyone else-were kept ignorant of the criteria used
by the Commission to establish release dates.
The mix of decisionmaking authority between prosecutors and
judges appears uncertain at best. We may conclude that judicial
influence over sentencing in guilty plea cases is potentially quite
extensive; that it may, because of its potential, operate as a tacit
check upon prosecutors; and that it may, at least in some districts,
predominate on a day-to-day and case-by-case basis. Beyond this,
we really do not know the precise extent to which the judge or the
prosecutor currently controls the determination of sentence following conviction on a plea of guilty in the federal courts.
B. Sentencing Authority in a Guidelines System

1. The Emergence of Prosecutorial Sentencing
At the outset of this part, I noted that sentencing reform proposals often have been criticized for their failure to deal immediately
with the problem of prosecutorial discretion. In the attempt to
64 See, e.g., Addonizio v. United States, 573 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd,

442 U.S. 178 (1979); United States v. Salerno, 538 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1976);
Kortness v. United States, 514 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1975); Briggs v. United States,
No. 75-1558 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 1975), cited in United States v. Salerno, 538 F.2d
at 1008.
65 United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
66
See A. Partridge, A. Chaset, & W. Eldridge, Policies of the Parole Commis-

sion and the Bureau of Prisons as They Affect the Judge's Sentencing Options 3-4,
16-17 (Federal Judicial Center memorandum, Oct., 1978).
67 See note 63 supra.
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assess the validity of this criticism, two empirical questions arose.
First, do judicial and parole board discretion in fact temper prosecutorial power in current guilty plea sentencing? Although our
knowledge in this area is limited, an affirmative answer appears
warranted. It remains to consider the second question, namely,
whether a guidelines system would eliminate that moderating
capacity.
A guidelines system, of course, could take many different forms.
The kinds of guidelines typically envisaged by reformers greatly
reduce judicial and parole board discretion without directly limiting discretionary decisions of the prosecutor.6 s Guidelines of this
kind would sharply reduce sentencing disparities in contested cases,
in which, as explained above, 69 judicial and parole board discretion
dominate. Relatively few sentencing variations would be permitted
within the terms of the guidelines themselves.70 Some disparities
might result from judicial decisions to depart from the guidelines,
but such decisions probably would be infrequent because the guidelines would leave few permissible grounds for such departures and
one or both parties would have the right to challenge the reasonableness of any departures on appeal. 7'1
68 Such guidelines would, for example, leave the judge no discretion on the
threshold question of probation versus imprisonment and would instead dictate this
"in-out" decision for each offense-offender category in the guideline matrix. For
cases requiring imprisonment, the guidelines would indicate a relatively narrow
range of possible terms, or might even specify a single sentence as the term to be
imposed. In addition, the judge would be directed to ignore all aggravating and
mitigating factors not formally used to determine the guideline category, except in
the case of the most unusual circumstances; even in such cases the sentence authorized could not differ from the guideline by more than a fixed, relatively small percentage. For detailed examples of such guidelines, see 2 FEDEAL. SENTENCrIN
REFonM, supra note 52, at 89-107.

Conceivable alternatives for the guideline structure would include ones that
would seek to deemphasize the sentencing significance of matters within prosecutorial control, and ones that would seek to preserve substantial amounts of judicial
discretion on such matters as the in-out decision, the effect of aggravating factors,
and the imposition of consecutive sentences. For detailed specification of such
variations and exploration of their implications, see id. 71-88.
69 See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
70 Some disparities might result from inconsistent prosecutorial practice in
pressing multiple counts or aggravating circumstances, but prosecutors probably
would not commonly treat one fully litigated case differently from another in these
respects. The principal source of inconsistency in these areas undoubtedly is plea
bargaining. See Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Offlcials,
1976 DuKE L.J. 651, 680.
71 See, e.g., S. 1722, tit. I, § 101, at § 3725(a), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
[hereinafter cited as proposed Federal Criminal Code].
Another potential source of disparity in contested cases would be decisions by
judge or jury not to convict despite evidence warranting conviction on the charges.
This power of nullification exists, of course, under current law, but its exercise might
become more frequent with the reduction of sentencing discretion. Such nullification
would not likely occur on a substantial scale, however, at least if guideline sentences
were set at a reasonable level
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Guidelines restricting only judicial and parole board discretion
would produce quite different effects in uncontested cases. The
sentence selected by the judge would, as in the contested cases, be
determined with virtual certainty once the offense of conviction
and any relevant aggravating and mitigating factors were specified,
but bargaining between the parties would in effect control these
crucial variables. 72 As a result, the actual sentence in a guilty plea
case could fall anywhere within a rather wide range, depending on
the outcome of the plea negotiations. For example, the guidelines
restricting judicial discretion presumably would mandate a fixed
increment in penalty for each additional charge resulting in conviction. 73 With every count transformed into a negotiating chip of
predictable value, the guidelines would create a bargainer's paradise. And needless to say, nothing would ensure consistency in the
pressing or dropping of these counts, upon which the actual sentence would depend.
Given the importance of plea negotiation in the present federal
sentencing system, such possibilities for disparity already exist in
one form or another. We must consider whether sentencing disparities in guilty plea cases would be any worse under the guidelines. The distance between the highest and lowest potential
sentences-the outer boundaries of negotiation-undoubtedly would
be less than under the current system, characterized as it is by unpredictability and very high statutory maximums. We might therefore expect that negotiated dispositions would be less widely dispersed under guidelines restricting judicial discretion.
Two important factors tend to offset this possibility. First,
counsel ordinarily know that under present law a maximum sentence, with consecutive maximum terms on each count, is a purely
theoretical prospect. The outer boundaries of negotiation must, as
a practical matter, be very much narrower than the statutory penalty
provisions would indicate.
Second, sentencing power today is shared by the judge and the
prosecutor. The expectations of a particular judge can and in
many districts do assure some consistency in the plea agreements
reached by the various assistant United States attorneys appearing
in that court. Under narrow guidelines, the judge would lose the
various devices now available to control or influence the effect of a
negotiated disposition.74 Bargaining and sentencing practices could
72 The judge could partially counteract such control by the parties through use
of the real-offense procedure. See text accompanying notes 96-158 infra.
73 See 2 FEERAL SENTENCiNG REFoRm, supra note 52, at 32-34.
74 See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra. Under narrow guidelines, the

judge could offset some unduly lenient dispositions by refusing to approve a reduc-
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then vary among government attorneys in the same office and even
among cases handled by the same attorney. The difficulty of obtaining agreement of opposing counsel would vary from case to case;
subject only to this constraint, however, guilty plea sentences would
in effect be set by individual assistant United States attorneys, with
at best some limited review within the prosecutor's office.75 Thus,
the principal effect of a system of narrow sentencing guidelines
would be to transfer discretionary sentencing power in guilty plea
cases from federal district judges to assistant United States attorneys.
2. The Effects of Prosecutorial Sentencing
Despite the prevailing theology that sentencing is a judicial
function, prosecutors, and some others, often assert privately that
United States attorneys could do a better job.7e This view is probably so prevalent that the prospect of more extensive prosecutorial
power does not evoke serious concern among many legislators and
even among some reformers. There are enough grains of truth in
this attitude that it deserves to be examined with more care than it
typically has received.
Because "prosecutorial sentencing" can occur only in the context of a negotiated disposition to which the defendant consents, it
is somewhat misleading to suggest, as critics of sentencing reform
often do, that sentencing reform will transfer to prosecutors a
power exactly like that now exercised by a judge. 7 Rather, the essential issues are whether, or to what extent, plea negotiation could
itself serve as an effective check upon prosecutorial discretion, and
whether bargaining in a guidelines system would operate more
fairly and more consistently than the current system's combination
of bargaining and unilateral, unstructured judicial sentencing.
To what extent can plea negotiation effectively constrain the
sentencing decisions of prosecutors? Generalization is quite evidently not to be attempted. But one kind of case worth considering is that in which the possibilities for acquittal at trial are, for
tion of the charges, but the scope of this power is currently in doubt

See text

accompanying notes 163-72 infra.
75
Better procedures for review within the United States Attorney's offices undoubtedly could be devised. See, e.g., White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea
Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv:. 439, 453-58 (1971) (proposing selection
of specific attorneys with responsibility for plea negotiation).
76
See, e.g., Di fIuNAS SmrTNcixo, supra note 23, at 79 (similar remarks
by state prosecutors in California).
77 Even Professor Alschuler's excellent analysis of prosecutorial sentencing power
makes essentially this claim; it portrays the defense attorney's viewpoint merely as
"one important influence on an oflicial sentencing decision made by the prosecutor."
Alschuler, Sentencing Reform, supra note 6, at 554 n.16.
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all practical purposes, nil. These "dead bang" cases, according to
many practitioners, account for the overwhelming majority of all
guilty pleas. 78 A defense attorney's "threat" to take such a case to
trial must count for very little; in practice the defendant simply
must accept whatever concession the prosecutor considers appropriate. For these cases, the prosecutor's sentencing decision is essentially a unilateral one.
In cases involving some possibility for acquittal, the prosecutor
cannot merely dictate the result. For such cases, a guidelines system
would improve the bargaining environment in several ways. First,
the stakes would necessarily become more tangible. Despite the
formal availability today of binding plea agreements for a definite
sentence, prosecutors often can or will bargain only in terms of
charge reduction or sentence "recommendations," both of uncertain
value. 79 Under guidelines restricting judicial discretion, the concrete sentencing implications of any plea agreement almost always
would be known.
Second, the relative predictability of sentences would mean
that the risks associated with the alternative of trial could be more
easily assessed. At present the possibility that a judge will impose
consecutive maximums on all counts may be essentially "theoretical," but practitioners often say that this prospect influences their
clients. Even when it does not, defendants under the current system
still must guess, over much too wide a range, what sentence will be
imposed if they choose to stand trial and are convicted. Under a
guidelines system both defense decisions whether to plead guilty and
prosecution decisions about the concession to be offered would, to
a greater extent, be independent of the defendant's tolerance for a
risky trial strategy, a factor not remotely relevant to any penological
purpose.8 0
Clarification of the bargaining stakes is in itself to be welcomed.
But there is another side to this coin. The very certainty of the
stakes would enable the prosecutor to offer a concrete inducement
78 See, e.g., M.

HEuMANN,

PLEA

BARGAINING

57-61, 100-02 (1978).

79 See note 55 & text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.

S0 The defendant's attitudes toward risk would still play some role in his or
her decision because the risk of conviction would remain an important variable.
But cf. text accompanying notes 230-34 infra (concessions should not be based

upon doubts about factual guilt). Of course, to the extent that potential offenders

are risk averse with respect to the threshold decision to commit a crime, greater
predictability in sentencing would in theory decrease deterrence, provided that all

other important variables remained unaffected. This proviso is most unlikely to be
fulfilled in practice, however, and most reformers believe that on balance greater

certainty would tend to promote more effective deterrence. See text accompanying
note 3 supra.
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that might seem irresistibly attractive. In contrast, in current practice the benefit gained, even by a plea agreement for a definite
sentence, is not always certain because the defendant might receive
the very same sentence, or close to it, after conviction at trial. Accordingly, pressure to plead guilty might be very much stronger
under sentencing guidelines than it is today. The direct correspondence between prosecutorial charge decisions and a particular
sentencing effect would put the prosecutor in a position that might
seem overly dominating. The same combination of certainty and
domination would arise under current law if plea negotiations were
conducted directly with the trial judge; and it is primarily this
element of domination which explains the prevailing view that
judicial participation renders plea bargaining inherently unfair.8 '
Sentencing guidelines would thus work important, but not unambiguously positive, changes in the quality of the plea bargaining
environment. Whether or not one prefers the shift to certainty
cum domination, the essential point for present purposes is that
prosecutorial power and bargaining leverage would be sharply enhanced by guidelines restricting judicial discretion. As a result, the
answer to the question whether plea negotiation could itself serve
as a check upon prosecutorial discretion appears to be negative:
the requirement of defense consent may not reasonably be expected
adequately to constrain prosecutorial power. Instead, guilty plea
sentencing under a guidelines system will be essentially a unilateral
prosecutorial decision in the "dead bang" cases, and a decision very
heavily dominated by the prosecution even in cases that it might
lose at trial.
The question remains whether sentencing at the discretion of
prosecutors, who are not very effectively constrained by the defense,
might nevertheless be preferable to sentencing at the discretion of
judges, who are even less constrained in this respect. Prosecutors
probably do develop a better "feel" for the essentials of a criminal
case than do some judges. Ordinarily, federal prosecutors are involved full time in criminal work, and to a degree they become
81See FED. R. CRm. P. 11(e)(1); ABA PROJECT ON GuiLTY PLEAS, supra

note 26, at §3.3(a). See also United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256
F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). For discussion of other objections to judicial
participation, see ABA PROJECT ON GMrTY PrLAs, supra note 26, Commentary
at 72-74. For persuasive criticism of the prevailing view, see Alschuler, The Trial
judge's Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 CoLum. L. 1Ev. 1059, 1103-34 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Alschuler, The Trial judge's Role]. Of course the combination
of certainty and domination does not necessarily entail an increase in the overall
pressure exerted on a defendant to plead guilty. The pressure created by an offer
of concrete sentencing benefits depends on the magnitude of the concession and
could be either greater or less than the pressure involved in an offer that eliminates
a remote contingency. See text accompanying note 209 infra.
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"experts," whose sentencing judgments could be of very high
quality. The sentencing decisions of these prosecutors as a group
conceivably might be rather consistent, or at least no more inconsistent than the sentencing decisions of judges operating under the
current system.
One can only speculate, of course, but I believe that such expectations are unwarranted and deeply incompatible with accepted
82
principles of institutional competence. First, as we have seen,
judicial and prosecutorial power under current law serve to temper
one another. Any system of shared power will likely produce
more consistent results than will one without checks. Indeed, the
weakness of the current system in part stems from the very fact that
it already does, to such a considerable extent, lodge broad powers
in a single individual, usually the judge. Guidelines restricting
judicial discretion would simply aggravate that tendency toward
concentration of power, while placing the prosecutor in the dominant role currently filled by the judge.
Second, if there must be unchecked discretionary power, all
experience counsels against lodging it with assistant United States
attorneys rather than with judges. Although prosecutorial discretion has not been subjected to as close scrutiny as judicial discretion,
some evidence, from highly credible sources, suggests serious inconsistencies in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the federal
system. 3 Moreover, federal prosecutors are almost uniformly far
younger than judges, they face much more acute personal and professional incentives to dispose of individual cases for reasons unrelated to the merits, 84 and their decisions are made in a context
that minimizes public visibility and its attendant limitations on
abuse.8 5 It need hardly be added that the United States attorneys
are after all prosecutors, not detached, neutral magistrates. In the
nature of things, they are ordinarily more "expert." Yet in no
other area of life would we even for a moment consider granting to
82 See text accompanying notes 48-55 supra.
83See UNITED STATES GENERAL AccoUNTrm
PROSECUTE

MANY

OFFICE,

SUSPECTED VIOLATORS OF FEDERAL LAwS

U.S. ATToRNEYs Do NOT

(1978); House Judiciary

Hearings, supra note 40, at 2458-73 (testimony of William J. Anderson, U.S.
General Accounting Office). The potential for disparity is increased by the
traditionally broad degree of independence of the United States Attorney's offices
from control by the Department of Justice. See, e.g., Beck, The Administrative Law
of Criminal Prosecution: The Development of Prosecutorial Policy, 27 AM. U.L.
REv. 310, 311-13 & n.8 (1978).

84 Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 50
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Alschuler, The ProsecutorsRole]; White, supra note 75,
at 449-50.
5
Alschuler, Sentencing Reform, supra note 6, at 564.
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officials of this kind a broad, unstructured power to deprive individuals of liberty or property. 86
I conclude that guidelines restricting only judicial discretion
would transfer discretionary sentencing power to prosecutors and
would impair the tempering role currently exercised by the judiciary. Nor would prosecutorial power be adequately constrained by
plea negotiation. The prospects for sound decisions in individual cases and for overall consistency in sentencing would be
appreciably worse than in the present system of broad, unstructured
87
judicial discretion.
C. Attempting to Structure ProsecutorialDecisionmaking
I have argued that guidelines restricting judicial and parole
board discretion, without provisions for controlling prosecutorial
discretion, would increase rather than decrease disparities in sentencing. The difficulties could be alleviated to a limited degree by
guidelines that either would deemphasize the sentencing significance
of matters within prosecutorial control, or would preserve enough
unstructured judicial discretion to permit judges to continue to act
as a check on prosecutors.8 8 But whatever the form of the guide86

Prosecutors are, of course, constrained in the sense that their sentencing
power may be asserted only against those who can be proved guilty of some offense,
and then only to the extent of the maximum penalty authorized. In practice, these
are not very reassuring limitations, as the observations of Justice Jackson, when he
was Attorney General, attest. See Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CaRm.
L. & CRUNOLOGY 3 (1940). In any event, these limitations do not obviate the
need for restrictions upon the extent of the penalty, just as restrictions upon the
circumstances justifying takings of private property for public use do not obviate the
need for standards on the amount of the compensation to be paid in such cases.
87
Because guidelines restricting judicial discretion would decrease disparities
in contested cases, but not in guilty plea cases, see text accompanying notes 69-75
supra, their net effect is not inevitably unfavorable. But given the overwhelming
predominance of guilty plea cases, the improvements realized in the cases going to
trial seem insufficient to outweigh the negative effects in the uncontested cases.
88 The sentencing impact of factors within prosecutorial control could be deemphasized, for example, by excluding from the sentencing computation certain
aggravating and mitigating factors that are relatively easy to manipulate. See text
accompanying note 222 infra. Detailed examples of such guidelines are presented
in 2 FEmDEAL SNrENcrNG REFORM, supra note 52, at 40-42, 98-107. Such guidelines, however, would have relatively little effect on the scope of prosecutorial
sentencing power. No matter how narrowly the offense and offender categories were
limited, most kinds of criminal conduct could still plausibly be placed in any of
several remaining categories. And ordinarily the breadth of the basic negotiating
boundaries would not be significantly narrowed. The prosecutor's charge-reduction
power would, as a result, provide an entirely adequate negotiating tool even if all
other sources of influence over the sentence were removed. See 1 id. 37-39.
The alternative approach would be to preserve judicial discretion-for example,
by leaving the judge free to choose either imprisonment or probation for most
offense-offender categories in the guideline matrix, by providing a relatively broad
range of possible prison terms for each category, by leaving the judge discretion to
impose concurrent or consecutive terms on multiple charges, and so on. Detailed
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lines and whatever one's assumptions about their net effect, a large
portion of the disparity problem unquestionably will remain unless
prosecutorial discretion in charging and bargaining can be brought
under control.
The needed controls could emerge from comprehensive policies
and guidelines directly governing decisionmaking by prosecutors.
Prosecutorial discretion, of course, affects many vital matters other
than sentencing.8 9 The case for subjecting all facets of that discretion to better control has received extended attention over many
years. 0 Despite repeated calls for action,91 direct restrictions on
prosecutorial discretion still seem a distant hope.9 2 No doubt many
factors have contributed to this standstill, including prosecutors'
resistance to dilution of present powers, warranted and unwarranted
concerns about litigation resulting from the adoption of any standards,9 3 and the sheer difficulty of formulating standards that can
usefully focus the myriad factors that should play a part in prosecutorial decisionmaking. 94 The last problem seems particularly significant for present purposes: virtually any standards one can
imagine would refer to the strength of the evidence or other factors
so vague as to impose no effective constraint upon the prosecutor's
sentencing power.95
examples of such guidelines are presented in 2 id. 37-39, 71-88. Guidelines of this
kind would carry forward the judges' power to offset the effects of prosecutorial
charging decisions, and yet would provide enough guidance to judges to promise
some reduction in sentencing disparities. Analysis suggests, however, that the
reduction of disparities achieved by this approach would be quite modest. See
1 id. 39-47; 2 id. 43-57.
89
Even a short list of matters involving serious potential for unfairness or
inconsistency would include prosecutors' decisions when not to prosecute, when to
grant immunity, when and how to investigate, when to discuss possible charges with
a defendant's lawyer, and when to publicize positive or negative results of an
investigation.
90
See, e.g., K. DAvis, supra note 4, at 188-214; Abrams, Internal Policy:
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. BEv. 1 (1971);
Vorenberg, supra note 70.
91
E.g., ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-Aiu, GNm:E-,rT PnocEDuRE §§ 10.3, 350.3(2)
(1975).
92 See Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process,
90 HAnv. L. REv. 564, 583 & n.103 (1977).
93 The Justice Department's standards for the exercise of discretion, recently
made public, seem to impose few concrete limitations, and even so they are
cautiously labelled "materials": "[Tihese materials are not to be construed as
Department of Justice 'guidelines' and . . . they impose no obligations on . . .
attorneys for the government. Of course, they confer no rights or benefits ....
United States Dep't of Justice, Materials Relating to Prosecutorial Discretion, 24
Cram. L. Rpm. 3001, 3001 (BNA) (1978).
94 See Jaffe, Book Review, 14 VmL. L. REv. 773, 774-75, 777 (1969) (Kenneth
Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry).
95 See Alschuler, Sentencing Reform, supra note 6, at 575-76 & n.73.
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The problem of devising adequate controls over prosecutorial
decisionmaking undoubtedly warrants continuing study. Over the
very long run, the solution to disparity in sentencing and in other
areas of prosecutorial activity may lie in the development of comprehensive standards. But given the many present obstacles to effective control of this kind, it seems preferable to focus attention
on less sweeping change. Parts III and IV discuss two more limited
approaches for effecting structured judicial control over segments of
prosecutorial activity that most heavily influence the determination
of sentence.
III. CONTROL

OF PROSECUTORIAL SENTENCING POWER:

"RI EAL OFFENSE" SENTENCING

In a system of guidelines restricting judicial discretion, prosecutorial sentencing power would be exerted primarily through the
initial charging decision and through charge-reduction plea agreements.9 6 Judges could seek to offset the effects of these charging
decisions by simply ignoring the formal offense of conviction and
determining the "category of offense" applicable for guidelines purposes according to their own conception of the offense actually
constituted by the defendant's conduct, that is, the "real offense."
Available evidence suggests that criminal sentencing decisions
already are based heavily upon actual offense behavior as distinguished from the formal offense of conviction. Empirical studies
of judicial sentencing indicate that in many jurisdictions prosecutorial decisions to reduce pending charges appear to have little
or no impact on the sentence ultimately imposed.97 Efforts to study
the same phenomenon by interviewing and other nonstatistical
techniques confirm the impression that many judges currently disregard charge-reduction agreements and treat the defendant much
the same as if he or she had been convicted on the initial charges. 98
Parole boards have long been suspected of following the same
practice.99
96 On "fact bargaining" that could affect sentencing through considerations other
than that of the charge, see text accompanying notes 220-22 infra.
97
See, e.g., J. EisrEsTEiN & H. JAcoB, FELONY JusmcE: AN ORGANiZA-IONAL
ArLyass op CnmxAL CounTs 131-34, 160, 279-83 (1977); Rhodes, Plea Bargain-

ing: Who Gains? Who Loses?, at V-8 to V-10 (1978) (LEAA study, copy on
file with the author); Wilkins, Kress, Gottfredson, Caplin, & Gelman, Sentencing
Guidelines: Structuring Judicial Discretion 88 (1976) (LEAA study, copy on file
with the author) [hereinafter cited as Wilkins et al.]. Contra, Shin, Do Lesser
Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the Sentencing and Parole Processes, 1 J. CMai.
JusT. 27, 34-35 (1973).
9
8 Wilkins et al., supra note 97, at 75.
99
See, e.g., Foote, supra note 23, at 135.
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This process of real-offense sentencing provides a means through
which the prosecutor's formally uncontrolled sentencing powers can,
to some degree, be held in check. But the broad judicial and parole
board discretion that currently afford the opportunity for realoffense judgments serve at the same time to obscure the very existence of this practice, as well as its many potentially unfair effects.
A judge's or parole official's impressions about the seriousness of
the actual offense behavior need not be made explicit and rarely
can be challenged in a way that would ensure their reliability.
Defendants and defense counsel unaware of the practice or uncertain about its precise extent may greatly overestimate the advantages
of a charge-reduction plea agreement. In current practice, realoffense sentencing thus neutralizes part of the threat to fair process
posed by untrammeled prosecutorial powers, but it creates new
problems of fairness at least as serious as those it seeks so crudely
and unsystematically to remedy. 0 0
In a reformed system built on narrow judicial discretion, the
real-offense concept could be used in a more formal, orderly fashion.
Both the real offense and the offense of conviction would necessarily
play some role in determining actual punishment. The ceiling for
the potential sentence would be set by the statutory maximum for
the offense of conviction; subject to this limitation, the actual sentence would be the one specified by the guideline for the real
offense.' 01 Thus, for a defendant committing robbery and pleading
guilty to theft, the sentence under the proposed Federal Criminal
Code could not exceed five years' imprisonment, the statutory maximum for theft.10 2 Referring to the guidelines, the sentencing judge
might find that the prison term indicated, for this defendant's
offender category, was two and one-half years for an actual theft and
five and one-half years for robbery. In such a case, a real-offense
policy would call for a five-and-one-half-year sentence, regardless of
the formal characterization of the offense. Because the statutory
maximum may not be exceeded, however, a five-year sentence would
be imposed on the "theft" conviction, while five and one-half years
100 Because the real-offense practice is inherently difficult to isolate or challenge

when sentencing discretion is broad and unstructured, the validity of the practice is
seldom considered in current case law. When the issue has surfaced, the courts
have simply accepted real-offense evaluations as one of many permissible kinds of

informal judicial sentencing judgments. See, e.g., cases cited in note 139 infra.
101 More sophisticated methods for giving weight to the real offense in the
formal guideline computation also could be designed. See Willdns et al., supra
note 97, at 53, 78. On use of the real offense to justify departure from the guidelines, see note 103 infra.
102 See proposed Federal Criminal Code, supra note 71, at §§ 1731(b) (2),
2301(b) (4).
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would have been imposed upon formal conviction for robbery. If
the guideline sentence for robbery were only four and one-half
years, that sentence would be imposed whether the formal conviction was for robbery or theft. 0 3
A guidelines system would obviate many of the difficulties associated with reliance upon the real offense under current sentencing
procedures. Because the policy relating to actual-offense behavior
presumably would be well-known,es defendants would no longer
be misled about the value of a charge-reduction bargain. And because the sentencing significance of the offense characterization
would be clear, the defense would be certain to focus attention
upon the question whether the real offense really occurred. Real
offense sentencing in a guidelines system thus provides a potential
103 A variation on this approach would have the judge start his or her analysis
from the guideline for the formal offense of conviction, but then consider the extent
to which the defendant's actual offense behavior makes the conduct more serious
than that involved in the "typical" case of the offense represented by the formal
conviction. The American Bar Association has suggested a preference for this use
of the real offense, rather than reliance on the real offense to invoke a guideline
,
category higher than that for the offense of conviction. ABA PRoJECToN ST imms
rNAL
JusTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATiS
RELATING TO =ra ADimNsTRATioN oF Cum
AND IocEDURES § 18-3.1, Commentary at 71 (2d ed.) (Approved Draft, Aug. 14,
1979). Judicial application of this technique, however, often would require considerable mental gymnastics, see Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 81,
at 1139, without significantly alleviating the basic problems of factflnding and
appellate review. See text accompanying notes 131-37 and 149-54 infra.
The A.B.A. recommendation reflects in any event a fundamental ambivalence,
and perhaps a serious confusion. The A.B.A. suggests that, by use of this variation
rather than the basic approach discussed in the text, "a practice is not institutionalized that risks infringing the appearance of justice." Of course, the "appearance of justice" would indeed be less threatened if this variation operated without
formal recognition or structure, under conditions of relatively low visibility. But it
is difficult to believe that the thoughtful A.B.A. report intended to endorse a continuation of the sporadic or covert real-offense practices that currently threaten such
serious deception in connection with plea bargaining. Presumably the A.B.A. intended that the existence and effects of the recommended procedure would be well
understood; in this event, however, concerns about the "appearance of justice"
(which I share, see text accompanying notes 138-48 infra) arise with precisely the
same force as they do under the more direct approach. The variation thus raises
essentially the same problems as the technique discussed in the text, but would in
all likelihood be more cumbersome to implement.
104 It is far from clear, however, that the real-offense practice is fully understood by defendants today, even when the practice has been implemented under
formal guidelines. The United States Parole Commission's decision to use the real
offense in its parole release decisionmaking guidelines has been made public in the
Federal Register, see 40 Fed. Reg. 41,330 (1975), but the policy is not disclosed
in the guideline tables published in the Code of Federal Regulations, see 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.20 (1979), and current law does not require that such details of parole release
be explained to a defendant before his or her decision whether to plead guilty.
See note 148 infra. It seems difficult to defend such an absence of full disclosure
at the time of plea now that a parole release decision, channeled by guidelines, is
no longer seen as a matter of grace. The injustice of incomplete disclosure will
become even more obvious if the real-offense policy becomes a part of the principles
governing sentencing, rather than parole release. See generally text accompanying
notes 146-48 infra.
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means for mitigating, without obvious procedural impropriety, some
of the effects of disparate prosecutorial charging practices and of
Because of this
unwarranted concessions in plea bargaining.
promise, use of the technique in a guidelines context has won the
endorsement of an impressive series of authorities, including the
United States Parole Commission, 1 5 the New York State Parole
Board, 1 6 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
UnfortuState Laws, 0 7 and the American Bar Association.108
an
the
contrary,
to
views
respectable
these
despite
and
nately,
official policy divorcing the guideline category of offense severity
from the formal offense of conviction would, like a covert realoffense policy, raise serious new difficulties in the very process of
solving the old ones. Although the constitutional problems posed
by use of actual-offense behavior would not be insurmountable, I
conclude that policy considerations argue decisively against reliance
upon real-offense sentencing in a guidelines system.
A. Constitutionality
Although the sentencing proceeding is a "critical stage," at
which the defendant is entitled to representation by counsel, 10 9 it
need not involve all the attributes of a criminal trial. The defendant has no right to a jury or to proof of factual issues beyond a
reasonable doubt; the presentence report may, at least in some instances, be kept confidential; and there is no constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine all the witnesses." 0 Emphasizing that
"most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them
in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if
o5 UNITED STATES PAROLE CO1lmissIoN, supra note 58, at 4.08. See also 40
Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,330 (1975). For decisions upholding the Parole Commission's
application of its real-offense policy, see note 59 supra.
106 See note 141 infra.
107 MODEL SENTENCING AND CORCTIONS ACT § 3-115, Comment at 144;
§ 3-206(d) (1978).
108 ABA PRoJEcT ON STANDARDS RELATING TO THE AD MN TRATON OF CmiINAL JUSTIC E, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 18-3.1(c) (iii) & Commentary at 71 (2d ed.) (Approved Draft, Aug. 14, 1979) (expressing some discomfort with the real-offense approach, but concluding that "the need to control
prosecutorially caused disparities may justify experimentation with this and other

options").
109 Mempa v. Ehay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
11 0
See generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PRocEDuREs §4.3(a),

Commentary at 211-12 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT ON SENTENCING
ALTEmATrvEs]. But cf. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 408-12 (E.D.
N.Y. 1978), afd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979) (under certain
circumstances, facts triggering higher sentence must be proved by "clear, unequivo-

cal and convincing evidence").

1980]

DUE PROCESS OF SENTENCING

information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses
subject to cross-examination,":"" the Supreme Court held in
Williams v. New York that the "due process clause should not be
treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure." 11 Courts have invoked these
principles in upholding the trial judge's power to give weight in
sentencing to the seriousness of the real offense, as determined in11 3
formally by the judge.
Could the procedural flexibility granted by Williams be retained in a guidelines system? An American Bar Association
Advisory Committee once observed, "[i]t would indeed be ironic if
procedural due process required the absence of legislative guidance
in order for the sentencing proceeding to be informal." 114 But
our conceptions of fair process often do imply a need for more
rigorous procedural safeguards when more definite substantive
standards are introduced. 1 5 Specht v. Patterson116 illustrates the
problem in a sentencing context. The Supreme Court was presented there with a Colorado statute permitting imposition of an
indeterminate sentence of one day to life, even after conviction of a
defendant on a charge normally carrying a shorter maximum sentence, if the judge found that the defendant, "at large, constitutes a
threat of bodily harm to members of the public, or is an habitual
offender and mentally ill." 117 The Court held that "'[a] defendant
in such a proceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant
protections which due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings.' " 11

Williams was distinguished on the ground that the

Colorado statute "does not make the commission of a specified crime
the basis for sentencing. It makes one conviction the basis for
commencing another proceeding . . . [requiring] a new finding of
fact . . . that was not an ingredient of the offense charged." 119
111 Wiliams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949).
112 Id. 251.
113 See, e.g., cases cited in note 59 supra and note 139 infra.
114 ABA PROJECT ON SENTmcING ALTERNATivES, supra note 110, at § 5.5(c),

Commentary at 264 (emphasis in original).
115 See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226-27 (1976); ABA PRoJEcT
ON STANDARDS RELATING ToTHE ADmINISTRATION OF CIMINAL JUSTICE, SNTENCING ALTmNATvEs AND P!ocEnurms § 18-6.4, Commentary at 153 (2d ed.) (Ap-

proved Draft, Aug. 14, 1979). See also note 176 infra.
116 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
117 Id. 607 (quoting Sex Offenders Act, § 1, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 39-19-1
(1963) (current version at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-13-203 (1968)).
11S 386 U.S. at 609 (quoting United States ex r"el. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355
F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966)).
19 386 U.S. at 608.
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At another point the Court stressed that the statute involved "a new
charge" comparable to a recidivist charge, for which the prior
offenses constitute a "distinct issue" on which the defendant is entitled to notice, a hearing, confrontation, and cross-examination. 120
On its face, Specht appears to hold that the right to full criminal trial procedures is triggered when the subsequent proceeding
requires a "new finding of fact" and poses a "distinct issue." Focusing on this facet of the case, some courts have required full procedural safeguards for post-trial dispositions dependent on finding
the defendant "insane" 121 or a "dangerous special offender." 122
Determination of the real offense in a guidelines system would seem
even more directly controlled by Specht because this inquiry concerns not only a "distinct issue," but the kind of issue traditionally
thought to involve a new criminal charge. 123 And reliance on
Williams would seem particularly difficult because the Court's approval of flexible procedures in that case was quite explicitly
grounded on their importance for the effective operation of a regime
of indeterminate sentences, involving assessment of diverse facets of
the offender's personality and "an increase in the discretionary
powers exercised in fixing punishments." 124 As applied to a sentencing reform system designed to limit the general range of information considered relevant in sentencing, to narrow the judge's
discretion, and to exclude rehabilitative concerns in most instances,
Williams could be considered thoroughly anachronistic. 25
Id. 610.
121 E.g., Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
122 United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874, 885 (W.D. Mo. 1974), af'd on
other grounds, 529 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975). Contra, United States v. Stewart,
531 F.2d 326, 332 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).
123The traditional characterization of the issue seems to play some role in
determining whether the legislature may remove the issue from the government's
case-in-chief and thus ease its burden of proof. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684 (1975), with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
124 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949). See also id. 250-51.
125 The force of Williams seems further eroded by the decision in Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). On facts virtually identical to those in Williams,
the Court reached the opposite result and voted to vacate a death sentence imposed
by a trial judge who relied on a confidential presentence report. The plurality
opinion noted "two constitutional developments" since Williams that mandated a
more formal sentencing procedure. The first was heightened scrutiny of capital
sentencing. The opinion also mentioned, as a second, independent development
the applicability of due process requirements to all sentencing and cited as support
Mempa v. Bhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), and Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605
(1967), neither a capital case. 430 U.S. at 358 (plurality opinion per Stevens, J.).
The opinion also distinguished Williams as a case in which the facts contained in
the presentence report were "described in detail" by the judge and never actually
challenged by the defense. Id. 356. These views, explicitly disclaimed only by
Justices White and Rehnquist, id. 364, 371, although Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackanun concurred only in the judgment of the plurality, portend more
120
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The real-offense determination nevertheless differs in critical
respects from the factual issue involved in Specht and its progeny.
First, the sanction triggered by the "new finding" in each of those
cases was greatly disproportionate to the severity of the actual offense of conviction; in guidelines sentencing the findings could,
under no circumstances, result in a sentence outside the normal
statutory range for that offense. 26 Second, even when sentencing
is channeled by guidelines, the real offense remains but one of
several interrelated factual issues used to generate a sentencing
range. The process of decision is not easily adapted to the process
of resolution of a criminal charge, in which the existence of each
element is an indispensable prerequisite to conviction. Jury trial
27
and reasonable doubt requirements thus seem quite out of place.
Separating actual offense behavior from other guideline elements
might, of course, be possible; this one issue is plainly capable of
resolution in a criminal trial. But if guideline computations (and,
indeed, decisions to depart from the guidelines) may, like current
sentencing decisions, give some weight to prior convictions and
prior arrests on charges eventually dismissed,126 the separation of
any charges currently being dismissed becomes somewhat artificial.
Considerations like these have led the lower courts to hold-in my
view, correctly-that the "full panoply" of criminal trial procedures
ought not to govern the ascertainment of actual offense behavior in
a guidelines system.' 2 9
A distinct problem is whether particularrights must be granted
as a matter of procedural due process. Even if the real-offense determination does not amount to the disposition of a new criminal
charge, "it is now clear that the sentencing process . . .must satisfy
the requirements of the Due Process Clause." 130 In determining
what process is due, there can scarcely be any doubt that the courts
stringent constitutional requirements for sentencing even in noncapital cases. See
also text accompanying notes 130-37 infra.
12 6 See ABA PROJECr ON SENTENciNG ALTERNATiE s, supra note 110, at
§ 5.5(c), Commentary at 265-66.
12 7
On the unsatisfactory nature of sentencing by a jury in noncapital cases,
id. 43-48.
generally
see
128 United States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973); United
States v. Cifarelli, 401 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 987 (1968).
Contra, United States ex Tel. Jackson v. Meyers, 374 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1967).
129 See cases cited in note 59 supra. Cf. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S.
41 (1978) (upholding the trial judge's power to base harsher sentence on his or
her belief that the defendant committed perjury at the trial, even though such
perjury is not formally proved).
(plurality opinion per
130 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)
Stevens, J.).
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would require notice and an opportunity to be heard, as indeed
131
rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides.
Similarly, full disclosure of the basis for any real-offense findings
would presumably be obligatory; again rule 32 probably would be
read to prohibit confidentiality for the type of information involved
132
in real-offense determinations.
Such dispute as there might be would likely center on the
question whether the defendant would have the rights to present
formal testimony and to cross-examine opposing witnesses. In
present practice under rule 32, it is apparently not uncommon to
deny cross-examination1 3 3 and to limit defense counsel to informal
"comment" upon alleged inaccuracies in the presentence report. 134
The American Bar Association recommends, in contrast, full rights
to present and cross-examine witnesses on any disputed factual
issues. 135 Whatever the conception of sound policy for the present
sentencing system, the determination of offense severity in a guidelines context would call for particular care. Because a finding
adverse to the defendant would result in a "grievous loss," measurable precisely in added months of confinement, procedures of high
reliability would be required. The Supreme Court's analysis of the
process due in parole revocation proceedings 136 suggests that in
guidelines sentencing the rights to present and to cross-examine
witnesses with respect to the real offense would be constitutionally
mandated.
1 31

32

1 37

FFD. R. Clam. P. 32(c)(3)(A).
See generally Spivey, Defendant's Right to Disclosure of Presentence Report,

40 A.L.R.3d 681 (1971).
133 United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 657-58 (2d Cir. 1973); Fernandez
v. Meier, 432 F.2d 426, 427 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d

509, 511 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1968).
14 United States v. Hodges, 547 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
McDuffie, 542 F.2d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Horsley, 519 F.2d
1264, 1266 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v.

Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1230 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
135 ABA PRoJECT ON SETENCDnG ALTERNATiES, supra note 110, at § 5.4(b).
13 6 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-89 (1972).
13 7 This conclusion is not affected by the Court's recent tendency to approach
the due process issue in "positivist" terms and to permit state action adversely
affecting liberty or property, without full procedural safeguards, as long as the
state law itself creates no "entitlement" to the liberty or property interest. E.g.,
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).

Even if the state is given flexibility in defining liberty or how it will be protected
in such fringe matters as confinement conditions and privileges, the initial imposition
of sentence infringes a protected liberty that government is not free to define away.
See L. TRmE, AMERICAN

CoNsTrrTUTONAL LAW

535-36 (1978); text accompanying

note 109 & note 125 supra. Even in the "fringe" context of prisoner transfers, the
Court was careful to base its permissive holding upon the absence of any state rule
"conditioning such transfers on proof of serious misconduct or the occurrence of
other events." Meachum, 427 U.S. at 216.
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The imposition of these requirements concerning evidence and
cross-examination does not, of course, impair the constitutionality
of the basic concept. Reliance by the sentencing judge on actual
offense behavior, properly ascertained, would likely survive constitutional attack. It remains to consider whether a policy of focusing
upon the real offense would be sound.
B. Policy Considerations
Implementation of a real-offense approach creates a good many
more difficulties than it solves. In essence, the approach attempts
to offset plea bargaining distortions by introducing distortions elsewhere in the system. I conclude that the effort is conceptually
unsound and ultimately would prove self-defeating. The principal
difficulties involve considerations of fairness, procedural efficiency,
the effect upon plea negotiation, and the likelihood of evasion.
1. Fairness
The drive to eliminate sentencing disparity has in large measure
been motivated by the need to restore both the appearance and the
actuality of fairness in the criminal justice process. Unwarranted
disparities have generated cynicism among the public and prisoners
alike and have undermined confidence in the reliability and integrity of the legal system. 138 A declared policy placing greater
weight upon the judge's conception of offense behavior than upon
the formal offense of conviction seems likely to reinforce rather than
dispel these attitudes. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more striking
way for the legal system to proclaim mistrust of its own processes.
Any claims to the legitimacy of giving weight to actual offense
behavior rest on the notion that informal procedures can establish
what "really" happened with a level of confidence adequate for
sentencing purposes. The same reasoning would permit the judge
to infer guilt even from an acquittal, which implies only reasonable
39
doubt; a few cases appear, in fact, to uphold just such a practice.
138 See M. FA xEL, supra note 3, at 39-49.
'39 United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309,

314 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972). Contra, Cwikla v. New York
State Board of Parole (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dutchess County, June 9, 1978). The soundness of the decisions permitting the sentencing judge to give weight to charges
resulting in acquittal appears extremely tenuous, even in the existing system of broad
sentencing discretion. On a closely related issue, the lower courts have held that
the sentencing judge (or parole agency) may not give weight to a conviction shown
to be invalid. Monks v. United States Parole Comm'n, 463 F. Supp. 859 (M.D.
Pa. 1978) (conviction based on involuntary confession); Majchszak v. Ralston, 454
F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (uncounseled juvenile adjudication); Wren v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 389 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (uncounseled
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However tolerable these judgments may seem while they remain
largely hidden from view, they would not easily survive the visibility
provided by a guidelines system. Suppose that in a robbery prosecution the jury convicts only of theft. If the judge is persuaded
that robbery "really" occurred, could he or she impose sentence on
the basis of the robbery guideline, even after the express acquittal
on that charge?
40 the Supreme Court invalidated,
In Giacco v. Pennsylvania,"
on vagueness grounds, a state statute permitting the jury to impose
court costs on a defendant acquitted of criminal charges. Although
Giacco does not reach the question whether a state could impose
penalties upon a person after acquittal if different procedures were
used, the decision makes clear that any such penalty must, at a
minimum, be administered under well-defined standards. Sentencing guidelines therefore could not leave to the judge's unguided
discretion the decision whether to rely upon the real offense in
sentencing despite acquittal on that more serious charge. The
guideline policy would have to be spelled out. But this requirement precipitates a dilemma: whatever the policy specified, the
resulting procedures will severely threaten the appearance of fairness and the constitutionality of the system.
One alternative would have guideline policy require that the
sentencing judge base offense severity upon actual offense behavior
in all cases; "lesser offense" convictions resulting from a contested
trial and partial acquittal would be treated no differently from
"lesser offense" convictions obtained by guilty plea and partial dismissal. The New York State Parole Board for a time followed this
rule in applying its parole release guidelines.1 4 ' Such a refusal to
conviction). If the defendants in these cases were retried and acquitted, it seems
implausible that these courts would then permit the sentencing and parole
authorities to draw an adverse inference from the charges.
The Supreme Court, however, continues to flirt with the possibility of realoffense determinations in the context of invalid convictions. United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), if read narrowly, holds only that resentencing is
required when a sentencing judge gave weight to a prior conviction without
realizing its invalidity; conceivably it would be permissible on remand for a judge,
after taking account of the constitutional infirmity, to impose a greater sentence
because of the behavior suggested by the charge. And in Lewis v. United States,

48 U.S.LW. 4205 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1980), the Court held that a constitutionally

invalid conviction provided sufficient evidence of dangerousness to warrant treating
the defendant within the coverage of the federal law that prohibits ownership of a
gun by someone who has been "convicted" of a felony.
140 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
141See STATE OF NEW YORK, BoAnD oF PAnoLE, MEmORANDUM: INTmum
GUIDELNES FOR PAROLE BoAnD DECISION MAKING 1 (Jan. 13, 1978) (copy on file

with author). In Cwikla v. New York State Bd. of Parole (N.Y. Sup. Ct, Dutchess
County, June 9, 1978), the court held that the Board could not consider, in
setting periods of confinement, any acts for which a defendant was acquitted.
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treat the acquittal as completely wiping the slate dean probably
cannot be condemned as inappropriate in all contexts. For example,
public agencies should be entitled, for purposes of hiring, discharge,
or possibly even parole revocation, 142 to treat criminal behavior as
adequately proved despite a formal acquittal in a criminal prosecution. But imposition of an additional term of confinement in the
criminal prosecution itself may not be justified on the same grounds
-it does not result from a different governmental process, designed
to carry out an arguably distinguishable function. Instead, it serves
only to accomplish precisely what the government can obtain, and
ordinarily is expected to obtain, by seeking criminal conviction for
the alleged actual behavior. Considerations like these probably
were at the root of Justice Stewart's position, expressed in his concurrence in Giacco, that imposition of a penalty following an acquittal would violate "the most rudimentary concept of due
process." 143 The same considerations also suggest that reliance
upon real-offense behavior to justify a higher sentence, after formal
acquittal on the more serious charge, should be held to constitute
impermissible double jeopardy. 144
This horn of the dilemma could be avoided by specifying in
the guidelines that real-offense determinations may not extend to
charges resulting in a formal acquittal. The United States Parole
Commission has established such an exception to its real-offense
policy. 145 Once this exception is made, however, it becomes apparent that the sentencing judge or parole agency is not simply
making a factual judgment based on all available evidence, according to a less stringent standard of proof. Rather, the sentencing
authority is singling out charge-reduction cases for special treatment
Subsequently the Board modified its policy so that offense seriousness categories
are now based on "the crime of conviction, any possession of weapons and type
of contact with the victim." STATE OF NEW Yonu, BoAD oF PAEorx, MEmOnANDum: BEVISED GuIDEL-ES FoR PAoroE DECISION MAKING 1 (Oct. 20, 1979)
(copy on file with the author). The first factor, crime of conviction, obviously
precludes consideration of the real offense, but unproved charges apparently still
may come into play to the extent that they affect possession of a weapon or type
of contact with the victim.
142 See, e.g., Standlee v. Ebay, 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Chambers, 429 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1970); In re Dunham, 16 Cal. 3d 63, 127
Cal. Rptr. 343, 545 P.2d 255 (1976). Contra, People v. Grayson, 319 N.E.2d 43
(ill. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975).
143 382 U.S. 399, 405 (1965) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id. (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
144Cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975)
(double jeopardy clause bars
prosecution as adult after juvenile court prosecution on same charge); Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) (double jeopardy clause bars resentencing
after first sentence has become final, even though first sentence was erroneous).
1- 5 UNDrrE STATES PxAOLE CoMvissIoN, supra note 58, at 4.08.
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and imposing a more severe sentence than it would consider proper
were a mere "reasonable doubt" to be established by trial. Such
differential treatment presumably would be explained in terms of
lack of confidence in the plea negotiation process. 146 But the explanation does not make the result much more comprehensible.
The system created permits the sentencing authorities, and perhaps
a single judge, simultaneously to dismiss a charge and to give it
credence; the system relies upon charging concessions to induce
pleas and, at the same time, proclaims the impropriety of those concessions; the system demands that plea commitments to the defendant
be honored 147 and then treats the sentencing consequences of charge
reduction as an undesired side effect, rather than a commitment to
be respected. A sentencing system that permits conflicting policies to
be pursued by independent authorities, prosecutors on the one hand
and sentencing or parole officials on the other, seems vulnerable to
multiple constitutional objections. 148 But whether or not such
attacks successfully surmount the doctrinal hurdles, the feeling will
persist that this is not a seemly way to render justice.
146 The United States Parole Commission has explicitly premised its real-offense
policy on this ground: emphasis on the offense of conviction "would place excessive
reliance on convictions obtained more often by negotiation of pleas than by trial
of the facts. Neither justice nor uniformity of treatment could be achieved with
such a system .... 40 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,330 (1975).
147 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
148 An equal protection claim could be based on the differential treatment of
those defendants who win dismissals and those who win acquittals. The Supreme
Court might not, however, consider strict scrutiny appropriate in this context,
cf. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974) (exclusion from narcotics addiction
treatment program of individuals with two prior felony convictions examined under
low-level rationality standard and held constitutional even though exclusion resulted
in imprisonment); in any event, the discrimination seems necessary to further the
usually stated objective of counteracting the effects of plea bargaining. The
question then would become whether the objective is a legitimate one, given the
obligation to honor plea commitments, see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971); or whether the objective, even if legitimate, properly falls within the
purview of the parole or sentencing agency given that the agency would not then
be claiming to exercise its assigned function of judging the behavior of all offenders
(after both dismissal and acquittal). Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88 (1976) (Civil Service Commission regulation may not be justified by reference
to governmental objectives outside the function of the Commission).
A real-offense sentence would be invalid under Santobello if the prosecutor or
judge had assured the defendant that dismissed charges would not be considered in
sentencing. In the likely absence of such an explicit assurance, an attack on the
plea would have to be based on the requirement that the waiver of trial be
"knowing and intelligent." But as the law stands, failure of the trial judge to
explain the workings of a real-offense policy probably would not be held a fatal

flaw.
Monx

Compare the cases discussed in Y. KAmsAit, W. LAFAvE & J. IsRA _,
Ckuv L PuocmuRE 1173-75 (4th ed. 1974).
Rule 11(c) of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires only that the judge explain the
maximum and minimum sentences provided by law. The existing principles, already
somewhat more restrictive than fairness could be said to demand, plainly will require
reworking when unstructured sentencing discretion gives way to a guidelines system.
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2. Efficiency
Presentence report characterizations of the real offense enjoy
today a measure of freedom from scrutiny and litigation. Their
importance is perhaps not understood by some defense lawyers, and
their concrete effect upon the ultimate sentence is in any event
difficult to predict. Tactical considerations also caution restraint
by the defense-only limited tools for challenging the presentence
report are available; 149 a successful challenge produces no certain
sentencing benefit; and indeed there is no practical way to ensure
that the challenge, whether successful or unsuccessful, will not in
some way trigger a harsher sentence. 15 0 A defendant who pleads
guilty to a lesser count, declares his or her contrition, and seeks
the mercy of the court ordinarily has every reason to avoid what
might appear to be "quibbling" with the probation officer's description of the offense.
In a guidelines system, challenges to the presentence report's
characterization of the real offense would likely be a daily occurrence. The sentencing significance of actual offense behavior would
be clear, the judge would be obliged to make an unequivocal finding, and the ability of the judge consciously or unconsciously to
penalize the contentious defendant would be limited by the sentencing guidelines. Resolution of these challenges would give rise to
further procedural burdens. In the absence of formal testimony
and cross-examination, a conscientious judge would find it difficult
to resolve genuinely disputed issues of fact.15 ' Indeed, due process
probably requires that the defendant be granted the rights to present
evidence and to cross-examine opposing witnesses. 152 And, in the
event of a sentencing decision based on the real offense rather than
the formal offense of conviction, efforts to appeal could be ex153
pected.
9
14 See text accompanying notes 110-13 and 133-34 supra.

350 See, e.g., M. HEOmANN, supra note 78, at 61-69; cf. United States v.
Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (judge's impression that defendant committed perjury
at trial justifies harsher sentence).
151 See, e.g., United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874, 881 (W.D. Mo.
1974), aff'd on other grounds, 529 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975). It may be possible
to narrow the areas of dispute by a pre-hearing conference procedure, see ABA
IN ALTERNATivE , supra note 110, at § 4.5(b); as judge
PROJECT ON SENENr
Friendly commented in another context, however, the potential for delay associated
with cross-examination is "not really answered, as any trial judge will confirm, by
the easy suggestion that the hearing offlcer can curtail cross-exanmination." Friendly,
"Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1285 (1975).
152 See text accompanying notes 133-37 supra.
153Under the proposed Federal Criminal Code, if the judge's sentence is
within the range for the applicable guideline, the defendant has no right to appeal
but may seek leave to fie a discretionary appeal if his or her initial avenue of
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These procedural burdens would be incurred, it must be remembered, on an issue that both prosecution and defense would
rather not litigate at all. If their preference is to be disregarded in
the interest of accurate factfinding, why not determine the offense
in the ordinary manner-by trial? Deferring the matter to the
sentencing stage would avoid the involvement of a jury, ease the
burden of proof,154 and normally narrow the scope of appeal. But
these advantages would be obtained at a price. The significance of
the formal conviction would be depreciated, the defendant might
feel he or she had been "had," and society would lose the effect of
the longer statutory sentence range that would have applied if the
actual offense behavior had been determined by trial. Because the
"streamlined" process would itself impose a significant burden, it
seems to combine the worst features of the available procedural
alternatives. More efficient in most instances would be a forthright
decision by the judge either to accept the full implications of the
charge-reduction agreement or to reject the agreement and hold a
formal trial.
3. Plea Negotiation
At least on the surface, opportunities for plea negotiation
would be sharply curtailed in a guidelines system using actual
offense behavior to determine sentences. Charge reduction would
still constrict the statutory sentencing boundaries applicable to the
case; when this affected the actual guideline sentence available, 55
plea negotiation could continue, and the real-offense procedure
would have limited value in correcting its consequences. In a great
many instances, however, the guideline sentence for the real offense
would probably fall within the statutory boundaries for both the
original and the reduced charge. Charge reduction in these instances would serve only to curtail the defendant's potential exposure to extra-guideline sentences. But a guidelines system presumably would limit the grounds for imposing extra-guideline
sentences and also afford appellate review. 5 6 Absent unusual aggravating circumstances, the risks avoided by charge reduction
would therefore be minimal in most instances.
relief, a motion to modify sentence addressed to the trial court, is blocked by
denial of the motion. See proposed Federal Criminal Code, supra note 71, at
§ 3725(b); CRmnNAL CODE REFoR ACT OF 1977, S. BEtP. No. 605, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1163 (1977).
154 The courts might hold, however, that the real-offense issue is so traditionally
a part of the prosecutor's case that the legislature is not free to dilute the burden
of proof. See note 123 supra.
155 See text accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
156 See note 153 supra.
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The disappearance of benefits to the defense from the typical
charge-reduction agreement would not go unnoticed. Before long
prosecution and defense doubtless would begin agreeing upon even
greater reductions. A serious theft (or even a robbery) could, for
example, be reduced to theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor
under the proposed Federal Criminal Code. 57 Despite the real
offense, the judge could impose at most the statutory maximum for
the offense of conviction, here one year in prison. Or, if the prosecution found such a concession excessive, the case would likely go
to trial. Use of the real offense would not offset the distortions of
plea bargaining and, in fact, would likely aggravate them by rendering the nominal offense of conviction even less realistic than it is
now. This difficulty could be avoided by declaring-and developing
a way of enforcing-a genuine prohibition of plea bargaining. But
then real-offense determinations would no longer be necessary.
Until that is done, the effect of such determinations would be
quickly neutralized by compensating actions elsewhere in the system.
4. Evasion
Until now I have considered only problems engendered by
good faith administration of a real-offense system. Prosecutors could
seek to avoid the thrust of the system, however, by agreeing to concede, or not to oppose, the defendant's characterization of the
offense. And given inevitable uncertainties of fact and evidence,
tacit understandings between prosecution and defense could develop
even without conscious bad faith. A real-offense system would produce what amounts to bargaining, but force it underground, thus
encouraging cynicism about the process and frustrating efforts to
preserve for the defendant the benefit of any tacit bargain. 5 8
A possible check upon conscious or subconscious evasion by the
prosecuting attorney would be the probation officer's presentence
investigation. But the Probation Service normally relies heavily
upon the prosecutor's cooperation. It hardly seems desirable to
convert that agency into an independent prosecutorial arm, capable
of overseeing evidentiary assessments made by the United States
Attorney's office. Suppose, moreover, that the Probation Service
157Proposed Federal Criminal Code, supra note 71, at § 1731(b) (3).
' s Recognizing the destructive potential of such a situation, the Supreme Court
has on several occasions refused to adopt plea bargaining principles that it considered not susceptible to reliable enforcement. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76-78 (1977).
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did learn of facts suggesting a more serious real offense. If the
defendant challenged the evidence, responsibility for determining
how strenuously to defend the point would rest again with the
United States Attorney.
I do not suggest that judicial efforts to determine the real
offense would be manipulated with any great frequency. Given the
importance assumed by those determinations, however, pressures
would plainly arise, and no readily available mechanism would
guarantee the integrity of the real-offense procedure. Under these
circumstances, further distortions of the system inevitably would
occur. Together with the problems of fairness, procedural efficiency, and the impact of permitted forms of plea negotiation, these
difficulties point-definitively, in my judgment-to the unsoundness
of any attempt to base guideline sentences upon the real offense.
IV.

CONTROL OF PROSECUTORIAL SENTENCING POWER:

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF CHARGE-REDUCTION AGREEMENTS

In the part of this Article just concluded, I noted that prosecutorial sentencing power in a guidelines system would be exercised
primarily through prosecutorial charging decisions and chargereduction plea agreements. Judges and parole officials have been
accustomed to neutralizing that power by the low visibility device
of real-offense sentencing. But as the previous part indicates, efforts
to counteract charging decisions by that device are likely to falter in
a guidelines system.
All of the difficulties of real-offense sentencing could be avoided
by authorizing judges to do formally and unambiguously what realoffense sentencing attempts to do by the back door-namely, to forbid or restrict charge bargaining and to reject charge-reduction plea
agreements. This candid, conceptually straightforward approach
would, perhaps because of its candor, run counter to many conventional assumptions about criminal sentencing. Nevertheless, this
approach could successfully reduce unfairness, inconsistency, and
excessive discretion in the criminal sentencing process. In the first
section of this part, I discuss three general issues raised by judicial
control of charge-reduction agreements-the propriety of judicial
supervision of the charging power, the implications for plea bargaining, and the prospects for evasion of judicial control. In the second
section, I suggest specific ways to implement judicial control and
analyze the narrower issues that would be raised by the particular
implementing framework that I favor.
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A. General Considerations
1. The Propriety of Judicial Control of Charge Bargaining
Can a trial judge reject a charge-reduction plea agreement
without improperly intruding upon the responsibilities of the prosecutor? The case for an affirmative answer should be quite clear,
but given the frequent misunderstanding about prosecutorial prerogatives in this area, the subject warrants careful attention.
In the federal system the sentencing judge's authority to reject
a disposition acceptable to both parties is specifically acknowledged
by rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 159 But the
scope of this authority is not made explicit by the rule. When the
judge concludes that the plea is involuntary, is made without full
understanding of the charge, or lacks a factual basis, the authority
to reject the plea is unquestioned; indeed, the judge has no discretion to do otherwise. 160 Difficulty arises, however, when the trial
judge rejects a plea despite full compliance with the voluntariness, understanding, and factual basis prerequisites. Although the
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a defendant has no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted by the court,161 it seems
equally clear that the trial court does not have absolute discretion
16 2
to reject a plea: a legitimate reason must support the rejection.
What has remained controversial is the question that is central for
present purposes-namely, whether the judge may reject a plea on
the ground that the offense pleaded to does not, in the court's judgment, adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's misconduct.
In United States v. Ammidown, 163 a defendant charged with
the first-degree murder of his wife, under exceptionally sordid circumstances, offered with the prosecutor's consent to plead guilty to
murder in the second degree. The trial judge rejected the agreement, and the defendant was convicted on the first-degree charge.
169 FED.
60

-

R. Crar. P. 11(e)(2).

See id. 11(c),

(d), & (f).

The cases have split on the propriety of re-

jecting a plea merely because of the judge's "doubt" about whether these requirements are met. Compare United States v. Navedo, 516 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1975)
(doubt about factual basis; rejection proper), with United States v. Martinez, 486
F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1973) (doubt about voluntariness; rejection improper).
161 North Carolina v. Afford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970); Lynch v. Overholser,
369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962).
162E.g., United States v. Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Compare
United States v. Bednarsli, 445 F.2d 364, 366 (1st Cir. 1971) (judge must
"seriously consider" accepting plea), with United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 702
n.3 (5th Cir. 1977) (formal statement of reasons for rejection held unnecessary).
163497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that rejection of the guilty plea had been
improper, vacated the first-degree conviction, and ordered that the
plea to second-degree murder be accepted.
Judge Leventhal's opinion for the court announced principles
that would confine judicial discretion over a wide range of very common situations. 16 The court recognized that rule 11 authorizes
the judge to reject a guilty plea and found, in commentaries supporting this judicial role, "isolated phrases voicing the fear that the
judge should not permit the plea bargain to become the means
whereby the hardened criminal escapes justice." 105 It also recognized as "axiomatic" that "within the limits imposed by the legislature, imposition of sentence is a matter for the discretion of the
trial judge," rather than the prosecutor. 166 Nevertheless, the court
stressed the need to harmonize the judge's traditional primacy in
sentencing with the traditionally broad power of the prosecutor to
determine when to file or dismiss charges. The court concluded
that, both for rule 11 dismissals pursuant to a plea agreement and
for rule 48(a) dismissals outright, 67 the starting point must be a
"presumption that the determination of the United States Attorney
is to be followed in the overwhelming number of cases." x6s The
court then narrowly limited the circumstances under which the trial
judge might justifiably reject a charge reduction acceptable to both
prosecution and defense:
[A] judge is free to condemn the prosecutor's agreement
as a trespass on judicial authority only in a blatant and
extreme case. In ordinary circumstances, the change of
grading of an offense presents no question of the kind of
action that is reserved for the judiciary.
[A] dropping of an offense that might be taken
as an intrusion on the judicial function if it were not
164 The specific holding in Ammidown was an extremely narrow one. Because
the trial judge had not formally given reasons for rejecting the plea, remand, at the
least, was required. The appellate court's further conclusion that the judge could

not legitimately reject the second-degree plea rested on the fact that subsequent to
the judge's initial action, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), had eliminated
the possibility of capital punishment on the first-degree charge; hence the judge's

sentencing power was no longer significantly circumscribed by the charge-reduction
agreement.
165 497

F.2d at 619.

",6611d. 621.
167Fau. R. Cium. P. 48(a).
168 497 F.2d at 621.
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shown to be related to a prosecutorial purpose takes on an
entirely different coloration if it is explained to the judge
that there was a prosecutorial purpose, an insufficiency of
evidence, a doubt as to the admissibility of certain evidence
under exclusionary rules, a need for evidence to bring another felon to justice, or other similar consideration. 16 9
Under this reasoning, a judge seems free to reject charge-reduction
agreements thought to be too lenient only when they appear to
serve no legitimate prosecutorial purpose. And, adding to the
examples of prosecutorial purpose already quoted, the court at another point stressed that "the United States Attorney . . . alone is

in a position to evaluate the government's prosecution resources
and the number of cases it is able to prosecute." 170 With this
notion of legitimate prosecutorial purpose, there would appear to
be few instances, short of those involving corrupt motives, in which
a judge could properly reject a charge-reduction agreement on
grounds of excessive leniency.
Although subsequent cases have cited Ammidown with apparent approval, 171 Judge Leventhal's conclusion that prosecutorial
charging discretion should normally prevail over judicial sentencing
discretion has not won general acceptance.17 2 But whatever the
current state of federal law, the proper reconciliation of prosecutorial and judicial discretion poses some difficulties in the context
of charge-reduction plea agreements. On the one hand, the Ammidown approach, requiring judicial deference to the prosecutorial
judgment in reaching a charge-reduction plea agreement, grants the
prosecutor a very large voice in the determination of sentence, a
long-recognized sphere of judicial authority. On the other hand,
169 Id. 622-23.
170 Id.

621.

171See, e.g., United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 90 (5th Cir. 1975);

United States v. Hastings, 447 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Ark. 1977); United States v.
Washington, 390 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Fla. 1975); State v. Crosby, 338 So. 2d 584
(La. 1976); People v. Matulonis, 60 Mich. App. 143, 239 N.W.2d 347 (1975).
172 Most of the other federal courts of appeals have yet to role explicitly on the
issue, although a Fifth Circuit decision holds that rejection for excessive leniency
is proper. United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
The 1974 amendments to rule 11, though not free of ambiguity, appear to
reflect the same view and thus probably supersede Ammidown even for the D.C.
Circuit. See FxD. R. Cuim. P. 11(e)(2) and Advisory Committee notes (decision
whether to accept or reject plea agreement left to discretion of trial judge). Nearly
all state courts passing on the question appear to have upheld the trial judge's
authority to reject charge-reduction agreements considered excessively lenient.
E.g., People v. McCartney, 72 Mich. App. 580, 250 N.W.2d 135 (1976) (dictum);
State v. Belton, 48 N.J. 432, 226 A.2d 425 (1967) (dictum); People v. Portanova,
56 A.D.2d 265, 392 N.S.Y.2d 123 (1977).
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the cases affirming judicial discretion to reject charge-reduction
agreements for excessive leniency are not easily reconciled with
other principles-the prosecutor's virtually unreviewable discretion
to forego prosecution entirely 73 and the very limited scope of
judicial authority to deny prosecution motions for outright dismissal
under rule 48(a). 174 The United States Attorney could, in other
words, have declined to prosecute Ammidown at all or could have
declined to bring charges greater than second-degree murder. Even
after first-degree charges in fact were filed, the government could
have obtained a rule 48 dismissal of either the first-degree count or
the entire case. Why should judicial authority be the least bit
broader when the prosecutor seeks only what Judge Leventhal called
a "diluted dismissal" 175 under rule 11?

That the greater power does not always include the lesser is a
familiar principle in law, if not in logic. 7 In the present instance,
several reasons justify greater judicial control over rule 11 "diluted
dismissals" than over rule 48 outright dismissals. To some extent the
absence of meaningful judicial review of initial decisions not to
prosecute and of outright dismissals seems to grow out of difficulties,
both practical and constitutional, in compelling prosecution when
the government is unwilling to go forward. 17 7 But a rule 11 dismissal pursuant to a plea agreement involves conviction and imposition of sentence. When the judicial machinery is invoked and
the prestige of the courts enlisted, mere judicial acquiescence in the
178
prosecutorial judgment seems plainly inappropriate.
One other difference between rule 11 dismissals and outright
dismissals requires consideration. When the United States attorney's charge-reduction decision is conditional upon the defendant's
agreement to plead guilty, the prosecution is not simply exercising
173 See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
174 See, e.g., United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
175 United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
6
17 For example, the government has great flexibility in deciding to exclude
factual elements from the definition of the offense; once an element is included,
however, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684 (1975), and inferences used to supply that proof must be rational, Tot v.

United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). See also Underwood, The Thumb on the
Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299,
1317-20 (1977); text accompanying notes 115-20 supra.
177 See, e.g., United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp.
483, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
178 As the Fifth Circuit stated in United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 703
n.4 (5th Cir. 1977), "once the aid of the court has been invoked the court cannot
be expected to accept without question the prosecutor's view of the public good."
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its judgment about whether a case warrants prosecution and whether
the admissible evidence will be sufficient to convict. The prosecution here is bargaining with the defense. This obvious point is
important because it suggests the inadequacy of certain common
justifications for rule 11 dismissals. Consider, for example, the
Ammidown court's suggestion that a charge-reduction agreement
would not intrude on the judicial sentencing function when it was
prompted by "an insufficiency of evidence." 179 A prosecutor's assessment of the weight of the evidence, though entitled to deference,
calls for dismissal of the unprovable charges, whether or not the
defendant pleads guilty to another charge.18 0 By rejecting a rule 11
dismissal and leaving the prosecution free to obtain a dismissal outright, the court can protect its sentencing authority without in any
way intruding upon the proper exercise of the prosecutorial
function.
Other possible justifications for a rule 11 dismissal pose more
difficult questions. Suppose the government believes its case is
strong, but not airtight; both sides are willing to compromise rather
than risk total defeat. Or suppose the defendant's cooperation is
needed and cannot be obtained while contested charges remain outstanding. Suppose that the United States Attorney's resources simply
do not permit full trial of all pending cases and that the government
considers half a loaf better than none. Here are situations involving legitimate prosecutorial goals that cannot be achieved by an
unconditional dismissal. Although these examples argue for rather
great deference to the prosecutor, the prosecution nevertheless is
seeking to attain its legitimate ends through the use of sentencing
concessions. The dismissal decision necessarily involves determinations that such concessions are required to achieve the government's
objectives and that achievement of those goals outweighs any adverse
impact on other interests inevitably implicated by the imposition
of punishment. As long as it remains "axiomatic" that imposition
of sentence is a matter for the court,' 8 ' these determinations are
82
ones on which the trial judge properly has the final word.
179 497 F.2d 615, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
180 Under the prevailing view, the prosecutor is not considered ethically bound
to seek dismissal unless he or she concludes that probable cause is lacking. See
ABA PoJEcT oN STANDARwS FOR CRMNAL JusnTcE, STANDARDS RmATNGTO T E
NOSECUTrON FuNcnoN AND THE DEFENsE FuNcnTON § 3.9(a)-(b) (1971).
181 The reasons that justify this traditional view are developed at text accompanying notes 76-86 supra.
182 The trial judge presumably should give great weight to the prosecutor's
judgment on the first of these issues, the need for concessions to achieve prosecutorial objectives. There seems to be no basis for deference to the prosecutor, however, on the second issue, the importance of the prosecutorial objectives in relation
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In the existing sentencing system, in short, a judge's decision
to reject a charge-reduction agreement considered excessively lenient
should not be seen as an improper intrusion upon the responsibilities of the prosecutor. Ammidown notwithstanding, the significance for sentencing purposes of the defendant's willingness to
cooperate in other prosecutions or readiness to save the government
the time and expense of trial is in the final analysis a matter for the
sentencing court to determine.
2. Plea Bargaining After the Control of Prosecutorial Power:
Charge-Reduction Guidelines and Explicit
Guilty Plea Concessions
Acknowledgment and active use of the judge's discretion to
reject charge-reduction agreements would help to reduce disparities
traceable to inconsistent prosecutorial decisions. But what safeguards, in turn, would ensure consistency in the exercise of the
judge's discretion? Proposals for federal sentencing reform initially
focused upon eliminating disparities in the exercise of judicial discretion. Controls upon judges may simply transfer discretion to the
prosecutors, but even if we can fill this loophole by judicial control
over charge reduction, we still would have managed only to return
to "square one." Sentence would be dictated primarily by the
offense of conviction. For guilty plea cases, representing the vast
majority of total dispositions, sentencing would be transmuted into
a decision whether to accept the charge-reduction agreement proposed by the parties, and this decision would be committed to the
unguided discretion of the sentencing court. That discretion should
itself be channeled by guidelines..

3

A system structured by rather specific guidelines covering both
charge-reduction and sentencing decisions would afford few, if any,
possibilities for leniency in guilty plea cases, unless the guidelines
to other goals of punishment, such as retribution, isolation of the defendant, and
equality of treatment.
183 For discussion of amendments to the proposed Federal Criminal Code,
supra note 71, that would be required to confirm a sentencing commission's authority
to promulgate formal guidelines governing this judicial decision, see 1 FEDERAL
SENTENcING REFORM, supra note 52, at 90 & n.113. The most recent version of
the pending Federal Criminal Code, as voted out of the Senate Judiciary Committee
last December 4, included amendments that would authorize a sentencing commission to promulgate such guidelines, see S. 1722, tit. III, § 125, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (adding 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(D)). A recent version of the pending
House bill similarly would authorize a sentencing commission to promulgate "standards" for the judge's decision whether to accept a charge-reduction agreement. See
H.R. 6233, tit. I, § 101, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (revising 18 U.S.C. § 4303
(a)(3)). See generally CRuMNAL CODE REFORM AcT OF 1979, S.REmP. No. 553,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1235-36.
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included explicit provisions for a guilty plea concession. Difficult
questions about plea bargaining would thus be driven to the fore.
Many people undoubtedly would be happy to see guilty plea concessions abolished completely and would find charge-reduction and
sentencing guidelines attractive precisely because they could provide a means of achieving that end. Consideration of the argument
for abolition of plea bargaining would require attention to many
difficult and important issues.'" I do not by any means consider
the preservation of plea bargaining inevitable, politically or otherwise. But for present purposes, it will be more fruitful to assume
that, at least for the immediate future, some form of guilty plea
concession will continue to have a place in criminal sentencing.
Effective remedies for the vice of excessive discretion, my principal concern here, need not entail the abolition of all guilty plea
concessions; they require only that the plea negotiation system be
insulated from excessive discretion, to ensure reasonable consistency
in guilty plea sentences. One would not wish, however, to pursue
this solution to the disparity problem without considering its side
effects, and particularly its potential for aggravating the already
troublesome state of guilty plea practice.
At the risk of oversimplifying an extraordinarily complex and
elusive phenomenon, I believe that one can group into three categories the principal concerns raised by plea bargaining. First are
the symbolic and doctrinal difficulties associated with putting any
"price" on the exercise of a constitutional right. Second is the
danger that the concession system will be unsoundly administered;
negotiated agreements may be inconsistent, skewed by conflicts of
interest and tainted by the influence of irrelevant or even invidious
considerations.10 Finally, the concession on some occasions may
simply be "too attractive," exerting unfair pressure for self-condemnation and risking possible conviction of the innocent. The
first of these problems is inherent in any type of guilty plea
concession. The second, unsound administration, is largely the consequence of excessive discretion, and it could be alleviated by
charge-reduction and sentencing guidelines, at least if the guidelines
184 At a minimum, one would wish to know to what extent the number of
eases to be tried would increase, at what cost, and with what means for paying
that cost. Whether a proposal abolishing all concessions would arouse insurmountable political opposition must also be considered. For a thoughtful development of
the justifications for some form of plea bargaining, see Enker, supra note 54, at
112-17.
, supra note 26, at 200-05; Alschuer, The Defense Attor185 See D. Nney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role]; White, supra note 75, at 449-52. See also
text accompanying notes 206-07 infra.
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system effectively controlled behavior. But if the guidelines authorized substantial guilty plea concessions, they would perpetuate the
third problem of undue pressure upon defendants. In fact, they
probably would aggravate that problem because the very certainty
and clarity of the concession system could intensify the pressure to
plead guilty and enhance the prosecutor's position of dominance. 18 6
In order to eliminate sentencing disparities without creating
new difficulties in plea bargaining, the guidelines developed must
provide uniform standards for charge reduction, while also ensuring
that the concession will be small. Such guidelines could, if welldesigned, eliminate excessive discretion. They would also avoid the
certainty cum dominance dilemma by clarifying the bargaining
stakes without imposing undue pressure on defendants or increasing
the prosecutor's bargaining leverage. Even the doctrinal problem
of imposing a "price" on the right to trial would be mitigated,
though not of course solved in principle, because the price would
at least be a small one.
The concept of "effective" guidelines with a "small" concession
is much too easy to state. The notion would scarcely be worth
proposing unless accompanied by specifics about how the guidelines
would be rendered effective; how the size of the concession would
be fixed; and how, if the concession were indeed "small," the perceived need to maintain a high proportion of guilty pleas would be
satisfied. These problems are considered in detail below, 18 7 but we
must first consider the desirability of explicit guilty plea concessions
as a matter of principle. I conclude that explicit concessions should
and would be held constitutional. Although such concessions would
raise difficult issues of policy, I argue that these issues are better
faced and resolved, whatever the resolution.
a. The Constitutionalityof Explicit Guilty Plea Concessions
The propriety of guidelines granting explicit sentencing concessions in exchange for pleas of guilty is clouded by uncertainties
of constitutional doctrine because the Supreme Court has kept alive
two lines of decision difficult to reconcile with each other. Plea
bargaining is considered legitimate, 88 but governmental actions
that have the sole purpose and effect of penalizing the exercise of a
constitutional right (or any legal right) violate due process. 189
186 See text accompanying note 81 supra.

187 See text accompanying notes 214-49 infra.
188 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1978); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-55 (1970).
189 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-26 (1969); United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-83 (1968).
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Guilty plea concessions therefore seem potentially vulnerable when
they flow not from the give-and-take of negotiation but solely from
differences in the statutory treatment of contested and uncontested
cases. Corbitt v. New Jersey, decided during the October, 1978
Term,19 0 involved state statutes providing the following penalties
for murder:
-mandatory life imprisonment, when the defendant pleads
not guilty and the jury finds the murder to be first degree;
and
-life or any term up to thirty years, at the judge's discretion, when the defendant pleads non vult (no contest). 191
This statutory scheme was upheld in an ambiguous and highly
qualified opinion joined by five members of the Court, but there
was no ambiguity in the position taken in the concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, approved ordinary plea negotiation on the
ground that it permits consideration of individual factors relevant
to the particular case, regardless of the defendant's plea: "the process
does not mandate a different standard of punishment depending
solely on whether or not a plea is entered." 192 Justice Stevens distinguished the New Jersey statute:
[A] defendant who faces a more severe range of statutory penalties simply because he has insisted on a trial, is
subjected to punishment not only for the crime the State
has proved but also for the "offense" of entering a "false"
not-guilty plea.
[Invocation of the] right of the defendant to stand
absolutely mute before the bar of justice and to force the
government to make its case without his aid . . . cannot

retain the protection of the Fifth 1 93Amendment and be
simultaneously a punishable offense.

Justice Stewart, concurring only in the result, voted to uphold
the statute on the ground that defendants going to trial might re190 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
391

Id. 215-16. N.J.

STAT.

AwN. § 2A:113-3 (West 1969 & Supp. 1978-1979)

prohibits the entry of guilty pleas to murder indictments, but permits pleas of

non vmut or nolo contendere. 439 U.S. at 215.
192 Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 232 (1978).
198 Id. 232-33.
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ceive less than the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment (if
acquitted or convicted only of offenses less serious than first-degree
murder), while defendants pleading no contest might receive the
"It is,
maximum sentence of life imprisonment despite the plea.1'
therefore, impossible to state with any confidence that the New
Jersey statute does in fact penalize a defendant's decision to plead
not guilty." 195 When he turned, however, to the problem posed
when differences in treatment based on the plea are indeed clear,
Justice Stewart was as pointed as the three dissenters:
While a prosecuting attorney, acting as an advocate, necessarily must be able to settle an adversary criminal lawsuit
through plea bargaining with his adversary, 196 a state legislature has quite a different function to perform. Could a
state legislature provide that the penalty for every criminal
offense to which a defendant pleads guilty is to be one-half
the penalty to be imposed upon a defendant convicted of
the same offense after a not-guilty plea? I would suppose
that such legislation would be clearly unconstitutional
197

The opinion of the five-member majority in Corbitt, written
by Justice White, devoted a long and troublesome footnote to the
question whether a system of statutory concessions ought to be
treated differently from systems of prosecutorial bargaining. Rejecting such a distinction "for the purposes of this case," 198 the
Court seemed to give particular weight to the fact that even in the
non vult cases, "there is discretion to impose life imprisonment.
The statute leaves much to the judge and to the prosecutor and
does not mandate lesser punishment for those pleading non vult
than is imposed on those who go to trial." 19
The Corbitt opinions, taken at face value, indicate that the
Court would uphold a guidelines system providing separate sentenc194 Under the New Jersey statutory scheme, the judge does not classify a
murder as first- or second-degree when accepting a no contest plea, and could
therefore impose life imprisonment even though the underlying facts would have
supported no more than a second-degree murder conviction at trial. Id. 218 & n.7,
226.

195 Id. 227 (footnote omitted).
196 The majority made clear in Corbitt, as the Court has done on numerous
prior occasions, that "[tlhe States and the Federal Government are free to abolish
guilty pleas and plea bargaining." Id. 223. It seems unlikely that Justice Stewart
intended to express disagreement with this principle.
197Id. 227.
198 Id. 224 n.14.
99Id.

(emphasis added). See also id. 215-16.
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ing ranges for contested and uncontested cases, at least if the two
ranges overlapped. A defendant pleading guilty in such a system
might receive a prison term as long as, or even longer than, that
imposed on some defendants who stand trial. But a sentencing
commission intent upon control of charging and sentencing discretion is unlikely to find adequate such a loosely structured
framework.
Effective controls upon discretion require rather narrow-and
thus essentially non-overlapping-penalty ranges for offenses of different severity. Guilty plea concessions under such guidelines
might be afforded by a provision, applicable to all guilty plea cases,
either reducing the severity level of the offense or granting a specific
reduction of the sentence after adjustment of the sentence for all
other relevant factors. These approaches would apparently be condemned by at least four members of the Court,200 and even the
Corbitt majority might see them as going a small, but critical, step
beyond the "possibility of leniency" involved in the New Jersey
scheme. 201 Under these circumstances, a sentencing commission
might, with some reason, prefer not to tackle the thorny problem of
explicit guilty plea discounts. But the stakes are extraordinarily
high. Effective constraints upon sentencing discretion simply cannot be achieved without either a quantum jump in the percentage
of cases going to trial or a specific guideline concession for defendants who plead guilty. Use of guilty plea concessions should not
be ruled out unless the constitutional barrier is insuperable.
In my view, the concerns about explicit statutory concessions
expressed by several of the Justices in Corbitt are not soundly based,
and the Court could ultimately be persuaded to uphold a thoughtfully developed system of guilty plea discounts. Difficulty arises,
first of all, with the notion expressed in the Stevens and Stewart
opinions that negotiated concessions do not penalize the right to
trial as such because they are adjusted on a case-by-case basis 2in
02
response to individual factors relevant to the circumstances.
200 Justice Stewart might conceivably be persuaded that judicial discretion to
depart from the guidelines provides the uncertainty that would, in his view, render
plea-related distinctions permissible. But an argument of that kind would seem

quite unconvincing in the context of a guidelines system designed to limit such
to unusual situations.
departures
2 01
ln discussing prosecutorial plea negotiations, the Corbitt opinion mentioned
approvingly the "probability or certainty" of leniency, 439 U.S. at 221, but its references to permissible statutory concessions are all couched only in terms of "the
possibility" of leniency, id. 224-25 nn.14 & 15. In fact, the Court seemed to rely
on the absence of certainty as a decisive factor, see text accompanying notes 198-99
supra, and treated that factor as critical for purposes of distinguishing United States
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). See 439 U.S. at 217.
202 See 439 U.S. at 227, 231-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

784

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

['Vol 128:733

This view might be tenable if prevailing doctrine authorized sentencing concessions only in response to lesser culpability, demonstrated remorse, or other penologically relevant considerations. But
the law now clearly permits the prosecutor to offer a concession, or
to threaten to file additional charges supportable by the evidence,
solely for purposes of encouraging a plea.20

3

Whatever else may

influence the give-and-take of plea negotiations, the plea may now
be given weight in its own right. Thus, the existing plea negotiation system ordinarily does precisely what Justice Stevens argued
the legislature may not do-impose additional punishment based
solely on the nature of the plea.
If the state may indeed make it "expensive" to contest a criminal charge, is a price set by statute or administrative regulation
significantly more offensive than one negotiated by opposing attorneys in the context of an adversary system? Implicit in the Stevens
and Stewart opinions seems to be a concern that statutory concessions, imposed unilaterally by a legislature holding "all the cards,"
are less fair than those agreed upon by adversaries bargaining on a
relatively equal footing. Certainly a legislatively established penalty
structure could impose "nonnegotiable" trial penalties substantial
enough to be unfairly coercive. But prosecutorial concessions can
be unfairly coercive as well. In fact, while warning repeatedly that
guilty plea concessions must not be so great as to coerce inaccurate
pleas, 204 the Court has approved prosecutorial inducements unlikely
20 5
ever to be exceeded by explicit legislative penalty structures.
Given comparable, poorly defined limits on the permissible
extent of both prosecutorial and legislative inducements, the potential for unfairness is, if anything, much greater in case-by-case
bargaining. Lack of uniformity is, of course, one major problem.
Particularly when dispositions are negotiated by constantly changing pairs of adversaries, considerable disparity in the treatment of
like cases is virtually inevitable. Much worse is the potential for
improper disposition of individual cases. Prosecutors have a variety
of career-oriented incentives for wanting to try or to avoid trying
specific cases. 20 6

For defense counsel an even sharper divergence

203 See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 221-23 & n.12 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71

(1977).
204 See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 225 & n.15 (1978); Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
205 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (prosecutor threatened to seek indictment under habitual offender statute, mandating life imprisonment upon conviction, if defendant insisted on trial on charge of forging check for

$88.30).
206

See White, supra note 75, at 449-52.
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arises between their own professional and financial interests on the
one hand and the interests of their clients on the other.2 07 To be
sure, an attorney may not ethically permit such personal considerations to intrude upon the performance of his or her duty. But, in
an unstructured bargaining situation, in which the criteria of a
"proper" outcome are at best vaguely specified,208 the tangible conflicts of interest faced by guilty plea negotiators could well skew
the results. Indeed, case-by-case negotiation is so flawed by these
structural problems that the process seriously undermines the defendant's right to make a well-informed, voluntary plea decision
with the effective assistance of counsel. Whatever the Court's
willingness to take account of such realities when judging the constitutionality of case-by-case negotiation, the legislature or a specialized sentencing agency is surely entitled to conclude that these
circumstances warrant restrictions on case-by-case bargaining and
formal guidelines to provide greater consistency in the extent of
plea-related concessions.
If statutory concessions of some kind are permissible, should it
make any difference whether the legislation merely provides for the
-possibility" of leniency or instead "mandates" leniency in guilty
plea cases? All of the Justices voting to uphold the New Jersey
statutes in Corbitt seemed to think that mandatory concessions
would raise much more difficult problems. This view may reflect
in part an assumption that a concrete offer of leniency will exert
more pressure upon the defendant than an offer phrased in terms
of more loosely specified possibilities. But the validity of this assumption depends upon the extent of the concession, as well as
upon its certainty. If the penalty for contested cases is mandatory
life imprisonment, even a slim possibility of receiving a five-to-tenyear term could represent a powerful inducement to plead guilty.
If instead the statute mandates a sentence concession of exactiy
twelve months, the defendant might find the pressure to plead guilty
much less intense. There is simply no basis for considering precisely specified concessions more coercive, in general, than vague
29
possibilities for leniency. 0
Considerations of coerciveness to one side, loosely defined possibilities for leniency raise many more problems of fairness than do
concrete concessions. Ordinarily, the defendant wants to know the
actual length of his or her sentence. Systems offering only the pos20 7

See Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 185.
id. 1203 (footnote omitted): "[A] recommendation of a guilty plea
almost always reflects a plausible evaluation of the defendant's interests."
200 See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
208See
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sibility of leniency put defense and prosecution attorneys under
tremendous pressure when they attempt to estimate what the possibilities in fact are. The defendant may receive poor advice, but
even if the probabilities are accurately described, the sentence
actually imposed may be more severe than the one that seemed
likely when the plea was entered. In such a case our system insists,
with rigorous logic, that no misrepresentations have been made and
no promises broken, but it will be impossible to convince the defendant that "he got what he bargained for."
To avoid such uncertainties, opposing counsel could negotiate
a concrete plea agreement guaranteeing a specific concession within
the legislatively authorized range of possibilities. Indeed, by facilitating binding plea agreements under the current sentencing system,
recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
plainly recognize the advantages of greater certainty. 210 But this
solution tends to defeat the very goals of a system of statutory concessions. The principal objectives are to reduce disparities and to
ensure proper disposition of individual cases by minimizing the
role of case-by-case negotiation. These goals can at best be only
partially realized as long as the statutory provisions simply permit
guilty plea concessions and remit determination of their extent to
bargaining by the parties in individual cases.
A sentencing commission might decide that some degree of
flexibility in guilty plea concessions is desirable or unavoidable.
As a constitutional matter, a commission ought to be free, however,
to adopt guidelines mandating the greatest feasible degree of uni2 11
formity in plea-related concessions.
b. Other Objections to Explicit Guilty Plea Concessions
The drafting of guilty plea guidelines would pose formidable
problems of policy. The extent of the concession would have to
be determined, either in general terms or separately for each offense2 10

FED. R. Caim. P. 11(e)(1)(C).
For purposes of assessing the Supreme Court's receptivity to these arguments, it may be crucial that the statutes at issue in Corbitt created separate punishment categories without in any way limiting plea bargaining or addressing any of
its evils. The view of the three dissenters in Corbitt ultimately may prove significant not so much for the narrow doctrinal position developed in Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion as for the recognition, implicit in that opinion, that the potential
dangers of plea bargaining warrant structural safeguards of some form or other,
even as a matter of constitutional law. From this perspective, it seems most unlikely
that the dissenters would condemn a statute that created separate punishment
categories only as part of a comprehensive attempt to prevent inconsistent treatment,
exclude extraneous or impermissible factors, and limit coercive pressure in the plea
bargaining system.
211
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offender category. Additional difficulties would arise when the
normal guideline sentence for a contested case was a very short
prison term: Should entry of a guilty plea -in such a case reduce the
sentence to probation? It seems particularly disturbing for the
symbolically and practically vital decision whether to incarcerate to
be so heavily affected by the plea. In addition, the inducement to
plead guilty might seem unusually coercive and thus unusually
likely to result in conviction and stigmatization of the innocent.
But concessions to defendants who would in any event serve some
time would also warrant careful scrutiny; the need for certainty in
ascertaining guilt is, of course, at least as strong in such cases as in
those not involving incarceration. Finally, a sentencing commission
would have to consider whether meaningful but fair inducements
could be designed for cases in which, whatever the plea, imprisonment should not be imposed.
Given the sensitivity of these issues, some might prefer to avoid
guidelines explicitly addressing the problem of guilty plea concessions.212 Such a "solution," however, does not eliminate the issues;
it merely hides them from view, thus permitting adoption of illadvised and disparate approaches to questions that are central to
the fair and effective administration of justice. The difficulty of
the questions cannot be denied, but it is hard to see how we are
well-served by a system that currently prevents any public examination of the issues posed countless times each day as guilty plea
sentences are negotiated and pronounced.2 13 Guilty plea guidelines
would provide a framework within which answers to these important questions could be developed and continuously refined.
3. Evasion of Judicial Control
If the sentencing system regulates charge reduction and if
guilty plea concessions are controlled, pressures to evade these requirements could arise. For reasons already discussed,2 14 it would
be unwise to rely upon control devices too readily circumvented.
Guidelines governing the allowable charge reduction, when combined with a rule against informal charge bargaining, would, how212 Compare Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HAnY. C.R.-C.L. REv. 269,
306-07 (1975), arguing that it may be wise, in some situations involving important
interests, moral flux, and absence of consensus, to avoid "freezing" policy in concrete
rules. It seems central to Professor Tribe's thesis, however, that the alternative of
case-by-case decisionmaking could afford a visible forum for development and refinement of consensus on the issues in question. See id. 308-10. This condition is far
from satisfied in the sentencing context
213 Possible qualifications to this conclusion are explored in the text accompany259-307 infra.
ing notes
2 14
See note 158 supra & accompanying text.
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ever, be difficult to evade. Unlike a real-offense determination, a
judge's decision to disapprove charge reduction would not depend
on the existence of substantial evidence, largely obtainable only
from the prosecution, to support the more serious charge. Indeed,
the absence of evidence supporting the more serious offense would
provide firm ground for rejecting the charge-reduction agreement
because, in that circumstance, the government should seek an unconditional dismissal under rule 48 without attempting to foreclose
215
litigation on the remaining charges.
A prosecutor seeking to ensure punishment less severe than
that indicated by the charge-reduction guidelines could, from the
outset, file charges fewer or less serious than those justified by the
evidence. The government could also obtain an unconditional
dismissal of any charges already filed. Although such action can
result in disparate treatment of similar criminal conduct, it involves
the exercise of a kind of unilateral clemency that has always been
considered the prerogative of the prosecutor.2 16 The problem of
controlling this discretion warrants attention in its own right, but
as long as these decisions are genuinely independent of the defendant's plea on any remaining charges, they should not be seen as
undermining the uniformity of sentencing in prosecuted cases.
A different problem arises if decisions to forego prosecution
on certain charges are tacitly linked to a defendant's promise to
plead guilty to other charges. Manipulation of this kind, however,
would be much riskier under charge-reduction guidelines than
under the present system. Currently, if a defendant pleads guilty
in exchange for a tacit commitment, the prosecution must honor
that commitment in order to maintain the flow of pleas. Under a
guidelines system, the prosecutor would be required to make the
first move-either by filing fewer than all the charges or by moving
for a rule 48(a) dismissal before the defendant's guilty plea had
been tendered. The prosecution would then be dependent on the
defendant's willingness to stick to the bargain and would not have
immediate recourse against defendants who reneged. Reinstatement
of dismissed charges would present problems under the Speedy Trial
Act, 217 and, in any event, the courts would presumably require some
nonbargaining explanation for the reinstatement. Similarly, if the
prosecutor filed charges previously withheld, the courts could re2 18
quire a legitimate explanation for the delay in filing.
215 See text accompanying notes 179-80 supra.
216 See cases cited in note 173 supra.

See Section 101, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c), (h)(6) (Supp. 1979).
Double jeopardy doctrine already forbids prosecution on a more serious
offense after trial on a lesser included offense unless, at the time of the previous
217
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The prosecution might avoid these risks by employing a more
subtle means for inducing the defense to comply with a covert,
impermissible agreement-the tacit threat not to bargain in future
cases with defense attorneys perceived as unreliable or unable to
"control" their clients. The potential effectiveness of this threat in
a guidelines system is difficult to gauge. A defendant would have
an obvious personal interest in disregarding a covert agreement, and
defense attorneys often would be unwilling or unable to pursue
their own goals in the face of the unequivocal interests of a particular client. 219

Perhaps the most that can be said is that the

emergence of informal, illegal ways of doing business would be
much less likely in a guidelines system of the kind described than
in the current sentencing system, in which a hortatory prohibition
of bargaining would run counter to the personal interest of every
individual directly involved in the process.
Determination of the offense category is only one of the steps
in the sentencing computation upon which prosecutorial influence
may be brought to bear. Also potentially subject to bargainingrelated distortions are judicial decisions concerning the proper
offender category, aggravating or mitigating circumstances explicitly
made relevant by the guidelines, and any factors that might prompt
a departure from the guidelines. When providing the information
necessary for any of these judicial decisions, the prosecutor might
decline to allege potentially aggravating facts or decline to challenge
defense claims with respect to mitigating circumstances.
To prevent distortion of these judgments, a sentencing commission could condemn as impermissible any such prosecutorial
commitment given in exchange for the defendant's agreement to
plead guilty. Standing alone, however, this rule would involve
unacceptably high risks of evasion.220 A rule against bargaining
over aggravating and mitigating factors could be supplemented by
exclusion from the sentencing calculation of those factors particutrial, "the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or
have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence." Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977). To preserve the integrity of charge-reduction guidelines, a sentencing commission could require the same type of showing whenever
the government files a charge that could have been joined with a prosecution that
has already proceeded beyond, say, formal arraignment.
219 In the current system, even when going to trial conceivably could be in the
defendant's interest, the possible advantages of a guilty plea are almost always
sufficient to permit defense counsel to rationalize the latter course as being in their
client's, as well as in their own, interest. See note 208 supra.
220

See text accompanying note 158 supra.
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larly susceptible to manipulation.221 But such an approach would
impair the sentencing judge's ability to tailor sentences to concededly relevant offense and offender circumstances.
To ensure that the substance of the sentencing judgment is
not unduly restricted, the problem of distortion resulting from the
inconsistent presentation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances probably is best handled on an item-by-item basis. Factors
easily manipulated and only marginally relevant should be excluded
from consideration. Some reliance on circumstances perceived to
be critical might be permitted even when possibilities for bargaining-related distortions could not be entirely excluded. Of course,
even rather narrow guidelines of this kind would prove inadequate
to control discretion in the absence of limitations on the scope of
bargaining over the charge. 222 In recognition, then, of the inadequacy of any reform that controls only the content of the sentencing
computation, the next section develops a guideline model that combines this approach-restricting discretion with respect to sentencing
variables-with explicit standards controlling charge-reduction agreements. The resulting guidelines system should minimize the
prospects for evasion of uniform plea bargaining policies adopted
by a commission.
Some possibilities for evasion of charge-reduction controls undoubtedly would remain. Actual experience would be necessary for
a definitive assessment of the evasion problem. As matters stand,
however, the obstacles to outright manipulation seem sufficiently
formidable that, together with the expectation of good-faith compliance by the overwhelming majority of prosecutors and defense
attorneys,2 23 instances of evasion would probably be too rare to
224
jeopardize the integrity of the governing guideline principles.
221 For example, the offender category could be governed solely by circumstances of employment, prior record, and other background characteristics readily
ascertained
by the Probation Service.
222

See note 88 supra.
223 Commentators and reformers often seem to assume that formal rules to regu-

late or prohibit plea bargaining inevitably would be circumvented by resourceful
courthouse regulars. For example, Milton Heumann concludes an otherwise thoughtful and provocative study by asserting flatly: "abolition [of plea bargaining] is an
impossibility ....
[T]o speak of a plea bargaining-free criminal justice system is
to operate in a land of fantasy." M. HEUMANN, supra note 78, at 157, 162. The
manipulation and the "no threats or promises" charade of past years occurred,
though, in a system that never explicitly addressed the relationship of negotiated
pleas to the acknowledged principle of voluntariness and that, for the most part,
attempted to ignore the bargaining system entirely. We have no basis for assuming
that attorneys would systematically pursue an unethical and dishonest course in a
system that imposed clear bargaining restrictions and at the same time made
realistic provision for processing all cases within the formal rules.
224 Additional considerations may affect the prospects for evasion in state prosecutions. See text accompanying notes 334-35 infra.
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B. Implementation
I have thus far identified a general approach for bringing the
interrelated processes of sentencing under systematic control. In
this section I shall discuss the specifics entailed in implementing
that general approach. In its most concrete form, the plan has two
principal components: sentencing guidelines that narrowly restrict
judicial sentencing discretion, while deemphasizing factors within
prosecutorial control; and charge-reduction guidelines that restrict
the form and substance of plea bargaining. For present purposes,
the content of these two sets of guidelines may be described briefly,
with a focus on the nature of the guilty plea concession, the procedure for entering a plea, and various practical ramifications. To
complete the illustration in concrete terms, the Appendix to this
Article provides a full text of model charge-reduction and sentencing guidelines.
1. The Guilty Plea Concession
A guidelines approach could accommodate any number of
judgments about the appropriate extent of the guilty plea concession and the circumstances that should trigger it. The substantive
resolution of these issues has not been a primary concern in this
Article, and, unfortunately, the plea bargaining literature has not
pursued them in depth, probably because the concession system has
until now been so utterly unstructured. The approach chosen for
illustration must therefore be considered quite tentative in its
particulars. It contemplates a small minimum discount for every
guilty plea, together with the possibility of a small additional concession in cases involving difficulties of proof that do not cast doubt
on factual guilt and in cases in which the defendant agrees to cooperate in other prosecutions. 22 Beyond these discounts, the
22 5

In building a concession into guideline tables, a commission could treat a
guilty plea as a factor reducing offense severity, as in a charge-reduction agreement,
or as a favorable offender characteristic, improving the guideline evaluation of the
defendant's overall background, in much the same way as would absence of a prior
criminal record. Alternatively, the plea could operate independently of the offense
and offender calculations and provide a defined reduction from a sentence determined without regard to the plea. The independent plea discount is the most
logical approach and avoids the mislabelling associated with charge reduction. But
this approach would require a total prohibition on charge-reduction agreements and
therefore would do the greatest violence to established modes of plea negotiation
practice.
Because it seems prudent to choose forms of implementation that, at least whenever possible, seek to regulate rather than displace current practice, the model guidelines set forth in the Appendix reject the concept of an independent plea discount.
They instead provide a minimum concession for every guilty plea case, linked to
the offender background computation. A guilty plea adds three points to the
offender's salient factor score, see Appendix § 31(D) infra, and thus has the effect of
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charge-reduction guidelines expressly prohibit further sentencing
concessions based, for example, on the savings of time and expense
resulting from avoidance of trial or on problems of proof that raise
a doubt about factual guilt. These guidelines do, however, include
a safety-valve provision, authorizing the trial court to depart from
their terms in the interests of justice, provided that the judge's
reasons are made public and communicated to the sentencing commission for use in refining the guidelines.
The central substantive judgment underlying this approach is
that the plea concession ordinarily should be rather small; 220 the
reasons for this conclusion have already been developed. 227 The
proposal rejects, however, the frequently advanced notion of a fixed
discount applicable across-the-board in all guilty plea cases. 228 Instead, the model guidelines make a rudimentary attempt to distinguish among the various legitimate motivations for leniency.
229
Savings of time and expense are common to every guilty plea,

and the guidelines therefore provide a small, automatic discount for
every guilty plea. Beyond this minimum discount, the guidelines
bar further concessions based on doubts about factual guilt, such as
ambiguity concerning the historical facts or uncertainty in appraisshifting every case one category to the left on the table of presumptive sentences.
As a result, the automatic plea concession would be, for example, a sentence reduction of five months for an offense of "low moderate" severity carrying a thirteenmonth sentence after conviction at trial, or a sentence reduction of twelve months
for an offense of "very high" severity carrying a five-and-one-half-year sentence
after conviction at trial. See Appendix § II(A) infra.
The guidelines permit a further concession to be extended, under certain limited
circumstances, by the charge-reduction device. See Appendix § I(B) infra. When
the guidelines would permit the offense severity category to be reduced by one level
of seriousness, such a charge reduction in effect would provide an additional sentencing concession of five months in the case of a "low moderate" offense carrying
a sixteen-month sentence after conviction at trial, or an additional sentencing concession of twelve months in the case of a "very high" offense carrying a five-andone-half-year sentence after conviction at trial. See Appendix § H(A) infra.
226 The typical guilty plea concession would be, for example, five months for
an offense carrying a thirteen-month sentence after conviction at trial, or twelve
months for an offense carrying a five-and-one-half-year sentence after conviction at
trial. See note 225 supra.
227 See text accompanying notes 186-87 supra.
228 The most fully developed of the "fixed discount" proposals appears in Note,
Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 301-02 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as YALE Note].
229 Although some cases will require more time in trial than others, a discount
explicitly linked to expected savings in trial time would have perverse effects.
Cases involving more serious offenses usually require more time in trial than those
involving less serious ones, and the discount suggested would increase as the expected sentence increased. But within any group of cases involving comparably
serious offenses, to extend a greater discount to the cases expected to consume the
most trial time would, in effect, impose the greatest pressures to plead guilty in the
closely contested cases. These are precisely the cases that should be tried. See
notes 230-34 infra & accompanying text.
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ing the legal sufficiency of an insanity or self-defense claim. 230 Although it is sometimes argued that compromise on such ultimately
unknowable matters is sensible, 231 the proposal reflects the view that
the inducement to plead guilty should not become most intense in
those cases in which the defendant might in fact be innocent.232
Rather, if uncertainties relating to a particular charge are genuine
and substantial, the prosecution should dismiss that charge unconditionally.2 33 If the prosecution sees no reasonable doubt about
factual guilt, but the defense disagrees, the dispute should be re234
solved in the way considered most reliable-by trial.
Some problems of proof, such as those resulting from possible
exclusion of evidence gathered in allegedly illegal searches and
seizures, cast no doubt on factual guilt. In such situations additional concessions may be permitted. The stronger inducement to
230 Whether certain problems of proof do or do not raise a doubt about factual
guilt will of course remain open for debate. With respect to confessions (and
their fruit) obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
compare the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433 (1974). With respect to a missing witness, compare White, supra
note 75, at 458-59, with Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 81, at 1127-28
n.226. For present purposes, I take no position on these subsidiary issues; I claim
only that factual guilt is the relevant criterion for determining whether concessions
based on problems of proof should be allowed.
231 E.g., Enker, supra note 54, at 113; Specter, Book Review, 76 YALE L.J.
604, 606-07 (1967) (D. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial).
232 See generally Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 84, at 69-79;
White, supra note 75, at 458-62. I do not imply that it is possible to know in any
given case what "really" occurred; I use innocence here only to indicate cases
involving at least a reasonable doubt about the defendant's factual guilt.
233 See text accompanying notes 179-80 supra.
234 One reason for regarding a trial as the most reliable procedure is the structure of the process, including its visibility and the neutrality of the decisionmaker.
Commentary defending compromise in close cases, see sources in note 231 supra,
often rests on thinly disguised distrust of the jury system. Although such distrust
is of course justified in some instances, our system's preference for open decision by
disinterested officials is, on balance, a sound one. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's
Role, supra note 84, at 78-79; text accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
Another, more fundamental factor is that only trial procedure requires full
development of the available facts prior to judgment. Even if one had confidence
in the guilty plea decisionmakers, their judgments still would be based on preliminary investigations, cold files, and statements not tested by cross-examination. Under
these conditions, bargains in close cases cannot be regarded as plausible compromises
by fully informed decisionmakers confronting the "unknowable." The difficulty,
moreover, is not a curable one, but rather an inevitable characteristic of a system
that depends for its efficiency upon short-circuiting the available techniques for
careful evidentiary development; a pre-plea hearing procedure that provided all
appropriate factual safeguards would simply reinvent the trial under another name.
On the general problem of information development in informal settings, compare
Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HArrv. L. REv. 637, 657-58 (1976) (discussing richness of techniques
for informal factfinding), with H. RAn=A, DEcisioN ANALrsrs 27-33, 39-50, 157-80
(1968) (discussing conditions under which a rational actor will forego opportunities
to acquire relevant information).
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plead seems more acceptable because factual guilt is not in dispute.
Moreover, in search and seizure situations, for example, the additional sentence reduction would penalize the government for conduct of questionable legality.23
The substantive judgments underlying these guidelines necessarily must be presented in exploratory and tentative form. Experience with the operation of structured discretion in bargaining
and sentencing could well provide support for a different or more
discriminating approach. The possibility of disagreement about
these particulars only highlights the need for guidelines to expose
the relevant issues, to develop a better understanding of them, and
to foster a degree of consistency in their resolution. 236
Because of the exploratory nature of the enterprise, the proposed guidelines include a safety-valve provision, permitting departure from the guidelines for publicly stated reasons. By preserving some flexibility for the sentencing judge and some negotiating
room for the parties, the proposal should permit the sentencing
system to respond more sensitively to genuine differences among
cases and should reduce pressures for covert evasion of the governing rules. The safety-valve provision would also provide a mechanism, now sorely lacking, for developing information likely to
facilitate a more sophisticated approach. Whether the narrow exception would in practice swallow all the rules would, of course,
remain to be seen. My own judgment is that the proposed framework provides enough concrete guidance and enough visibility to
prevent most bargaining-related disparities and to mitigate other
problems of fairness posed by the present system of virtually unrestricted plea negotiation.
2. The Plea Hearing
Analysis of plea bargaining has frequently generated proposals
that the circumstances prompting a plea agreement be presented to
the judge in some formalized pretrial proceeding.23 7 The commentators differ with regard to whether discussions between the
235 Accord, White, supra note 75, at 459-62. The contrary argument is developed in Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 84, at 79-83; Tigar, Waiver
of ConstitutionalRights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 21-24 (1970).
236 For discussion of limited circumstances under which exposure of such issues
could justifiably be avoided, see text accompanying notes 259-77 infra.
237 See, e.g., N. MoanIs, THE FurTuR OF Ia msoNMENT 54 (1974); Alschuler,
The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 81, at 1123-36; White, supra note 75, at 462-65;
Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HtAv.
L. REv. 564, 585-94 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HAv. Note]; YAim Note, supra
note 228, at 300-12.
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parties should be permitted prior to the formal proceeding, 23 8
whether the proceeding itself should be on the record,23 9 and
whether the judge's role in the proceeding should be one of active
negotiator or neutral arbiter.240
Whether such a proceeding could alleviate any of the principal
2 41
problems of plea negotiation is itself subject to some dispute.
Under the most favorable assumptions, however, these proposals by
themselves offer little hope for reducing sentencing disparities or
the coercive effects of powerful inducements to plead guilty. As
long as the authorized range of sentences remains broad and judicial
discretion largely unguided, courts would have scarcely any basis for
assessing the propriety of particular concessions proposed; neither
uniformity nor effective limits on the extent of the concessions
could therefore be expected to emerge from formal pretrial hearings.
The model guidelines reflect an attempt to achieve greater
uniformity and sounder results in individual cases by adapting the
pretrial hearing proposals to the framework of a guidelines sentencing system. The guideline limitations on the extent of permissible
bargaining outcomes make unnecessary any attempt to forbid discussions between the parties prior to the plea hearing or to transfer
responsibility for negotiations to the judge. The proposed procedure would instead preserve current practice by granting the
prosecutor discretion to determine whether concessions beyond the
small automatic discount are warranted and by permitting the
parties to discuss that possibility in an unstructured setting. Any
agreement reached would, as in the current system, be submitted
to the court for approval. The proposal includes guidelines for the
exercise of this judicial discretion, but otherwise preserves the
framework of present practice under rule 11.
3. Feasibility
The impact of the proposed guidelines upon the guilty plea
rate seems impossible to predict a priori. Because the permissible
238 Yes: White, supra note 75, at 464; YALE Note, supra note 228, at 300 (but
No: N. Monaus, supra note 237, at 53-55; Alschuler, The
to be "discouraged").
Trial Judge's Role, supra note 81, at 1147.
No: N. Moans, supra note 237,
239 Yes: YAix Note, supra note 228, at 301.

at 54.

240 Compare HAav. Note, supra note 237, at 588-91 (active involvement by
"magistrate"), with YALE Note, supra note 228, at 301 (passive judicial role). See

also Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role, supra note 81, at 1123-24, 1147 (judge
should assume the dominant role, but not an "adversary posture" toward defendant
and should remain "essentially passive" regarding exchanges between parties and
evaluation of strength of evidence).
241 See, e.g., Kaplan, American Merchandizing and the Guilty Plea: Replecing

the Bazaar with the Department Store, 5 Am. J. Cams. L. 215, 221-22 (1977).
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guilty plea concession generally would be rather modest, guilty pleas
would be most likely in cases involving no plausible defense.
Defenders of plea bargaining often assert that these "dead bang"
cases account for the great bulk of all guilty pleas in current practice;

242

if so, guidelines like those proposed might produce little

change in the percentage of cases going to trial. But if prosecutors
typically offer their most attractive deals in their weakest cases and
if the resulting pleas represent a major part of the total, 243 then the
trial rate could increase. The proposed guidelines of course reflect
a deliberate judgment that cases of this kind should be tried.
Ultimately, experience would indicate whether the number of
contested cases increased, either generally or for certain offenses,
and in the event of an increase of either sort, whether modifications
were required. Corrective action might take the form of either an
increase in the concession or an expansion of the system's trial
capacity. Because it is conceivable-though, in my judgment, unlikely-that adoption of such guidelines could produce a drastic and
unmanageable increase in the trial rate before any corrective action
could take effect, implementation on an experimental basis in a few
districts seems desirable. A sentencing commission could also adopt
a "judicial emergency" provision, comparable to the one in the
Speedy Trial Act of

"

1974,2 4

enabling prompt suspension of the

entire guidelines procedure in the event of a genuine crisis. The
remote prospect of a breakdown in the judicial machinery is, however, inherent in any proposal for constraints on discretion and
should not in itself forestall adoption of controls.
A related problem is the impact of the guidelines on the proportion of bench trials to jury trials. Some statistical evidence
suggests that substantial sentencing concessions are currently granted
to defendants who waive their right to a jury trial and agree to a
trial before a judge. 245 If the guidelines authorize no concession
for such jury waivers, defendants formerly electing a bench trial
might plead guilty (if the guilty plea concession appeared attractive)
or elect a jury trial (if the plea concession were considered too
small). Either procedure is arguably less satisfactory than the relatively efficient, but nonetheless definitive, resolution of guilt by an
adversary trial to the court.
2 42

See text accompanying note 78 supra.

243 See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role, supra note 84, at 60.
244

Section 101, 18 U.S.C. § 3174 (1976).

245 Tiffany, Avichai, & Peters, A Statistical Analysis of Sentencing in Federal

Courts: Defendants Convicted After Trial, 1967-1968, 4 J. LE AL Sn. 369, 379-86
(1975). Contra, J. EisssmNTFn & H. JAcoB, supra note 97, at 276-84.
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If guidelines did substantially reduce the proportion of contested cases tried without jury, a sentencing commission might feel
impelled to explore the possibility of an explicit concession for
waiver of a jury. Formal authorization of such a concession might
have the constructive effect of making an expeditious but fair procedure for ascertaining guilt attractive to some defendants who
might otherwise plead guilty. In fact, by making the jury waiver
concession much larger than the guilty plea concession, a sentencing
commission could establish a framework for eventually replacing
guilty plea dispositions by the somewhat more costly, but plainly
more dignified and reliable, procedure of a formal bench trial.
Jury waiver concessions nevertheless raise troublesome issues.
Their constitutionality is not self-evident,2 6 and the feasibility of
tailoring them to the costs of, or the need for, jury trials in certain
kinds of cases is not obvious. Even their contribution to efficient
court administration is unclear: the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure permit the defendant in a bench trial to demand formal
findings of fact,24 7 and under the present rules, this right cannot be

waived prior to conviction.2 8 It would be instructive to know
whether a bench trial with formal findings "costs" less than a jury
trial. In any event, jury waiver concessions are unlikely to encourage choice of the "most efficient" option-bench trials without
formal findings-unless the concession is further refined to ensure a
greater sentence benefit for such cases. At that point, new questions
of fairness and constitutionality could justifiably be raised. These
questions are typical of the difficult substantive issues inherent in
246 If the plea bargaining system is ignored, the discrepancy between penalties
applicable to bench and jury trials presumably would be seen as imposing a de-

liberate and impermissible penalty upon exercise of the right to jury trial. But if
the purpose and effect of a jury waiver concession were to shift cases from disposition by guilty plea to disposition by a more formal procedure, the result could

well be different. Of course, because the defendant seeking a bench trial is not
"ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a
frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation," Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970), the initial basis for the Supreme Court's approval
of plea concessions would be lacking. But this "remorse" rationale, never a very
realistic one, was thoroughly exploded by the decision in North Carolina v. Alford,

400 U.S. 25 (1970), and the Court now explicitly justifies plea concessions by the
mutual advantages flowing from the system, see Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S.
212, 222 n.12, 222-23 (1978). Such mutual advantages equally characterize a
system of concessions for waivers of a jury or indeed for waivers of nearly any
constitutional right. The constitutional problem must for the present remain a
murky one, however, because the Court has yet to reconcile its approval of plea
bargaining with its disapproval of penalties designed to discourage the exercise

of constitutional rights. See text accompanying notes 188-99 supra.
247 F ED. R. Can. P. 23(c).
248United States v. Livingston, 459 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1972); Howard v.
United States, 423 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1970).
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any effort to make explicit the premises upon which the federal
system of criminal justice presently operates. If a guidelines system
and formal guilty plea concessions did expose problems concerning
the legitimacy of the factors currently inducing defendants to seek
a bench trial, then the preferable solution would be to confront
249
those problems directly.
V. WILL VISIBILITY AND REGULARITY ENHANCE THE QUALITY
OF THE SENTENCING PROCESS?

The preceding sections explained how excessive discretion can
be eliminated and procedural regularity achieved in the loosely
organized criminal sentencing system. I wish now to explore some
difficulties that could be created by the attainment of these goals.
I have in mind not the comparatively well-known disadvantages of
all formal rules, but rather some ways in which sentencing reform
could actually impair the values that formal procedure and the rule
of law ordinarily are expected to promote. Because the difficulties
that concern me are relatively unfamiliar and intangible, I begin
by identifying those more familiar problems that will not be a part
of my subject.
We have become accustomed to hearing that compliance with
the standard requirements of procedural due process-notice, an
opportunity to respond, and "some kind of hearing" m-can be
time-consuming and expensive. In certain areas, cost and delay are
said to prevent accurate and effective decisionmaking or at least to
outweigh the limited potential for gains from formal procedures.251
More recently, we have heard that imposition of due process requirements may undermine trust and community spirit between
those responsible for and those affected by certain kinds of decisions.252 None of these concerns has any plausible application to
criminal sentencing. The constitutional text leaves no room for
debate about whether or not due process requirements should apply
249

Limited qualifications to this general preference for visibility are developed.
in the text accompanying notes 259-307 infra.
250
See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974); Friendly,
supra note 151.
251
In recent decisions the Court has not explicitly considered these factors in
deciding whether or not due process applies; in deciding what process is due,
however, the Court has relied heavily upon them, even to support the denial of
any predeprivation hearing. E.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-82
(1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 348 (1976).
252 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 594-95 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); Rehnquist, The Adversary Society, 33 U. MIss L. RPv. 1 (1978).
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-to sentencing; 253 in any event, few would deny that traditional
procedural safeguards can contribute to the accuracy of sentencing
judgments and that the high cost of inaccuracy mandates use of
reliable procedures.2 5 4 And, at least under the assumptions of the
American adversary system, there is obviously no shared enterprise,
no bond of "community" between government and the criminal
5
offender, that could be relevant to the decision about punishment.
Despite acceptance of the need for procedural due process in
the form of notice and some kind of hearing, the law sometimes
permits the decisionmaker rather wide substantive latitude, that is,
latitude with respect to the results that may be reached and the
reasons, if any, that need be adduced in support of those results.
Until recently, this was uniformly the case in criminal sentencing.
Movement away from such broad discretion and towards clear, binding rules may entail other familiar costs-in this instance, rigidity
and inadequate individualization. Clear rules will, almost inevitably, be overinclusive or underinclusive, failing to capture all
factors that should affect the result. In the interest of excluding
impermissible considerations and preventing arbitrary results, restrictions on discretion necessarily exclude some legitimate considerations and some enlightened modifications of otherwise arbitrary
results.2 50
Concerns about inadequate individualization, though obviously
relevant to any rigid sentencing rules, have little application to the
kinds of sentencing guidelines typically proposed. These guidelines set a presumptive sentence, given certain presumptively relevant circumstances, but permit judges wide latitude to depart from
that sentence whenever the situation warrants. 25T Because discretion
25

notes 130-32 supra.
not include all the attributes of a formal criminal
trial. See text accompanying notes 109-13 supra.
3 See text accompanying
254 Such procedures need

255 Bonds of community between society and the offender do remain real,
however, and help to define reciprocal rights and duties that continue even during
confinement; most states, though by no means all, have now abandoned the harsh
fiction that the prisoner is "civilly dead." See Special Project, The Collateral

Consequences of CriminalConvictions, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929, 1030 (1970). But cf.
x .rm
AND Tnm ADMwInSTAToN OF
Psmmur's ComnssioN oN LAw ENFoRcE
JusTrcE, TAsK FORCE RE-PORT: CoRnEcTioNs 88-91 (1967) (discussing numerous
civil disabilities still imposed on convicted persons). At the time of sentencing,
the adversary stance is traditionally considered paramount, but this attitude has
been questioned even in the context of American procedure, see Enker, supra note 54,
at 118-19, and quite different conceptions seem to prevail in other cultures, see, e.g.,
JumSPRUDENE 439-48 (1962).
K. lLELLYN,
256
See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAv.
L. REv. 1685, 1687-89, 1702-05 (1976).
257 Some restrictions upon justified individualization would result to the extent
that a sentencing commission attempted to forbid variations based on relevant, but
too easily manipulated, factors. See text accompanying notes 221-22 supra.
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is guided and controlled, but not eliminated, ample opportunities
for proper individualization ordinarily remain.
Although a guidelines sentencing system would not be vulnerable to these kinds of objections, it could present more troublesome
problems. Efforts to reduce disparity might, we have seen, generate
greater disparity, given the complicated dynamics of the sentencing
process.2ss Even if uniformity and procedural regularity can be
achieved, the political and institutional complexities of sentencing
could generate new difficulties in the very areas in which uniformity
and regularity are expected to be helpful. The problems that concern me fall into two broad groups. First is the question whether
guided discretion, with enhanced visibility and accountability, will
produce wiser sentencing policy. I believe that much resistance to
sentencing reform reflects an intuition that current conditions of
low visibility help to produce more sensible sentencing decisions.
I shall argue that there is some truth to this view; efforts to obscure
results and to minimize the accountability of decisionmakers, which
I call "low visibility politics," are not necessarily unprincipled or
incompatible with democratic theory.
The second set of problems focuses not on the instrumental
value of structured discretion-its ability to produce sound policybut rather on the value of such a system to the defendant. Will an
elaborate guidelines system, such as the one described in the preceding section, promote the sense of participation and involvement that
we expect due process rights to foster? Again, I believe that resistance to sentencing reform on the part of many practitioners
reflects an instinct that the present unstructured system provides for
this qualitative dimension of fair procedure much more satisfactorily
than would a regime of formal guidelines.
The next two sections explore these concerns about visibility
and participation. I conclude that the conventional conception of
the rule of law retains most of its traditional virtues in the sentencing context, but that departures from formal due process can sometimes enhance the efficacy and fairness of the sentencing system.
A. Low Visibility Politics
A sentencing guidelines system would render highly visible a
host of troublesome issues.m9 These would include, for example,
258

See text accompanying notes 68-87 supra.
conception of "visibility" used here warrants brief explanation. Even
under a system of totally unstructured judicial discretion, an individual sentencing
decision will be quite vivid for the defendant affected and for the attorneys in the
case. The sentence imposed may even attract extensive coverage in the press, and
259The
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such substantive questions as whether longer sentences should be
imposed on unemployed offenders, when a characteristic of this kind
may be predictive of future dangerousness but may also be closely
linked to involuntary status or race. 2

0

The proposal developed in

part IV to regulate charge reduction and plea bargaining would
expose equally troublesome procedural issues, including the problem of fixing the exact price of exercising the right to trial, the
propriety of offering probation as a guilty plea inducement, and
the propriety of granting concessions in contested cases in exchange
for waiver of particular trial rights. 261 Not surprisingly, many
persons sympathetic to the goals of sentencing reform prefer not to
stir up these hornets' nests or doubt that those who do so will be in
a position to produce thoughtful solutions.
1. Some Costs and Benefits of Low Visibility Decisionmaking
The dangers of visibility in a fully developed sentencing reform proposal involve several distinct dimensions. Visibility poses
dilemmas both for those who claim to know the proper solution to
the issues presented and for those who admit that they do not.
The dilemma faced by the agnostics is apparent: a world of high
visibility sentencing decisions will present them with issues on which
they remain quite perplexed. As decisionmakers-judges, sentencing commissioners, academic consultants-they can avoid the necessity of decision by presenting the issues to the political institutions
and awaiting the judgment of the body politic, as their professional
tradition instructs them to do. But is it inevitably wise to expose
public awareness undoubtedly will be much greater for a particularly noteworthy
individual case than it ordinarily will for generally applicable sentencing regulations,
however controversial and however openly adopted. I do not focus here on such
problems of public attention to the final sentencing judgment itself. Rather, my
concern is with the visibility of the operative legal rules or principles according to
which concrete decisions are rendered. From this perspective, a system of broad,
unstructured discretion inevitably obscures the governing criteria (if any), not only
from the general public but also from scholars, from the affected parties, and often
from the decisionmakers themselves. (For example, the United States Parole Board
eventually discovered, with the aid of sophisticated empirical research, that for
years it had unknowingly based release decisions primarily upon a small number of
criteria. See Coffee, supra note 36, at 997.) Conversely, a guidelines system
mandating a definite incremental penalty for all offenders previously convicted, or
for all unemployed offenders, would be "visible" for my purposes. Most citizens
might be -wholly unaware of the principles adopted, but the rules would be readily
available to anyone who did take an interest in discovering the premises upon
which decisions were being made.
260 This problem is usefully explored in Coffee, supra note 36; Project, Parole
Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 872-77
(1975).
261 See text following note 211 and text accompanying notes 225-36, 245-49
supra.
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the problems and demand a political solution when the questions
mix value-laden elements with empirical assessments that the public
is unlikely to appreciate; when public opinion in any event is
volatile, unformed, or ill-informed; when the issues are emotionally
charged and socially divisive? In countless areas society finds a way
to obscure such issues and avoid deciding them publicly. 2 2 The
tactical advantages of such a course often seem so clear that reservations based on the niceties of political and constitutional theory may
263
simply be dismissed out of hand.
Those who do "know"-and care-about choosing the wise
course confront an even sharper dilemma. On such issues as the
guilty plea discount, for example, public resistance and the press
of circumstances could preclude an ideal solution-the abolition of
all concessions. Premature adoption of this ideal could simply
make the inevitable nullification process more visible; and the resulting cynicism might be much more destructive than low visibility
disregard of the ideal. Yet, if the idealist instead chooses to condone the inevitable "realities," while attempting to minimize their
worst effects-as has been done in the past by critics of both plea
bargaining and preventive detention-then the "realities" assume a
legitimacy they may never have enjoyed in the amorphous world of
low visibility decisions. Better perhaps to keep the ideal alive, in
hibernation, until the social climate permits it to re-emerge as an
active force. This kind of hope might, for example, underlie the
position of Justice Powell in Bakke,264 an uneasy compromise between an ideal that condemns racial quotas and a reality likely to
5 a compromise which four
entail low visibility, de facto quotas, 26266
Justices saw as little short of hypocrisy.
262 See, e.g., M. KAD isH & S. KADisr, DISCRETION To Dison~m 37-94 (1973);
J. SKorucK, JUSTICE Wirour TnM_. 12-15 (2d ed. 1975). See also Underwood,
Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and
Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1430 (1979).

See text accompanying note 290 infra.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
Powell, J.).
263
264

(opinion of

265 Justice Powell allows that the presumption of regularity in programs he
would condone could be overcome by proof that a covert quota was in effect.
But he does not appear to place primary importance on verifying the actual workings
of such programs. Instead, he repeatedly stresses their "facial" appearance and
emphasizes the importance of whether a program is "viewed as inherently unfair
by the public generally .. . . 'Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."'
Id. 319 n.53 (emphasis added) (quoting Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14

(1954)).
266 "[T]here is no basis for preferring a particular preference program simply
because in achieving the same goals that the Davis Medical School is pursuing, it
proceeds in a manner that is not immediately apparent to the public." Id. 379

(Brennan, J.,concurring & dissenting).
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Another cost of explicit, highly visible policymaking is suggested by the controversy surrounding establishment of offense
severity levels. Criminal justice officials, along with many others,
often conclude that legislatively prescribed penalties are far too
severe and that even the current, diffuse process of divided judicial
and parole powers fails adequately to mitigate the harshness of our
penalty structure: average time served is simply too long.26 7 Reduced discretion and more direct legislative decisionmaking could
aggravate this already serious problem. 2 8
Although such considerations suggest that the adoption of a
low visibility approach should not be condemned as inevitably unsound, their force seems to me insufficient to override the traditional
virtues of exposure and accountability in the context of the current
debate over sentencing reform. The tendency of visibility to generate unduly severe sentences presents the most troublesome problem. We should not too readily assume, however, that current
conditions of broad discretion and low visibility do, on balance,
generate shorter prison terms. Introduction of the parole system
was, to be sure, accompanied by hopes that it would serve to mitigate harsh sentences, and parole boards probably have had this effect
in some jurisdictions at some times. But there is also disturbing
269
evidence that indeterminacy may have lengthened time served.
2 70
The verdict simply is not in yet on this crucial issue.
A related concern that visible rules may legitimate and perpetuate controversial values at a time of moral flux is developed in Tribe, supra note 212.
That concern prompted Professor Tribe to urge, for some circumstances, an unconventional requirement of individualized decisionmaking unconstrained by rules;
the proposal nevertheless presumes that conventional demands for visibility and
accountability will be satisfied in connection with the individualized decision. See
note 212 supra. The perspective developed in the text suggests that this proposal
may not go far enough and that in some situations individualization under conditions of low visibility may be required to prevent legitimation of controversial
values. Cf. M. KADISm & S. KADisH, supra note 262, at 77 (Low visibility nullification by the police "has the advantage of allowing the official rule of full enforcement
to be maintained. This is not idle ceremony. A criminal code has symbolic offices
to fill. . . . Relying on police Enulification] avoids proclaiming outwardly that the
law is not meant to be taken literally.").
267 ABA PRojEcT oN STswAns
RELATING TO TE ADMmNSTRAT N o
CRUMINAL JUSTICE, SE1NTENCING ALTErNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 18-2.1, Commentary at 12-14 (2d ed.) (Approved Draft Aug. 14, 1979). See also text
accompanying note 26 supra.
268 As Professor Zimring has warned, "[once a determinate sentencing bill is
before a legislative body, it takes only an eraser and a pencil to make a one-year
presumptive sentence into a six-year sentence for the same offense." Zimring,
supra note 23, at 17. See also text accompanying note 24 supra.
269 See, e.g., Foote, supra note 23, at 134.
270
See Messenger, Introduction, to A. voN HmscH & K. HANnAnAN, supra
note 9, at xxii-xxvi.
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Despite its inherent dangers, greater visibility also creates
checks that help to avoid high averages in time served and, of course,
to reduce the high incidence of unfortunates who would be among
the "above average" statistics. Low visibility has prevented advocates of a less brutal system from painting a clear picture of the
actual pattern of punishment, its fiscal and other consequences, and
the precise differences that would flow from specific policy changes.
A proposal for narrow discretion and presumptive sentences would
enable criminal justice planning agencies to predict, within useful
limits, the effect on cost and prison population of any given penalty
structure. Rather than facing the abstract question whether the
typical burglar should serve one year or six, legislators could be
confronted directly with the budgetary consequences of an otherwise
attractive punitive stance. In Illinois, for example, corrections
specialist David Fogel and his staff used computer models to determine the effects, under a variety of alternative assumptions, of
several different penalty levels in a "flat time" sentencing system.
They found that, in a sentencing structure with four penalty categories, moving from a scheme of two-, three-, five-, and eight-year
terms to a more severe "four-six-ten-sixteen" scheme would triple
27

the Illinois prison population.

-

The dangers of a brutal legislative response thus are not unbounded. At the same time, visibility offers considerable benefits
in terms of effective planning, better public awareness of the underlying dilemmas of crime control, and more responsible political
decisionmaking. These benefits could make the risks worth running, even for those deeply committed to lenity. Of course, one
would have to have great confidence in one's reading of the political
27 2
pulse in a particular jurisdiction to venture a firm conclusion.
The point is simply that, given the inevitable vagaries of politics,
the threat to leniency caused by high visibility is not necessarily
more acute than the easily overlooked dangers of the low visibility
approach.
The multiple political uncertainties of both high and low
visibility recommend a political structure that avoids the most
serious dangers of each. Visible, conscious choice of governing
principles need not imply that the choice is made by, or even
readily subject to control by, elected political representatives. In
271D. Foomr., supra note 14, at 259-60.
272

In states that have recently moved toward greater determinacy in sentencing,

preliminary indications suggest that average time served will be substantially higher

than that under the sentencing systems previously in effect.
note 24 supra.

See sources cited in
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the administrative process, both rulemaking and adjudication can,
in some settings, permit a quite explicit choice between definite,
politically controversial alternatives without inevitably generating
the solution that Congress would have selected. It is possible, in
other words, to provide for high visibility of legal principles (to
scholars, lawyers, and the public), but to temper the political accountability of those who make the crucial, high visibility decisions.
In the sentencing context such an approach would entail delegating to a sentencing commission the power to make basic severity
judgments in formally promulgated rules. The commission's determinations, of course, would remain subject to review and revision
by the legislature, but the initial decision would be insulated from
the most direct political pressures, and the realities of the legislative
process would limit to a degree, though not eliminate, the prospects
for vigorous oversight by the elected body. It might even be considered desirable to deflect further the political pressure for long
sentences and to provide time for the public to become accustomed
to sentences that seem short by contemporary standards but require
just as much time actually to be served. If so, the legislature could
authorize a "bark and bite" system: sentencing guidelines would
require that seemingly severe sentences be pronounced upon conviction, but parole guidelines then would provide for an automatic
reduction through rules granting early release.2 73 Devices of this
kind would enhance the prospects for a responsible severity policy,
while affording enough visibility to permit conscious planning,
comprehensive evaluation of related problems, and examination and
criticism by all interested persons.
The tendency of visibility to effect legitimation of doubtful
values raises another difficult problem. Were the constitutionality
of plea bargaining still an open question, this tendency might argue
for condemning the practice in principle and hoping that disregard
of the ideal would remain largely invisible. But as matters now
stand, concessions for waiving the right to trial do enjoy an imprimatur of legitimacy. 27- At least for the time being, therefore,
effort should be directed toward identifying and, if possible, eliminating the worst of the evils fostered by plea bargaining.2 75 This
goal is scarcely furthered by concealing the details of the concession
system. Exposure and accountability, as made possible, for example,
by the proposed system of charge-reduction guidelines, will focus
supra note 9, at 88-92, 98-101.
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
275 See text accompanying notes 184-87 supra.

273 See A. voN HmscH & K. HANR'n&-,
274
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attention on these concessions and facilitate informed action to impose constructive limits on their extent.
The potential sensitivity and social divisiveness of the issues at
stake seems to me too easily exaggerated. We regularly debate and
decide at the polls questions concerning the death penalty or the
extent to which the affluent will be taxed to provide better food,
shelter, and education for the poor. The political and social fabric
would easily withstand the tensions resulting from the public consideration and resolution of "delicate" sentencing issues. In this
area the conventional assumption that the health of our political
institutions is promoted by public involvement in the resolution of
sensitive problems seems to me quite sound.
It remains true that many of us simply have no idea how
properly to resolve some of these issues. In part, however, this is
because low visibility prevents us from learning very much about
the context in which they arise.270 A principal goal of sentencing
reform is to create a framework that will generate this kind of
information. The assumption that additional knowledge will be
useful may prove naive. Indeed, the current reform effort is in
large measure sparked by the conclusion that after years of experimentation with treatment techniques, we really do not know how
to "rehabilitate" criminal offenders. 277 But there will be time
enough to admit another failure after we can genuinely claim to
understand what sentencing and guilty plea decisions actually entail.
2. The Structure of Political Accountability
In arguing against a low visibility approach in the sentencing
context, I have concluded that the decisive considerations are essentially pragmatic: unstructured judicial discretion reduces visibility much more than necessary to further the substantive priorities
of the reformers. This conclusion has made it unnecessary to consider the more elusive question whether low visibility techniques,
even if attractive on tactical grounds, are consistent with accepted
principles of democratic government. 278 Yet my own "solution" to
the various visibility problems involves delegation of lawmaking
authority to an agency insulated to a degree from the legislature.
See Vorenberg, supra note 70, at 670-74.
See note 1 supra.
278 For discussion of the legitimacy and constitutionality of decisionmaking
structures that obscure the operative legal principles, see McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 257-71 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); H. FpIENDLY, TnE FEDEBA
276

277

ADmmqxsTR

WV
AGENcs 19-25 (1962); L. FurLam, Tin Monrt
YALE L.J. 575, 587-93

(1964); Wright, Book Review, 81

Discretionary Justice: A PreliminaryInquiry).

y

OF LAw

(1972)

157-58

(K. Davis,
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The insulation is affirmatively sought, rather than a mere by-product
of a structure preferred on other grounds, and I have argued that,
if need be, steps should be taken to see the insulation enhanced. 279
Is there adequate justification for choosing a decisionmaking structure that will dilute political accountability and enable administrators to pursue policies, especially with respect to leniency, without direct popular participation and control?
The constitutional side of the problem involves no real obstacle,
at least in terms of formal doctrine and concrete decisions likely to
be rendered by courts.2 10 The absence of a practically effective
judicial sanction does not, however, absolve us from considering
whether an administrative structure designed to delegate a fundamental policy choice to experts would violate the spirit of our
constitutional system and the democratic principles underlying it.
Critics of delegation, who insist on choice by the legislature
when possible, sometimes rest their case primarily on the language
of the Constitution, which vests "[a]ll legislative powers" in Congress.2 11 When opponents of delegation go beyond that text, they
nearly always base their argument on majoritarian principles.
Judge J. Skelly Wright thus observes: "An argument for letting the
experts decide when the people's representatives are uncertain or
cannot agree is an argument for paternalism and against democracy." 282 Justice Harlan explains that the nondelegation doctrine
"insures that the fundamental policy decisions of our society will
279

See text accompanying note 273 supra.
The essence of the constitutional problem is that a delegation readily
justified in terms of the legislature's limited time and expertise, see text following
note 20 supra, is actually preferred not on these grounds, but largely because the
delegation enables the legislature to avoid a political choice (on severity issues, for
example) that the legislature is in fact perfectly capable of making. The latter
motivation may be obvious enough to various reform groups, but it is unlikely to
emerge with sufficient clarity in the formal legislative history. Even if it were to
do so, the courts would likely be unwilling to invalidate the statutory plan on that
basis. See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). One vigorous opponent of delegation has
suggested implementing a more stringent doctrine by requiring courts to focus not
on the nature of the power delegated, but rather on the legislative context in which
the decision to delegate was made. A delegation would be upheld if the statute
authorizing the delegation indicated a clear choice among the policy alternatives
perceived by Congress when it acted; it would be struck down if the legislative
history indicated an abdication of choice. S. BARBER, THE CoNsTrruoN AND TaE
DmEGATION OF CoNcBEssIoNAL PowrER 41-49 (1975).
281 E.g., H. FriENDLY, supra note 278, at 21. Closely related is Professor
Barber's argument that the premises of a written constitution are violated if a
temporary legislative majority can alter the basic constitutional structure ordained
by the framers. S. BABmER, supra note 280, at 14-18. For development of this
theme, see Freedman, Delegation of Power and InstitutionalCompetence, 43 U. Cm.
L. REv. 307 (1976).
282 Wright, supra note 278, at 585.
280
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not be made by an appointed official but by the body immediately
responsible to the people." 283 Judge Henry Friendly, in his influential Holmes lectures, 2 4 Justice Brennan, writing separately in
United States v. Robel,28 and the principal older authorities 286
sound the same majoritarian theme.
Professors Davis and Jaffe, perhaps the leading enthusiasts of
delegation, recognize that opposition to delegation rests on majoritarian concerns, but they use this perspective to drain the objection
almost entirely of its moral force. Professor Jaffe writes,
large decisions of policy should be grounded in consent.
Consent is the product of compromise and can only be
arrived at through representation.

.

.

.

We must not,

however, overstate the proposition concerning "consent"
The aim of government is to gain acceptance for
objectives demonstrated as desirable and to realize them as
fully as possible. We should recognize that legislation and
administration are complementary rather than opposed
processes; and that delegation is the formal term and
method for their interplay. Finally we should demand
no more than that 7in the total process we achieve govern2
ment by consent. s
Both representation and consent are in this view matters of degree,
and the decision to delegate is itself a part of consensual government.2 8 8 Indeed, when Professor Davis, himself a strong supporter

of delegation, severely criticizes the wisdom of delegating broad
low visibility powers to the police, 28 9 Professor Jaffe responds that

"[t]his under-the-counter approach may offend the Puritan, it may
offend the legal theorist, but I am sure that those who are offended
are in a rather small minority, and if a society-a democracy if you
will-chooses to operate that way, the appeal to general principles
of equal protection and legal formality does not seem to me to be
sufficient." 290
(Harlan, J.,dissenting).
283 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963)
See also Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on
Three Doctrines,LAw & Comz". POB., Summer, 1976, at 46.
284 H. FRIENDLY, supra note 278, at 21-22.
285 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
286 E.g., E. FrEUND, ADINISThATIVE PowErs ovER PEBSONS AND PNoPERTY

218-21, 582-83 (1928).
287
288

L. JAF E, JUDICIAL CoNTRoL OF ADMINIsTRATIVE

ACTIoN 33-34 (1965).

See K. DAvis, supra note 4, at 47 ("the words 'all legislative powers'
include the power to determine how much delegation is desirable").
289 Id. 80-96.
29
0 Jaffe, supra note 94, at 777.
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The majoritarian perspective therefore provides a somewhat
problematic basis for the antidelegation position. 2 91 Yet Professor
Jaffe's approach does not seem altogether satisfying either: if majoritarianism and consent are logically incapable of explaining the
needs so strongly felt by Judge Wright, Judge Friendly, and others,
then perhaps their concern reflects more complex values.
Sensitivity to the implications of interest group politics no
doubt accounts for much of the intensely perceived illegitimacy of
delegated policymaking. Judge Wright, for example, explicitly
charges that delegation enables "special-interest groups to effect the
transfer of governmental power away from the large public to the
special-interest small publics." 2 9 2 Many other critics of the administrative process similarly tend to view administrative agencies as
peculiarly vulnerable to "capture" by the interests ostensibly being
regulated, while they see the legislative process as more broadly
representative of the public at large.29 3 Yet these perceptions may
stem primarily from the particular focus or experience of individual
scholars. Professor Jaffe takes just the opposite view-"[d]elegation
as the handmaiden of regulation is distasteful to holders of economic power" 2 94-and recent years have seen numerous important
instances in which special interests, having "captured" Congress,
have succeeded in overturning by legislation an agency policy that
favored widely dispersed, relatively powerless members of the general public.29 5

Such instances only make vivid what empirical

political science has reported for years: that the legislative process is
291 Opposition to delegation proves equally problematic when it is premised
on what amounts to an, antimajoritarian philosophy-namely, that separation of
powers and the nile against delegation are intended to protect minority rights and
prevent tyranny by a legislative majority. This view might indeed explain much
of the attraction of separation of powers and "checks and balances" for those among
the framers who were concerned to safeguard privileges of wealth and status from
the potential political power of the popular majority. But the logical connection
between separation of powers and the protection of minorities, however they be
defined, breaks down completely. See R. DArnm, A PREFACE To DMocRA-nc
Trmony 11-22 (1956). Moreover, the implicit preference for legislative inertia and
preservation of the status quo, however natural it may have seemed under the
sway of laissez-faire attitudes of the eighteenth century, seems difficult to support
given contemporary assumptions about the need for affirmative steps by government
to protect many essential human rights and to give content to formal freedoms.
292Wright, supra note 278, at 585 (quoting J. APPELBY, PoLicy A-m ADmtNIsrATIoN 162 (1949)).
293 E.g., M. BERNsT=N, BEGULATnN BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMISSION
(1941); M. EDmLmAN, THE SYMouc USES OF Poirrcs 44-72 (1964); T. Lowi,
THE END OF LImuAmm 87-89 (1969); G. ScHuBERT, THE PuLIc INTEBEST
(1960). see generally Stewart, supra note 29, at 1684-85.
294 L. JAFFE, supra note 287, at 33.
295

See

J.

F,

DmAN,

supra note 29, at 66-68; Sofaer, Judicial Control of

Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 CoLbu,. L. REv. 1293,
1306 (1972).
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itself dominated by myriad "special-interest small publics." 296 The
balance of forces acting on an administrative agency will likely be
different from that acting on a legislature, but one cannot say that
policymaking delegations always-or even generally-will favor
political forces that are less representative of the broad public interest or that the delegate will be less responsive to unorganized,
economically powerless groups than the legislature would be. 297
The case that concerns us, that of administrative policymaking
in criminal justice, illustrates these ambiguities. Delegation often
seems to serve a broader, more long-range conception of the "public
interest" than would legislative decisionmaking; if the former favors
any group, those favored are probably convicted defendants, a group
that typically lacks organization and political and economic power
perhaps more than any other. Yet the enhanced influence of this
group on a sentencing or parole agency in some respects parallels
traditional forms of agency "capture." Of course, criminal defendants, unlike a regulated industrial group, do not have special
access to the technical information and analysis on which regulatory
decisions may depend. And although public defender agencies provide a degree of organization and common representation for indigent defendants, law enforcement interests ordinarily are organized
at least as effectively. But limitations on resources available to
prosecutors, to the courts, and to corrections agencies require that
sentencing policy be shaped with a view toward maximizing guilty
pleas, avoiding unmanageable growth in prison population, and
maximizing incentives-for example, through early release and "good
time"-for good behavior and "voluntary" self-control among prisoners. In these ways the position of sentencing and parole authorities resembles that of many other regulatory agencies, which lack
the resources necessary for aggressive enforcement and therefore
come to rely upon compromise and industry cooperation in order
298
to achieve more modest objectives.
298 See the research collected in A mucAx LEzcrs~rwrv
BEHAVIOR 213-320
(S. Patterson ed. 1968). For a rigorous theoretical approach implying that this
situation is virtually inevitable under contemporary conditions, see R. DAmH, supra
note 291, at 63-84, 124-51.
297 For analysis of some of the factors that tend to make agencies particularly
susceptible to capture by highly organized special interests, see M. EDELmAN, supra
note 293, at 44-68; Stewart, supra note 29, at 1685-86. The agency's opportunities
to avoid capture, by actively developing a constituency supportive of vigorous regulation, are explored in Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Toward
a More Adequate-and Less Pessimistic-Theory of "Clientele Capture," 6 PoL'Y
Scr. 301 (1975).
298 See, e.g., Jaffe, Federal Regulatory Agencies in Perspective: Administrative
Limitations in a Political Setting, 11 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 565, 566 (1970);
Stewart, supra note 29, at 1685-86.
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Concern about capture by "special-interest small publics" thus
seems to explain much of the intense opposition to administrative
resolution of basic policy issues, and in a sense, this misgiving appears applicable to the delegation of policymaking authority in
sentencing. Yet the parallels obviously are superficial. The essence
of the concern lies in the prospect of a small, highly organized group
subverting a popular judgment that is rather clearly expressed-or
would be if the legislature were denied the power to avoid the issue
by delegation. 2 " Deference to prisoner interests in sentencing flows
almost entirely from the severely limited resources of the criminal
justice system, and this circumstance remains under undiluted popular control. 30 0 It seems inaccurate, then, to portray sentencing and
parole commissions as subverting a popular preference for severity.
Rather, those agencies often seek to reconcile, and in any event are
ultimately forced to obey, two quite contradictory expressions of
the popular will-punish severely but punish inexpensively. When
the legislature chooses to delegate in order to facilitate a more
orderly reconciliation of these two objectives, it is, of course, delegating a fundamental value choice. But if the decision to do so
commands majority support, it should not be be seen as antidemocratic in the sense of relegating the issue to a forum in which the
balance of political forces will be skewed against the broad general
interest.
A delegation of this kind nevertheless might be considered
antidemocratic in other significant senses. When important value
choices are made by experts in the administrative process, the public
and its representatives ordinarily will remain relatively unfamiliar
with real-world problems and their interdependencies; they will not
to the same degree confront the hard choices or participate in the
compromises and sacrifices that make politics "the art of the possible." Surely a society loses something when the public aspects of
its political process approach an empty ritual or charade, partially
or wholly detached from the difficult business of running a government.3 01
299 The consequences of delegation in such a situation are thoughtfully explored
in Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach,
88 YATx L.J. 243 (1978).
300 Because resources are never unlimited, the electorate cannot, of course,
totally nullify the leverage and pressure for conciliation that can be exerted by the
regulated group. But within such constraints, the public chooses just how vulnerable
to such pressures the enforcement agency will be.
301 Compare M. EDnEMAN, supra note 293. Edelman provides a comprehensive description of the extent to which our politics already approaches this state,
but he appears to accept the condition as an inevitable consequence of society's
inability to achieve complete solutions to complex, threatening situations, and he
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Unfortunately, one cannot hope to explore this concern fully,
given the inadequate state of contemporary democratic theory.
Representative government necessarily entails, even at the legislative
level, a dilution of immediate accountability. As long as the legislature is viewed as a deliberative body rather than merdly an assembly of explicitly instructed ambassadors, some such dilution is
entirely desirable and in no sense antidemocratic. 3 2 Normative
political science continues to struggle with the seemingly insoluble
dilemmas involved in determining when representatives should vote
their constituents' as opposed to "their own" views. If anything,
there seems to be increasingly less consensus on the nature of the
interests that representatives should represent and how they should
conceive their role in representing those interests. 30 3 Beyond these
difficulties are other intractable problems, including those of accounting for the intensity of preferences and identifying the time
period to be allowed for investigation and discussion of majority
preferences before translating them into action.30 4 Because no clear
criteria for the resolution of these problems emerge within the
framework of democratic theory, it seems dogmatic to stigmatize a
delegation as antidemocratic when it is designed to afford fuller
consideration to the more intensely held preferences or when it is
designed to postpone legislative action until better public understanding materializes and preferences shift. And, of course, delegation of policymaking authority in sentencing may be justified on
precisely these grounds. 30 5
often appears to assume that the empty rituals serve a useful psychological function
for the citizens who observe them. It could be argued, of course, not only that
such a condition is at odds with the traditional conception of a politically healthy
community, but also that its destructive effects extend beyond the political realm
and could impair the capacity for realism and responsible action in other areas of
social and personal life.
302 The classic statement is Edmund Burke's Speech to the Electors of Bristol,
reprintedin LEGISLATIVE PoLITics U.S.A. 11-12 (2d ed. T. Lowi 1962).
303 See Gilbert, Operative Doctrines of Representation, 57 Am . POL. Scr. Ttuv.
604 (1963).
supra note 291, at 56-60, 90-119.
304 See R. D.,mu,
305 An analysis in terms of intensities may appear all but hopelessly subjective,

but arguably preferences for severity expressed at the legislative level are in some
sense superficial or cavalier when they are not explicitly linked to budgetary deci-

sions that will enable the severity preferences actually to be carried out. At the
administrative level, the legislatively authorized penalties are inevitably adjusted
according to the resources society has made available; the resource decision thus

provides a relatively concrete measure of how serious society is about its preferences
for severity.
With respect to the need to allow time for public perceptions and expectations

about severity to adjust to sentencing terms that will actually be served, see text
accompanying note 273 supra.
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It is unrealistic and ultimately unconvincing to maintain, as
proponents of delegation sometimes appear to do,30 6 that political
structures diluting popular accountability are everyday devices of
good government, which impair no significant values in a democratic
community. But the delegation of politically sensitive questions
should, according to any theory of democracy, be legitimate under
certain conditions, and the sentencing problem involves an unusually favorable set of these conditions. Delegation is likely to
afford time and opportunity for public perceptions about sentencing
to adjust to a system that will no longer present an appearance so
sharply different from its reality; delegation is likely to generate
law premised on a more long-range, more multifaceted view of the
public interest; and delegation is unlikely to disadvantage the least
organized and least powerful of the various groups affected. Larger
questions concerning the dilution of accountability remain, needless
to say, in other fields of public concern and even in other criminal
justice matters.30 7
I conclude that the techniques of delegation may legitimately
serve to curb the potential vagaries and excesses of the political
process and that, with the aid of these techniques, we need not fear
the enhanced visibility that sentencing reform will bring. Ultimately, there is little to be lost and much to be gained in knowledge,
progress, fairness, and consistency by exposing and examining the
many difficult issues central'to the actual quality of justice and
presently hidden from view.
B. Participation,Autonomy, and ProceduralDue Process
Under contemporary constitutional doctrine, the procedural
due process guarantee has been viewed as serving primarily to assure
accurate implementation of substantive rules, not necessarily to
afford participants in the process a personally satisfying role for its
own sake.308 When there is no concrete entitlement to a particular
result under given circumstances, or when, for other reasons, formal
procedure cannot adequately improve the accuracy of outcomes, the
306 See text accompanying notes 287-90 supra.

307 Related problems concerning the proper role of popular attitudes in determining the scope of criminal punishment are tentatively explored in Schulhofer,
Book Review, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 181, 196-201 (1980) (G. Fletcher, Rethinking
Criminal Law).
308
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-47 (1976); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972); L. TRIBE, supra note 137, at 501-06.

The Court seems

not to have considered how its acceptance of this generalization can be reconciled
with the acknowledged principle that sentencing procedures must comport with due
process, even when no substantive rules and no conceivable "entitlements" affect the
judge's choice within a broad statutory sentencing range.
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courts ordinarily find no constitutional right to due process.30 9 But
when due process is guaranteed in the interests of accuracy, it ordinarily does serve the further purpose of giving "to the individuals
or groups against whom government decisions operate the chance to
participate

persons."

.

.

,

an opportunity that expresses their dignity as

310

Even when the constitutional guarantee is altogether inapplicable, as in the countless areas of policy formulation in which
interested parties have no vested right to any particular result, the
law often does recognize a statutory or common law right to some
form, and frequently a very substantial form, of participation. 11
This subconstitutional tradition, now very much a part of the fabric
of American administrative law,32 undoubtedly serves, in part, to
foster sound decisionmaking. It also seems to reflect a widespread
assumption that, regardless of its impact on the result, direct interaction between decisionmakers and those immediately affected is
inherently desirable, a way of proceeding closely identified with the
essentials of liberty and democratic government.313
Because guidelines would bring structure and focus to the trial
judge's sentencing decision, the defendant would, under given circumstances, have a presumptively valid claim to a particular sentence. This move in the direction of more definite substantive
"rights" will bring with it a requirement of greater procedural
309
See generally Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due
Process, in DuE PROCESS: XVIII NOMOS 126, 131-37 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
eds. 1977).
31
0 L. TimE, supra note 137, at 502. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 28, 49-50 (1976);
Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: The Significance of Old
Friends, 9 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. REv. 449, 454-74 (1974).
3"1 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976) (opportunity for interested persons to participate in agency rulemaking). For a discussion
of statutes and case law extending participation rights that go beyond the minimum
notice-and-comment requirements of the A.P.A., see Rodgers, A Hard Look at
Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699,
712-18 (1979).
703-08,
312
See Stewart, supra note 29, at 1717-60, 1810-13. Rodgers, supra note 311, at
716-18, argues that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978),
which took a less generous view of the scope of participation rights in agency
rulemaking, "was a relic the day it was handed down." Compare Byse, Vermont
Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure:A Somewhat Different View,
91 HAav. L. REv. 1823, 1831-32 (1978), with Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the
Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HAnv. L. Rv. 1805, 1821-22, 1822 n.66
(1978).
313 See, e.g., joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
170-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Kadish, The Advocate and the
Expert--Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 Mnr~r. L. REv. 803, 830
(1961).
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safeguards. Sentencing procedure is already subject to the due
process clause,3 14 but in deciding what process is due, courts will be
more likely to require formal testimony and cross-examination in a
guidelines system.3 15 Beyond this, my proposal for charge-reduction
guidelines would impose upon the plea bargaining process substantive limitations heretofore unknown. Although negotiations could
proceed in an unstructured setting, compliance with the substantive
requirements would be verified at a formal hearing.31 6 In sum, a
sentencing reform package of the kind I have described would produce a quantum increase in the formal rights, both substantive and
procedural, conferred on the criminal defendant.
Will these changes enhance the defendant's opportunities for
meaningful participation in the sentencing process? Their effect
probably will be just the opposite. In current practice, to be sure,
the defendant's right to participate in the judicial sentencing decision has minimal content: a limited hearing is mandatory, and
the defendant has the right to speak, but not the right to be apprised
of reasons for the result.3 1 .' In guilty plea cases, however, the defendant's involvement is, or can be, quite significant. Arnold
Enker, in a thoughtful defense of plea bargaining, has stressed this
facet of the plea negotiation process:
While the negotiated plea may be of low visibility to the
public at large (and to law professors), it is highly visible
to the defendant. Whether the factors entering into the
bargain are or are not meaningful as sentencing goals, they
are at least visible to the defendant and his attorney.
The defendant is able to influence the sentence, he may
set forth bargaining factors and determine their relevance
to the decision, and he may use his bargaining power to
eliminate the grossest aspects of sentencing harshness and
arbitrariness, be they legislative or judicial. The defendant, if he does not like the bargain, may reject it and stand
trial. If he accepts the bargain, he cannot help but feel
that his sentence is something that he consented to and
participated in bringing about, even if he at the same time
resents the process that induced his consent.3 18
There is, of course, much room for debate about how well or
how often plea bargaining in reality comports with Enker's assump314 See text accompanying note 130 supra.

315 See text accompanying notes 133-37 supra.
316 See text accompanying notes 225-35 and following note 241 supra.
317
See text following note 6 supra and text accompanying notes 130-34 upra.
318 Enker, supra note 54, at 115.
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tions about the extent of the defendant's influence, about the
degree of personal participation by the defendant in discussions between counsel, and about the actual balance between satisfaction
and the resentment Enker also acknowledges. For the moment, the
essential point is that plea bargaining, though a totally unstructured
and informal process, potentially can afford a very satisfactory vehicle
for participation and valuable human interaction.
In any movement from a regime of unstructured discretion to
one of rules, an inevitable-and ordinarily a desired-consequence
is a degree of depersonalization. Critical judgments are made by a
distant legislature or agency, and possibilities for unconstrained
decision by participants operating face-to-face are greatly reduced.
The process is bound to seem less "human"; in a sense, this is precisely the reason for moving to rules (a "government of laws") from
discretion (a "government of men"'y. Nevertheless, introduction of
substantive rules and formal procedure into a previously unstructured area ordinarily does not represent a loss for participation
and humanization because in the unstructured setting, private
parties affected by government action are largely without formal
power to protect their interests. 319 Essentially at the mercy of the
official's broad discretion in such cases, a private party can speak,
but normally has no means for ensuring that he or she will be
listened to, reckoned with, and accepted as a force whose participation really counts.
Plea bargaining differs from other areas in which recognition
of due process rights is urged because unstructured plea bargaining
operates against the background of formal trial rights already conferred. Entering the unstructured setting with something valuable
to trade and some leverage, however small,3 20 the defendant has a
genuine basis for participation as a person whose preferences must,
32 1
to a degree, be taken seriously.
319 This is not to say, of course, that private parties in such a situation have no
effective negotiating power whatsoever. A regulatory agency's dependence upon
voluntary compliance and upon congressional support often means that some private
parties can take advantage of economic and political realities to develop considerable

negotiating leverage. In such a situation, introduction of substantive rules and
formal procedure could, as in the other cases considered in the text, reduce the
scope of these private parties' participation and influence.

See also Eisenberg,

supra note 234, at 672-80.
3 20

See text accompanying note 78 supra.

321 Cf. Dauer & Gilbool, The Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession:
A Critique for ProfessorJohnson and a PartialReply, 47 S. CAr.. L. REv. 116, 144-45,

145 n.92 (1973) (conferral of formal hearing rights upon debtor facing repossession
of goods opens channels of informal communication and provides source of
negotiating power).
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A successful structuring of the bargaining process would eliminate much of this potential for active and effective personal involvement by the defendant. The possible guilty plea concessions and
circumstances justifying them would be specified within narrow
limits. By comparison with current practice, the scope of discussions and the areas for argument and negotiation would be vastly
reduced. Indeed, in a typical case under sentencing guidelines,
little could be negotiated: determination of the offense and offender
categories applicable to the case usually would be a routine
matter; 322 a guilty plea would automatically produce a fixed discount from the essentially fixed sentence determined by the applicable categories; at most, an additional discount, also fixed in
extent, might be possible in certain defined circumstances. But if
compromise is prohibited in "weak" cases, as I propose,3 23 the principal source of defense leverage and influence on the sentence would
be eliminated.3 24
Because effective control of plea bargaining will reduce opportunities for participation and thereby increase the already great
feeling of helplessness experienced by many criminal defendants, it
is a fair question whether such a reform will further the values that
the rule of law is expected to promote. Sentencing guidelines
would not prevent a criminal defendant from seeking leniency by
urging any available ground for a sentence less than the presumptive guideline term. But by limiting the defendant's role almost
exclusively to this sort of humble plea for mercy, guidelines, together with plea bargaining controls, would strip away whatever
power the defense may have had and preclude forceful and effective
involvement as a more-or-less equal party to the sentencing decision.
Why should a criminal defendant be denied the opportunity to
trade constitutional rights for the greatest sentencing benefit he or
she can obtain? Why should a defendant (and a prosecutor) be
confronted with an all-or-nothing choice when conviction and a
mild sentence are satisfactory to all persons immediately involved?
What will sentencing reform have achieved if individual dignity
and autonomous personal choice must be sacrificed to this extent?
322

The decision would be particularly routine if the sentencing guidelines were
deliberately cast in terms of factors easily ascertained and if factors subject to
prosecutorial control were deemphasized. See text accompanying notes 221-22 supra.
323
See text accompanying notes 230-34 supra.
324 Opportunities for participation would be immeasurably enhanced in contested cases, however, because the guidelines would indicate the kinds of facts and
arguments necessary to influence the judicial sentencing decision. This rudimentary
information is now largely unavailable, see Enker, supra note 54, at 115, and the
defendant, once convicted, is of course in no position to "negotiate."
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These concerns are not easily placed in perspective when the
values at stake are so elusive and the process in question is as yet
untried. But three points warrant discussion. First, the concerns
mentioned arise, to an extent, in all efforts to promote uniformity.
Second, their force is particularly weak in the sentencing context,
because deceptively few defendants benefit from the present system
of individual autonomy, and fewer still benefit for arguably legitimate reasons. Finally, restrictions on participation-in its fullest
sense of effective defense influence on the sentencing decision-seem
to me appropriate rather than lamentable in a soundly functioning
sentencing system.
A central premise of the sentencing reform movement is, first
all,
that like cases currently are not treated alike. Elimination of
of
disparity obviously cannot be beneficial to everyone; defendants
currently able to obtain unusually advantageous treatment inevitably
must suffer from successful reform. Supporters of reform need not,
however, rest their case on an unqualified preference for egalitarianism over individualism. It is enough to claim that the extent
of the present inequalities is so great, and their side effects so
destructive, that movement toward a substantially greater degree of
consistency is the prudent and fair course. Available evidence provides more than ample support for this limited claim.- 25
The group of defendants who would suffer from a more consistent process is, in any event, probably much smaller than Enker's
discussion implies. 32 6

The appearance of effective participation,

however real in psychological terms, likely proves misleading much
of the time. Prosecutors often are able to tell dozens of defense
attorneys that although the going rate for a given case is five years,
"for you . ... , 327 Extensive empirical evidence of real-offense
sentencing328 likewise suggests that large numbers of defendants do
not really get the break that they believe a charge-reduction agreement will produce for them. It could conceivably be argued that
the appearance of effective participation, even though essentially an
illusion, should be preserved for its psychological value. That view
seems to me unsound even from an instrumental perspective; it
certainly cannot be defended as a reflection of respect for the dignity
and personal worth of the individual defendant.
Some defendants undoubtedly do succeed in using the unstructured bargaining system to their advantage. One could conceivably
325 See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.

326 See text accompanying note 318 supra.
327 Alschuler, Sentencing Reform, supra note 6, at 576 n.73.
328 See text accompanying note 97 supra.
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defend from an individualistic perspective the legitimacy of unusually lenient treatment explained only by the defendant's (or the
lawyer's) skill in evoking sympathy or by effective defense exploitation of an evidentiary weakness in the case. The plea bargaining system is so flawed by conflicts of interest and other structural
problems, however, that differences in treatment cannot be expected
to flow solely from legally relevant factors or arguably relevant
differences in the effectiveness of presentation of an individual's
case.32 Albert Alschuler has forcefully summarized the problems:
[Tjhe "break" that follows the entry of a guilty plea . . .
[is commonly influenced] by a prosecutor's feelings of
friendship for particular defense attorneys, by his desire to
go home early on an especially busy day, by his apparent
inability to establish a defendant's guilt at trial, by his
(or the trial judge's) unusually vindictive attitude toward
a defendant's exercise of the right to trial, by the race,
wealth or bail status of the defendant, by a defense attorney's success in threatening the court's or the prosecutor's
time with dilatory motions, by the publicity that a case
has generated, or by any of a number of other factors-ir30
relevant to the goals of the criminal process ....
If one finds this diagnosis convincing, as I do, then uniform
standards for guilty plea sentencing--that is, restrictions upon the
bargaining autonomy of the individual parties-become imperative. 331 The defendant can still play a role by ensuring that all
legally relevant factors are accurately ascertained. If this role seems
pale and insignificant, it is only because the factors that should influence the guilty plea concession ultimately are judged to be rather
few and rather easy to identify. Once the legally relevant inquiry,
however narrow, has been concluded, the defendant's only legitimate
influence upon the sentence has been exercised. By providing additional sources of leverage and autonomous action, the present plea
bargaining system affords not an avenue for appropriate participation, but rather simply a means for manipulation. The result is
not only to frustrate the criminal law's expressed goals, but also to
329 See text accompanying notes 185 and 206-07 supra.
330 Alschuler, Sentencing Reform, supra note 6, at 575.
331
An alternative, currently fashionable in the economic sphere, is to eschew
direct regulation of the terms and conditions of trade, but to effect structural changes
in such matters as information flow, barriers to entry, and the market power of
individual firms, so that results will more nearly approximate those of a free market
Until practical means can be developed for making analogous structural changes in
the plea bargaining system, more regulation rather than "deregulation" must remain
the answer.
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encourage among defendants both cynicism and disrespect for the
effectiveness of the legal order 332 at precisely the point at which
the opposite message should be forcefully conveyed.
I conclude that guilty plea guidelines would restrict effective
participation for only a relatively small group of defendants and
that reduction of their sense of influence and control is not undesirable. The dangers of dehumanization are nevertheless real.
Plea bargaining guidelines, particularly at their inception, must be
rather flexible ones, and the system's capacity to respond to any
relevant, openly identified circumstances must be stressed. The
specific proposal developed in this Article satisfies this requirement, 33 and other guilty plea guidelines proposals that include
comparable safety-valve features will likewise adequately preserve
the participatory dimension of procedural due process.
VI. CONCLUSION

In directing my attention to sentencing in the federal courts, I
have chosen to focus upon a single, comparatively well-managed
segment of American criminal justice. Sentencing disparities remain an urgent problem in the more than fifty other American
jurisdictions.
Several factors suggest that sentencing reform legislation might
not pose the same risk of aggravating disparities in the context of a
state court system as it does in the federal system. In some states,
plea agreements for a definite sentence probably are more common
than they seem to be in the federal courts, and judges there may
assert their sentencing authority less frequently and less forcefully
than do their federal counterparts. In such jurisdictions, guilty
plea sentencing may already be primarily a prosecutorial function,
and restrictions on judicial discretion might not transfer significant
additional power to the prosecutors. If so, control of judicial discretion could conceivably improve sentencing in contested cases
without making matters worse in guilty plea cases, even without
simultaneous limitations on prosecutorial sentencing power. Restraints on prosecutorial discretion would still remain essential, of
course, for addressing the core of the disparity problem.
352Professor Alschuler writes, "[pllea bargaining reinforces the view of
offenders who see the world as a network of processes and connections and who
assume that justice is all a matter of whom you know." He quotes a prominent
Chicago defense attorney as stating: "'Plea bargaining . . . encourages the defendant to believe that he has sold a commodity and that he has, in a sense, gotten
Alschuler, Book Review, 46 U. Car L. Thsv. 1007, 1041
away with something.'"
(1979) (C. Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice) (footnote omitted).
333 See text following note 236 supra.
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My proposal for limitation of prosecutorial sentencing power
contemplates sentencing guidelines that deemphasize factors within
prosecutorial control, charge-reduction guidelines that restrict
charge bargaining, and explicit criteria that regulate guilty plea
concessions. The proposal is in principle suitable for any state
system. Prospects for evasion of the plea bargaining controls must
be examined closely, however, in light of the procedure, traditions,
and personalities in particular jurisdictions.
Evasion may be a much more serious danger in state than in
federal courts. Federal prosecutions normally grow out of formal
investigations by either the F.B.I. or one of the many other federal
agencies with enforcement responsibilities. 334 These agencies cannot themselves impose criminal sanctions upon suspected violators.
They must refer the matter to the United States attorney for prosecution, he or she must agree to proceed, and paperwork is inevitably
generated. Informal bargaining by the investigating agency could
occur, particularly with respect to the possibility of a noncriminal
disposition, but covert agreements contemplating charge reduction
in exchange for a guilty plea to formal criminal charges would be
awkward and unstable at best.33 State prosecutions, in contrast,
most typically are triggered by an arrest at the scene of the crime.
If formal sentencing and plea bargaining standards were perceived
as inappropriate or inconvenient, offenders and the police probably
could avoid them by understandings implemented at or shortly after
arrest. This danger seems less acute when the defendant's conduct,
no matter how it would normally be characterized by the arresting
officer, would call for formal prosecution and a substantial prison
term. Nevertheless, the possibility of evasion and other problems
related to successful implementation of charge-reduction guidelines
in a specific state system plainly require careful analysis of the legal
and institutional particularities of the jurisdiction in question.
Criminal justice administration, for all its unique complexities,
is but one of many social processes capable of deflecting or defeating
well-intentioned, highly sophisticated efforts to promote change. I
have used sentencing procedure to illustrate some of the reasons
why it is not so easy to move from discretion to rule, or even from
unstructured discretion to structured discretion; why incremental
movement along these continuums may be unproductive or selfdefeating; and why an extraordinarily elaborate structure may be
the only sound alternative to no structure at all. I have also de834 See Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical
Study of Prosecutorlal Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1036, 1038-42 (1972).
335 See text accompanying notes 214-19 supra.
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scribed how the elaborate "rule of law" approach, even if feasible,
raises the further question whether added visibility and more formal
procedure can, under such highly structured conditions, produce
wiser policy and more satisfactory possibilities for participation by
affected parties. My answer with respect to sentencing procedure is,
with some qualifications, affirmative. The same inquiry could usefully be pursued across a wide range of regulatory and private law
subjects. 8 6 We await the understanding of law, administration,
and politics, and of their diverse interactions, that will permit aspirations for social change to be pursued confidently and without
unpleasant surprises.
836 A provocative example of such an inquiry is Mnookin & Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(1979).
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APPENDIX
I. Model Charge-Reduction Guidelines
II.

Model Sentencing Guidelines38 7
A. Guideline Table: Presumptive Sentences
B. Notes to the Guideline Table
C. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors3 38
D. Computation of Salient Factor Score
I. MODEL CHARGE-RFDUCTION GuIDELINES

A. When any plea agreement described in rule 1l(e)(1)(A) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is submitted for the court's approval pursuant to rule 1l(e)(2), the court shall require the attorney for
the government to disclose the considerations thought to warrant dismissal of any charges pursuant to the plea agreement. Such disclosure
shall be made in open court on the record, except as provided in
paragraph B(4).
B. In determining whether to accept or reject such plea agreement,
the court shall be guided by the following principles:
(1) The savings of time and expense for witnesses, the parties,
and the court resulting from disposition by guilty plea shall not justify
the dismissal of any pending charges. The sentencing guidelines provide
for a sentencing adjustment that gives appropriate weight to this
consideration.
(2) Ambiguities of fact or difficulties of proof that raise a
question concerning factual guilt shall not justify dismissal of any
pending charges.
(a) If the government concludes that there is no reasonable
doubt concerning factual guilt and the defense disputes this position,
337ne proposed sentencing guidelines were adapted from guidelines in use
by the United States Parole Commission in parole release decisions. See 28 C.F.R.
§2.20 (1979). To permit stricter limitations on discretion, additional offense and
offender categories were introduced, and the punishment presumptively indicated
for each category was restricted to a narrower range. (The guidelines developed
here are also more refined, in these respects, than an earlier proposal I presented in
2 FEDmAL SmNTENci= REFoRm, supra note 52, at 98-102.) I stress that I have
not addressed any of the many substantive judgments implicit in the Parole
Commission's guidelines: severity levels, the relative seriousness of different offenses,
and the factors used to rate the offender's background all follow or roughly
approximate the approaches adopted by the Commission. By including these
approaches in the model guidelines, I do not in any sense suggest that these
substantive judgments are the ideal ones. I claim only that the guidelines provide
an appropriate framework within which these or plausible competing policy choices
may be expressed.
338 The statement of these factors was adapted from those developed by the
California Judicial Council. See CAL. B. 421, 423.
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the charge-reduction agreement shall be rejected and the dispute shall
be resolved by trial.
(b) If the government concludes that there is a reasonable
doubt with respect to factual guilt on any charge, it may move for
dismissal of that charge under rule 48(a). Such motion shall not be
contingent upon the defendant's plea with respect to any remaining
charges, and if any such motion is granted, the court shall enter an
order continuing for at least seven days any proceeding involving the
defendant's decision whether to tender a guilty plea to any remaining
charges.
(3) If the availability or admissibility of significant evidence is
substantially in doubt, for reasons not related to factual guilt, the court
shall accept the plea agreement to the extent that it provides for
reduction of the charges by one level of seriousness.*
(4) If the defendant has agreed, upon acceptance of the plea
agreement, to cooperate in the investigation and/or prosecution of other
persons, and if the attorney for the government certifies that such
cooperation is expected to be of significant value and cannot be obtained
by other means, the court shall accept the plea agreement to the extent
that it provides for reduction of the charges by one level of seriousness.*
The justification set forth in this paragraph may, in unusual cases, be
presented to the court in camera under seal, but such justification shall
remain part of the record. The charge reduction authorized by this
paragraph shall be in addition to any charge reduction authorized
pursuant to paragraph (3).
C. In determining the sentence to be imposed following conviction
pursuant to any plea agreement described in paragraph B(3) or (4),
the court shall also give to the guilty plea the weight specified in the
sentencing guidelines.
D. The court may, in the interests of justice, accept a plea agreement
in circumstances not authorized by paragraph B, or reject a plea
agreement required to be accepted by paragraph B, but in any such case
the court shall state in open court, for the record, its reasons for
departure from the principles set forth in paragraph B and shall submit
a copy of that statement to the sentencing commission on the form
prescribed for this purpose.
E. Except pursuant to a plea agreement formally disclosed to the
court as required by rule 1l(e)(2), the attorney for the government shall
not agree either to refrain from presenting any charge or to seek dismissal
of any pending charge on the condition that the defendant plead guilty
to any other federal charge. The court shall ensure compliance with
rule 11(e)(2) and with this paragraph by appropriate scrutiny of the
circumstances surrounding any indictment or information on related
charges filed subsequent to the defendant's arraignment.
*When multiple charges are pending, the court may dismiss any charge or

charges to the extent that such dismissal has the effect of decreasing the potential
punishment by an amount not to exceed 25%of the penalty prescribed for the most
serious offense committed. If the court approves a dismissat or reduction in grade
that reduces by one seriousness level the most serious offense charged, the court
may not in addition approve the dismissal of any other charges pursuant to this
paragraph.
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II. MODEL SENTENCING GUmDENES

A. Guideline Table: Presumptive Sentences
(Time to be served indicated in months; "non-inc." indicates
a non-incarcerative sanction is to be imposed.)
Offense characteristics: severity of
offense behavior (examples)
LOW
Escape (open institution or program (i.e.,
CTC, work release)-absent less than
7 days) ...........................
Alcohol law violations .................
Counterfeit currency (passing/possession
less than $1,000) ....................
Immigration law violations .............
Income tax evasion (less than $10,000) ...
Property offenses (forgery/fraud/theft from
mail/embezzlement/interstate transportation of stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen property) less than $1,000 ...
LOW MODERATE
Bribery of a public official (offering or
accepting) .........................
Counterfeit currency (passing/possession
$1,000 to $19,999) ..................
Escape (secure program or institution, or
absent 7 days or more-no force or threat
used) ..............................
Firearms Act, possession/purchase/sale (single weapon-not sawed-off shotgun or
machine gun) .......................
Income tax evasion ($10,000 to $49,999) ..

Offender characteristics:
(salient factor score)
Very
Very
Good Good Fair Poor Poor
12-10
9-7 6-5
4-3
2-0

nonInc.

noninc.

noninc.

8
mo.

13
mO.

18
24
mO. mo.

10
mO.

16
mO.

22
ma.

28
mO.

6
mo.

11
mo.

16
mo.

Mailing threatening communication(s) ....

Misprision of felony ....................
Property offenses (theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate transportation of
stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen
property) $1,000 to $19,999 ..........
Smuggling/transporting of alien(s) .......
Theft of motor vehicle (not multiple theft
or for resale) ......................
MODERATE
Counterfeit currency (passing/possession
$20,000 to $100,000) ..............
Explosives, possession/transportation ......
Firearms
Act, possession/purchase/sale
(sawed-off shotgun(s), machine gun(s),
or multiple weapons) ................
Income Tax Evasion ($50,000 to $100,000)
Mann Act (no force-commercial purposes)
Theft of motor vehicle for resale ........
Property offenses (theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate transportation of
stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen
property) $20,000 to $100,000 ..........

38
mO.
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II. MODEL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Continued)
A- Guideline Table: Presumptive Sentences (continued)
(Time to be served indicated in months; "non-inc." indicates
a non-incarcerative sanction is to be imposed.)
Offender characteristics:
(salient factor score)

Offense characteristics: severity of

Very
Very
Good Good Fair Poor Poor
12-10 9-7 6-5 4-3 2-0

offense behavior (examples)
HIGH

-

Counterfeiting (manufacturing) .........
Income Tax Evasion (over $100,000) .....
Property offenses (theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate transportation of

18
mO.

24
mO.

31
mo.

42
mO.

52
mO.

24
mO.

32
mO.

40
mO.

54
mO.

66
mO.

36
mO.

44
mO.

52
mO.

66
mO.

80
mO.

stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen
property) over $100,000 but not exceeding $500,000 ........................

VERY HIGH
Robbery (weapon or threat) ............
Breaking and entering (bank or post office

entry or attempted entry to vault) ......

Extortion .............................
Mann Act (force) .....................
Property offenses (exceeding $500,000) ...
GREATEST I.
Aggravated felony (e.g., robbery, sexual act,
aggravated assault)-weapon fired or
personal injury ......................
Explosives (detonation) ................
Sexual act (force) .....................

1
I

J

GREATEST II.
Aircraft hijacking .....................
Espionage ............................
Kidnapping ...........................

Willful homicide ......................

(Greater
than are
above-however
to
not given ruespeciic ranges
'

the limited number of cases and the
extreme variations in severity pos-

sible within the category)

B. Notes to the Guideline Table
1. If an offense behavior can be classified under more than one
category, the most serious applicable category is to be used.
2. If the sentencing judge finds that one or more of the aggravating
factors specified in section C of these guidelines are present, and that
these aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors determined
to be present, the sentence prescribed for the applicable guideline
category may be increased by not more than 20% of the prescribed
sentence, or by not more than six months, whichever limit is the lower.
If the sentencing judge finds that one or more of the mitigating factors
specified in section C of these guidelines are present, and that these
mitigating factors outweigh any aggravating factors determined to be
present, the sentence prescribed for the applicable guideline category
may be reduced by not more than 20% of the prescribed sentence, or
by not more than six months, whichever limit is the lower.
3. Aggravating and mitigating factors not specified in section C
of these guidelines may not be relied upon as a basis for departure from

1980]
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sentences prescribed in the guideline table, unless the court finds that
the factor is one that rarely arises and that was not adequately taken into
consideration in the formulation of these guidelines.
4. In the case of a defendant convicted of multiple offenses committed at different times, an incremental penalty shall be imposed as
follows:
(a) the base penalty shall be that prescribed for the most
serious offense committed;
(b) the base penalty shall be increased by 50% of the penalty
prescribed for the second most serious offense committed;
(c) the penalty indicated by paragraph (b) shall be increased
by 25% of the penalty prescribed for the third most serious offense
committed;
(d) any penalties imposed other than for the first three most
serious offenses shall run concurrently with the penalty indicated by
paragraph (c).
For purposes of this note 4, offenses shall not be deemed committed at "different times" if they are part of the same transaction, even
if the transaction extends over several months or years, or if they
involve offenses' of the same general character committed in separate
transactions involving the same offender(s) and the same victim(s).
C. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
1. Circumstances in Aggravation include the fact that:
(1) The crime involved great bodily harm, threat of great bodily
harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty or callousness.
(2) The defendant was armed with a weapon at the time of the
commission of the crime.
(3) The victim was particularly vulnerable.
(4) The crime involved multiple victims.
(5) The defendant induced others to participate in the crime or
occupied a position of leadership of or dominance over other participants
in its commission.
(6) The defendant threatened witnesses, suborned perjury, or in any
other way illegally interfered with the judicial process.
(7) The planning or sophistication with which the crime was carried
out, or other facts, indicate premeditation.
(8) The defendant involved minors in the commission of the crime.
(9) The defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense.
2, Circumstances in Mitigation include:
(a) Facts relating to the crime, including the fact that:
(1) The defendant was a passive participant or played a minor role
in the crime.
(2) The victim was an initiator, willing participant, or provoker of
the incident.
(3) The defendant participated in the crime under circumstances
of coercion or duress, or the conduct was partially excusable for some
other reason not amounting to a defense.
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(4) The defendant believed he had a claim or right to the property
taken, or for other reasons mistakenly believed the conduct was legal.
(5) The defendant was motivated by a desire to provide necessities
for his family or himself.
(b) Facts relating to the defendant, including the fact that:
(1) The defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition
that significantly reduced his culpability for the crime.
(2) The defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing prior to
arrest or at an early stage of the criminal process.
(3) The defendant made restitution to the victim.
D. Computation of Salient Factor Score
Salient Factor Score
Item A ......................................................
No prior convictions (adult or juvenile) = 2
1 prior conviction = 1
2 or more prior convictions = 0

]

Item B ......................................................
No prior incarcerations (adult or juvenile) -- 2
1 or 2 prior incarcerations = 1
3 or more prior incarcerations = 0
Item C ......................................................
Age at first commitment was 26 or older
25 or younger =

LI
=

1

0

Item D ......................................................
Commitment offense did not involve auto theft or check(s)

=

1

Otherwise = 0

Item E ......................................................
Has never had parole revoked nor been committed for a new
offense while on parole, and not a probation violator this
time =: 1
Otherwise = 0
Item F ......................................................
No history of heroin or opiate dependence
Otherwise =

1

0

Item G ......................................................
Verified employment (or full-time school attendance) for a total
of at least 6 months during the last 2 years in the community = 1
Otherwise =

0

Item H ......................................................
Plea of guilty or nolo = 3
Otherwise = 0
Total score ..........................

Li

